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This thesis describes the realities of the military
industry in the key countries of the former Communist Bloc
(FCB) and their perspective on the role that military exports
plays in their political and economic structures.
Furthermore, the thesis asserts that, because future arms
transfers will be of increasing technological sophistication
the United States' ability to exercise political and military
options in international affairs may be limited.
Finally, the thesis proposes a solution to the problem
noted above by arguing for a series of changes to the CoCom
structure that will combine the particular demands of the
evolving FCB states with the dynamics of the world arms
market. In doing this, the thesis proposes a new conceptual
framework for CoCom as well as specific actions to reduce the
deleterious effects of arms sales from the FCB.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On May 4, 1990, CoCom announced that when Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary established the export control
systems they had promised, CoCom would lift its trade
sanctions. The same arrangements were extended to Russia and
Ukraine in November, 1992. Not only were the sanctions to be
lifted, but these five countries were also offered "more
favorable treatment" if they complied with CoCom guidelines.
CoCom required that these countries establish a system to
control exports on certain commodities and technologies. The
system was based on its own Western framework where each
country was required to control a number of sensitive
technologies and commodities on CoCom's three lists: the
Industrial Core List, the International Atomic Energy List,
and the International Munitions List.
To date only Hungary has responded favorably to the offer
and was removed from the CoCom proscribed list on February 10,
1992. The central question is then: why, if the same offer
has been made to these different countries, has only Hungary
established a system that complies with the CoCom
principles?
If the external pressure on each of the other countries
has been the same, and yet they have acted differently, then
V
perhaps there are internal factors in each country that carry
more weight. These endogenous factors would be more resilient
to change than exogenous factors that can be influenced
through a sanctions policy. An examination of these different
internal factors will explain what has prevented each of the
remaining five countries from following CoCom's preferred
course. The central question is answered by examining
internal factors relating to social, political, and economic
issues that may have played a greater role in the adoption of
the export control measures in Hungary than external factors
that were responsive to policies of conditionality.
The method of examination used in the study is Alexander
George's focused comparison method. The results of the
research are depicted in the table below. (Comparative Matrix)
These results outline the internal factors, which are far
beyond the scope of a policy of conditionality, Lhat have been
the determining factors in shaping export control measures.
In light of these findings, this study recommends two
mechanisms to limit the impact of conventional arms
proliferation from the Former Communist Bloc (FCB). First the
U.S. should pursue a policy of coopting the arms industries in
these countries. The U.S. could then develop a positive
relationship with the arms producing countries of the FCB and
gain the ability influence the arms export policies through a
vi
cooperation rather than direction. This approach is
potentially as effective and does not have the cost associated
with perceived hypocrisy or confrontation. Cooptation
recognizes the domestic considerations inherent in arms export
measures and the differing stages of development in the FCB.
In is particularly effective with countries who are determined
to maintain a defense industry for national security needs.
The second method is an approach that shifts from
controlling arms exports to expanded monitoring of arms
exports. The national security challenge associated with
controlling arms transfers is that it has the effect of
driving these transfers underground. - If the emphasis is
shifted away from the controlling arms transfers to monitoring
them it gives the U.S. the opportunity to respond to a dynamic
security environment.
vii
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1. The Issue Examined
As the Soviet Union emerged as a threat to Western
interests at the beginning of the Cold War CoCom (the
Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) was established
with the principal purpose of denying access to western
technology and thereby slowing weapons development in the
Soviet bloc.' Throughout the Cold War many policies in the
West made the linkage between responsible actions on the part
of the Soviet bloc into either the carrot of favorable
treatment or the stick of sanctions. The general goal of
these policies was to bring the former communist bloc into the
mainstream of the world community; the actual collapse of
Communism was normally outside of their context. In 1989
Communism collapsed in East/Central Europe and the countries
there not only promised to be responsible actors in the world
but also sought a larger framework for inclusion in the West.
As the world changed in 1989, CoCom made the transformation
from a simple denial regime to one that would offer access to
technologies and commodities as long as certain requirements
were met.
I
On May 4, 1990, CoCom announced that when
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary established the export
control systems they had promised, CoCom would lift its trade
sanctions. Not only were the sanctions to be lifted, but
these three countries were also offered "more favorable
treatment" if they complied with CoCom guidelines.2
CoCom required that these countries establish
a system to control exports on certain commodities and
technologies. 3  The system was based on its own Western
framework where each country was required to control a number
of sensitive technologies and commodities on CoCom's three
lists: the Industrial Core List, the International Atomic
Energy List, and the International Munitions List. The
management of the system had to have a process of registering
(licensing) firms engaged in foreign trade, and finally an
export permit (license) review process for each transaction.'
The system had two further principles: 1) a legal basis for
its implementation, and 2) an administrative structure in the
government to manage the system.
Access to the items on the Industrial Core List
and the International Atomic Energy List were critical to the
economic growth of all three of these countries. In 1989
these countries were not as concerned with acquiring items on
the International Munitions List but they all had industries
capable of building and exporting these items. Therefore,
2
CoCom required not only the control of both the reexport and
use of items they wished to acquire but also the control of
items for which they had the potential to export like complete
weapons systems.
In November, 1992 much the same offer was made
by CoCom to Russia and Ukraine. 5  To date only Hungary has
responded favorably to the offer and was removed from the
CoCom proscribed list on February 10, 1992.6 The central
question is then; why, if the same offer has been made to
these different countries has only Hungary been able to
establish a system that complies with the CoCom principles.
2. The Theory of Conditionality
The "carrot" and "stick" approach has been applied
to all five (six, now that Czechoslovakia has split into the
Czech Republic and Slovakia) countries on a fairly equal
basis. 7  One may argue that Russia and Ukraine have had
relatively little time to respond to the offer, but what has
prevented Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia from
following through with their earlier plans? All six have been
brought into the CoCom Cooperation Forum on Export Controls
and numerous efforts have been taken to instruct them on
exactly what the requirements are for an export control system
and removal from the proscribed list.
Some have concluded that the conditional sanctions
were effective in the case of Hungary and that the proper
3
course of action is to leave them in place against Poland,
Russia, Ukraine and now the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Following the theory that conditionality is effective; these
five remaining countries should eventually establisn the
desired export control systems. This paper intends to show,
however, that in fact the Hungarian case is quite unique,
indicating that a thorough understanding of social, political,
and economic conditions which shape export controls may well
point out that there are problems with the theory of
conditionality.
3. Mypothesls
The thesis will argue that interna.. factors relating
to social, political, and economic issues played a greater
role in the adoption of the export control measures in Hungary
than external factors that were responsive to policies of
conditionality. If the externail pressure on each of the
countries has been the same, and they have acted differently,
then perhaps there are internal factors that carry more
weight. These endogenous factors would then be more resilient
to change than exogenous factors that can be influenced
through a sanctions policy. An examination of these different
internal factors will explain what has prevented each of the
remaining five countries from following CoCom's preferred
course.
4
This is not to say that the events outside of
Hungary did not play a significant role; the events of 1989
had as large an impact there as anywhere. It is rather an
examination of why Hungary was different prior to 1989, how
the changes of that year uniquely affected Hungary, and how
all this led to Hungary erecting an arms control system that
was able to fit into the COCOM guidelines.
B. THE METHODOLOGY
1. The Method Used
The general methodology used in the study is the
Focused Comparison method. 8  Using Hungary as a hypothesis
generating case, four other countries are compared to Hungary;
two that are most similar ind two least similar. The two
cases most similar to Hungary are Poland and Czechoslovakia
and the two least similar cases are Ukraine and Russia. 9
a. Hungary as the Hypothesis Generating Case
On February 10, 1992 CoCom removed Hungary from
the proscribed list.'0 This is the critical factor that sets
Hungary apart from the other countries in the study. All have
indicated a willingness to adopt the kind of system that CoCom
requires, and yet in every case except Hungary they have been
unable to do so. Therefore the first step in developing a
comparative study is to lay out the base case against which
all the other studies will be focused, and from which the
5
hypothesis can be generated. The country that displays the
most similar pattern to Hungary will likely be the country
that is closest to adopting the same kind of measures.
b. Rationale for the Most Similar Cases
(1) The Three Darlings of the West. For some
people there is the sense that the border of western
civilization has extended no further east than the eastern
edge of the Carolingian Empire of the early ninth century.
The line takes a few turns east then west on its way down to
the Julian and Karavenke Alps, but those living east of that
line are considered by many to still be outside the community
of Europe. The Polish author, Czeslaw Milosz, describes this
feeling that Eastern Europe in general has been, and continues
to be, kept out of the western club. "Undoubtedly I would
call Europe my home, but it was a home that refused to
acknowledge itself as a whole; instead, as if on the strength
of some self-imposed taboo, it classified its population into
two categories: members of the family (quarrelsome but
respectable) and poor relations.""
During the comunuist period there was a
convenient wall and the West Europeans did not have to think
much about their "poor relations." Now that the wall has
collapsed there are more subtle means employed to keep Europe
separated. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, an institution established to aid Eastern
6
Europe, has spent twice as much on itself than it has
disbursed in loans to the struggling countries in East
Europe." 2
In this regard the countries of Central
Europe are different than the rest of Eastern Europe, to
include Russia and Ukraine. It was not by accident that the
initial offer by CoCom was made first to Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. These three countries of Central Europe have
been treated differently than the rest of the Soviet Bloc
throughout the cold war. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia
were the darlings of the West and efforts to separate them
from the Soviet Bloc were the most forceful and concentrated.
It was only natural that the expectation in each of these
countries for inclusion in the West was very high in late
1989.
(2) Shared Experiences during the Communist
Period. The cases defined as most similar have the shared
experience of the Soviet period. Each was subjected to the
process of Satellization and Sovietization, each was affected
by the changes associated with perestroika and each escaped
the Soviet bloc at about the same time in late 1989 and early
1990. The revolutions that swept Central Europe in 1989 had
many common roots and since they had all been held in the
Soviet camp by force, once the threat of force was removed
they all broke away at the same time. 13 More specific to the
7
arms industry there was a two phase process that radically
changed the dynamics of military production and arms exports
in these countries. The first phase (1986-1989) was linked to
the general policies of perestroika that radically altered the
internal and external relations of the Soviet Union, the
eastern bloc and the rest of the world. The second phase
(1990-1991) is connected with the collapse of the socialist
system throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the
substantive change that occurred in the political, military
and economic ties between these countries."'
(3) Direction of the Defense Industry by the
CMEA. The final thread that ties the similar cases together
is the overt direction of the defense industries in these
countries by the Soviet Union through the mechanism of the
CMEA. Two key factors combined between 1947 and 1950 to shape
the future of the defense industries in Central Europe. First
was the process of Sovietization in Central Europe which began
in earnest in 1947. It was at this point that all of these
countries were forced to subordinate their military-industrial
programs to the Soviet program.15 The armaments industries in
these countries developed over the course of next forty years
under the supervision of the Military-Industrial Commission of
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance where the Soviet
Union directed a division of labor between these states that
would shape the industries in these countries up to the
8
present day."6 The second factor that has shaped the
structure of the armaments-industry in Central Europe was the
outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Prior to this the only
industry to speak of that had survived World War II was
located on the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia; after 1950 the
intense armaments building efforts began in southern Poland
and throughout the Vdg River valley in Slovakia. The
armaments industry which the Soviets seized control of in 1947
grew at an intense rate between 1950 and 1956, thus setting
the foundation for the structure of the industry that exists
today.
c. Rationale for the Least Similar Cases
(1) The view of the Soviet Union as a monolith
was the driving factor in placing Ukraine and Russia in a
category separate from the other countries in the study. The
history of strong state control of daily life, the obsession
with secrecy, the cultural norm of believing that one person's
gain can only be realized at the expense of someone else all
have subtle but important influences on the adoption of arms
control legislation. These aspects of the patchwork of the
cultural and political blanket of Soviet and Russian life were
absent in the Central European states.
(2) A second defining difference between the
Central European states and Russia/Ukraine was the internal
direction of the defense industry. The degree of
9
interdependence between Russian and Ukrainian arms production
firms far exceeded the level of influence that Military-
Industrial Commission of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance had on the arms industries of Central Europe. The
difference in this relationship has resulted in the Central
European arms producers having a better appreciation of their
ability to compete in the international arms market. On the
other hand, the scale and diversity of arms production in
Russia and Ukraine has lead to a misunderstanding (even
utopian view) of the ability to sell arms.
2. The Questions Applied
The following is a listing of the questions that
were asked of each of the cases in order to establish a
controlled comparison.
a. Pertaining to Social Factors
What are the internal social factors that are
correlated with the implementation of an export control
system? In order to determine this three specific questions
were asked of each country.
(1) (Question S-1] Did the social legacy of the communist
period allow for a relatively smooth transiticn period?
(2) [Question S-2] Was the demand for a strong social safety
net relatively high?
(ý) [Question S-3] Were the prospects and initial hopes for
full integration with Western Europe relatively high?
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b. Pertaining to Political Factors
What are the political factors that have
contributed to the adoption of export control measures? Three
questions are asked of each country in order to operationalize
these factors.
(1) [Question P-l Were the structural impediments to the
legislative process, in the transition period, relatively
high?
(2) [Question P-2] Were political interest groups, for
example defense industry workers, influential in the debate
over these questions?
(3) [Question P-3] Do the national security objectives
dictate the maintenance of a domestic military industrial
base?
c. Pertaining to Economic Factors
The most complex, and perhaps the most telling,
set of factors are the economic antecedents that correlate
with the size and structure of the domestic defense industry.
To make a comparative assessment, four basic questions, with
some specific variations, were posed for each case. For
example, due to the influence of the Soviet Union, military as
well as civilian production went on in the same factory so
that production could be easily expanded in time of war."7
(This is why there are such odd names as the Weapons and Gas
Appliance factory in Hungary.) However, the balance between
military production and civilian plants varied between each
country in general and among different plants in each country.
Even in the best of circumstances the chances of successfully
ii
converting a defense plant are daunting. As one conversion
expert put it "You can build tractors on a tank production
line, and it will look like a tractor, but it will cost as
much as a tank." Therefore, the relative ease in converting
each industry varied from case to case. The economic
questions to be asked in each case are:
(1) [Question E-1] Were the prospects for converting the
defense industry relatively high?
(a) [Question E-l.a] Were defense industry firms already
in the process of production conversion in 1989?
(b) [Question E-l.b] Did the production possibilities for
individual firms allow for the shifting of resources?
(2) (Question E-2] Was export specialization in military
hardware relatively high?
(3) [Question E-3] Was there a relatively high degree of
autonomy in the defense industry?
(a) [Question E-3.a] Was domestic research prior to 1989
relatively high?
(b) (Question E-3.b] Were there a relatively large number
of defense products of original design?
(c) [Question E-3.c] Is there a relatively strong move
toward cooperation with Western firms?
(4) [Question E-4] Was the outlook on exports in 1989
relatively good?
(a) [Question E-4.a] Did they have export potential in
expanding markets as early as 1990 i.e. the Far East of Middle
East?
(b) (Question E-4.b] Did the prospects for exports rise
over time?
12
3. The Anticipated Kodel
Table I-1 is a graphic depiction of the anticipated
model for a country that is able to quickly respond to CoCom, s
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H. PROLOGUE: DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS
MARKET
A. NOT THE END OF HISTORY FOR THE ARMS MARKET
It is not the end of history for the arms market. The
transfer of arms between countries will continue because of
the legitimate role they play in national security and because
of the dynamics of technological innovation. Others have put
it more plainly that,
despite all the western public anger and outcry
concerning the perceived destabilising effects of
the modern global arms market in the light of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and for all the
political initiatives and government activity which
followed it, we are not going to see any
fundamental increase on the restrictions placed
upon the 'core' of the arms trade ... from the
developed to the less developed world.'
Weapons are a legitimate tool used by the state to
provide for its own security. Many argue that the transfer of
arms must stop because they lead to regional instabilities and
promote regional arms races. While neither of these are
desirable phenomena the arguments do not address the
fundamental question of how a country that has a legitimate
need for arms, acquires arms if it does not produce them.
Regional instabilities and arms races aside, the state
must also respond to the dynamics brought about simply by
technological change. Desert Storm was the watershed event
16
for the world's recognition of the impact of sophiisticated
conventional arms. What Desert Storm showed the rest of the
world was that quality, in terms of the technical
sophistication, of conventional arms could greatly make up for
shortfalls in quantity. Desert Storm created a resurgent
demand for, among other things, night vision technology,
battlefield information systems, countermeasures against
advanced guided precision munitions, and advanced surface-to-
air missiles
Though global demand for military hardware has clearly
been on a downward course since 1985, and more dramatically
since 1989, the market has become even increasingly dynamic
since during the same period. 2  The steep decline in total
world arms transfers is almost matched by the reduced sales
for the two major arms suppliers, the United States and the
former Soviet Union alone. (See Appendix B)
The story of declining arms sales is different, however,
for the Tier II suppliers; of the ten leading arms suppliers
after the U.S. and U.S.S.R, sales actually increased from 1985
to 1989 for four countries. (See Appendix B) In an annual
report prepared by the congressional research service a number
of regions were projected as growing markets for arms,
including the middle east and south-east Asia. 3
At the same time that demand has dropped, the supply side
of the market has also become increasingly globalized and
17
those customers that remain active in the market are, more
often than not, required to pay cash for their military
hardware. Because the industries in the former communist bloc
do have comparative advantage in certain areas they have an
opportunity to compete with inexpensive and reliable
equipment.
B. THE CHALLENGE OF "COUNTRY X"
This changing nature of the international arms market
presents an interesting problem for western, and specifically
U.S., security planners. The current administration is basing
military force structure on being able to fight and win two
"nearly simultaneous" major regional conflicts. The Bottom Up
Review included "Country X" as a planning scenario to
represent the unforeseen and unplanned conflict that is almost
certain to pose a security threat in the future. The ability
t6 deal with "Country X" will be largely dependent on
defeating the military hardware that it will be able to
procure from abroad. The question is, where does "Country X"
buy its arms and how sophisticated are they likely to be?
C. A BETTER DIFFEENT KIND OF WEAPON
One of the greatest sources of military hardware in the
world today is the defense industrial base of the Former
Communist Bloc (FCB). For almost forty years these countries
invested considerable intellectual capital into the specific
18
problems of combatting "western" military technology. Many of
the weapons were produced with a completely different design
philosophy than the hardware developed in the West.
Innovations like reactive armor were designed to neutralize
the western advantages like their predominance in precision
guided munitions. Their success was effectively limited by
restricting open access to "western" technological
innovations; in this role CoCom was quite successful.
Since the end of the bi-polar world the restrictions on
technology transfer have been severely weakened. Weapons
systems, developed in the FCB, that combine the philosophy of
countering western advantages combined with greater access to
technology could present a serious problem five to ten years
into the future. This problem is more acute if the
international community is forced to deal with these weapons
while attempting to intervene in a future regional conflict.
Imagine the problems for military planners facing a
hostile country equipped with the Polish PT-91, the Russian
KH-31 and the Czech Tamara. The Polish tank is being produced
not only for the Polish army but also for export, as is the
KH-31. The PT-91 is a modernized version of the Russian T-72
built in Poland through Russian license. There are a number
of domestic improvements like reactive armor and a laser
detection array that can warn the crew if it is being targeted
by a laser rangefinder or designator. These improvements make
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the tank more capable in countering precision guided
munitions.'
The Russian KH-31 air-to-air missile or "AWACS Killer"
is specifically designed to track and destroy airborne command
and control platforms.S Though the Czech Republic has no
intention to buy them, the Czech designed and produced TAMARA
radar system, which is reportedly capable of defeating stealth
technology, has also been offered for export.6
The West has two options in dealing with this problem.
First, it can continue with a policy of attempting to control
arms transfers even though, as this thesis a.empts to show,
this policy may be ineffective as well as costly. The second
approach, discussed in the conclusion, is a policy of coopting
the defense industries in the FCB and broadening arms transfer
transparency.
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IU. THE HYPOTHESIS GENERATING CASE STUDY
A. HUNGARY
Hungary first erected an export control system in early
1990 in an atmosphere of radical change and hope for the
future. The revolutions of 1989 had finally given them the
opportunity to become a fully integrated member of the
European community. The separation between East and West,
brought on by Soviet domination of the eastern block, had come
to an end and now was the chance to become united with the
rest of Europe. Full integration meant that Hungary could
solve one of its most pressing and longstanding problems; that
of ethnic Hungarians outside the borders. For if all of
Europe was united, as in the West, then borders would begin to
melt away and the Hungarian people would no longer be
separated as in the Europe of Trianon. This is the context of
Hungary's decision to erect this system, a reasonable choice
to show that Hungary could establish the same legal framework
as the community to which it aspired.
The complete intogzition of Europe would prove difficult
to achieve, and Hungary's irredentist problem would not simply
melt away. Instead of becoming a member of a larger and
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richer community Hungary would soon have the sense of being
alone and isolated. Had this been the context in which the
export control system been examined it is questionable as to
whether the timing of the decision, or even the decision
itself, would have been the same.
1. Export Control Measures in Hungary
CoCom removed Hungary from the proscribed list on
the 10th of February 1992. The principal reason was that
Hungary had erected an arms transfer control system that, in
the view of COCOM, was sufficiently stringent. What was
behind Hungary's actions? What has set her apart from her
immediate neighbors Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
countries who received the offer form CoCom at the same time
and are similar to Hungary in many respects, but who have yet
to erect such a system? The decision to erect this system,
and the process of arriving at this decision must be viewed in
a social, political and economic framework that is specific to
Hungary. Before those aspects can be examined, however, it is
necessary to understand the specific structure of Hungary's
export control system, the chronological sequence of its
development, and the inmnediate background of the decision
process behind it in Hungary.
a. Review of Control Measures
The current "Hungarian Export Control Regime"
covers all items on COCOM's three lists as well as material,
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equipment and technology controlled by the Australia Group (a
list of dual use chemical and biological precursor materials,
equipment and technology), the MTCR (Missile Technology
Control Regime) and the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group).'
There are four tenants of the Hungarian export
control regime, which has as a western model as its base.
These four tenants are a legal basis for the system itself, an
administrative structure in the government to manage the
system, a process of registering (licensing) firms engaged in
foreign trade, and finally an export permit (license) review
process for each transaction.
The principle document governing the system is
Government Decree No. 61/1990. (X.1.) which has its legal basis
in sections 16 and 18 of the Customs Act and section 29 of the
Foreign Trade Act. The measure was adopted in October of 1990
and in its original form it included only the CoCom Industrial
Core List. Most of the measure passed since that time have
been amendments to 61/1990 in which they adding the various
lists of other export control regimes, like the International
Atomic Energy List. 2
The second principle of the export control
regime, the government administrative structure, has two
parts. The first part is the Export Control Office which
manages the day to day affairs and is subordinated to the
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. The provisions for
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this office are outlined in 61/1990. The second part is the
Interministerial Committee which has final approval for both
registering firms and granting export permits. The committee
structure was established by Government Decree No.
48/1991. (111.27.); in its original form committee included the
Minister of the Interior, the Minister of National Defense,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of International
Economic Relations, and the Minister Without Portfolio
Responsible for National Security (who is in practice the
chief of all the intelligence services) The original
structure of the committee was amended later to include the
Minister of Industry and Trade. 4
The third tenant requires that all export
firms, whether brokerage firms or actual production
enterprises, register with the Office of Export Control.
Their "license" to conduct trade activities is subject to the
approval of the interministerial committee. Finally a review
process is conducted for each transaction which takes two
forms. The first form is somewhat automatic, general export
permits may be obtained for the purpose of exhibiting items,
or returning them for repair. These general permits may also
be issued for specific items traded regularly in specific
quantities. All other transactions must be submitted to the
Office of Export Control which follows the general guidelines
of the interministerial committee, or in the absence of clear
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guidelines submits requests for export permit to the committee
for approval.
The legal provisions of the system also provide
for police enforcement of the regulations and punishment for
its violations. Table 1.1 outlines the most significant
measures taken by the government in chronological sequence.
Table 1-1
Chronology of Hungarian Export Control Measures
March Customs Act The enforcement
1966 provisions of Govt.Decree No. 61/1990.
(X.1.) is based on
sections 16 and 18 of
this act.
June Foreign Trade Act The legal basis for
1974 Govt. Decree No.
61/1990. (X.1.) is
based on section 29 of
this act.
January Govt. Decree No. 2/1986. Establishes licensing
1986 (1.19.) of nuclear export andimport.
February Grosz Government This announcement was
1990 announces export controls made after the firstfor military items. round of elections had






May CoCom offers to take
1990 Hungary off the
proscribed list.
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October Govt. Decree No. 61/1990. Establishes the legal1990 (X. I.) basis for export
controls. In its
original form it
included only theCoCom Industrial CoreList.
February Govt. Decree No. 48/1991. Establishes the inter-1991 (111.27.) ministerial committeethat will oversee
export controls.
May Govt. Decree No. 66/1991. Amends 48/1991: adds
1991 V.21.) the Minister ofIndustry and Trade to
the Committee of
experts.
November Govt. Decree No. Amends 61/1990:
1991 143/1991. (XI.8) revises CoCom core




December Govt. Decree 152/1991. Amends 61/1990:
1991 (XII. 6.) updates theInternational Atomic
Energy List in 2/1986.
February CoCom removes Hungary
1992 from the proscribed list.
April Govt. Decree No. 62/1992. Amends 61/1990: adds
1992 (IV. 4.) CoCom InternationalAtomic Energy List.
April Govt. Decree No. 66/1992. Amends 61/1990: adds
1992 (IV. 10.) CoCom International
Munitions List.
December Govt. Decree No. Amends 61/1990: adds
1992 166/1992. (XII.81.) the MTCR List.
April Govt. Decree No. 54/1993. Amends 61/1990: NSG
1993 (IV. 7.) Nuclear Related Dual
Use Items.
b. Background
The context in which the decision to establish
export controls was made is reflected in the attitudes of the
time, attitudes about both what the future would hold and the
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tangible realities of the present. The most interesting
aspect of the decision process, however, is the head start
that the last communist government gave the first elected
government on laying the groundwork for this issue.
On 15 September, 1988 CoCom removed a number of
telecommunications items from its list of controlled
technologies. This had an immediate impact on Hungary which
was now able to implement the long-planned purchase of a
digital telephone exchange. The advantages associated with
greater access to Western technology were outlined in an
editorial that appeared in the Magyar Hirlap that very day. 5
Almost exactly one year later, with the communist government
still in power, Hungary raised the issue of easing CoCom
restrictions to a U.S. trade delegation visiting in Hungary.
It was clear to the Hungarians, even then, that though very
few items heading to Hungary were on the restricted list,
companies often did not even fill out an application if there
was the chance of being turned down.'
There is further evidence that this government
was making headway in its negotiations with CoCom. In
November 1989 a government representative announced that
Hungary could safeguard the re-export of Cocom listed items. 7
Later that month the Foreign Minister, Imre Pozsgay, announced
that progress was being made in nogatiations with CoCom.
Plans were being made for CoCom itself to establish an export
28
control office in Budapest that would track the transfer of
CoCom listed items.8 The initial decree restricting arms
transfers, and establishing an interministerial committee was
in fact announce by this government in February of 1990.9
The attitude of the expendability of the arms
industry, based on the world situation, was clear in
announcement of the initial decree. Here the government
stated that "1989 saw a considerable drop in military
production, with a 30 per cent fall in orders, the trend is
likely to continue this year, thus rendering the new
restrictions largely irrelevant."°0 Hungary calculated very
little, if any cost, to her domestic industry from the
establishment of an export control regime. In 1989 the market
appeared to be on a never ending course downward, and
Hungary's view of her own domestic industry was that it was
too small and too easily convertible to make these new
restrictions anything but "irrelevant." In addition Hungary
was not anticipating windfall profits from the sale of excess
military hardware, for while the residual stocks of the other
countries in this study were marketable abroad for their
military value, the sales of residual Hungarian equipment in
1989 went largely to museums for their historical value."
As the elections in Hungary approached, and the
likelihood of the communists being returned to power faded,
the headway Hungary had been making with CoCom stalled.' 2
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While the West took a "wait and see" position until the
election, it is clear that the groundwork accomplished by the
lasL communist government in Hungary, under the leadersiip of
Karoly Grosz, would prove beneficial to the first elected
government. There is apparent continuity between the
objectives of the two governments on this issue with the first
export control decree being signed only a month before the
very first round of free general elections.' 3 This is a clear
expression of how willing the Hungarian communist party was to
move further and faster than any of its neighbors.
After the election, the new government
continued to work with the U.S. as its sponsor for removal
form the CoCom proscribed list. The offer by CoCom to the
three central European countries was made in May 1990, the
same month that the newly elected govcnment came into power.
Considering the normal difficulties with the transition of any
government, much less the transition from a communist to a
democratic government, it would have been understandable for
the new government to take some time and review the proposal
before any serious negotiations. What happened, however, is
thac they immediately began to work out this issue with the
U.S. In early June there were talks conducted in Washington
between the U.S. and Hungary specifically on this issue. In
the latter half of that month U.S. representatives traveled to
Budapest and concentrated on how Hungary could guarantee the
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legal and technical conditions for a nationwide export control
system. While the meeting was in progress a Hungarian
official annour=ed that the system could be in place within
six months. 14
Twenty months after the CoCom offer, CoCom
removed Hungary from the proscribed destinations list. Twenty
months is an unusually short amount of time in international
and governmental affairs for a proposition to be made by an
international organization to an indepenaent government, have
that government comply with the provision of the proposition
and then have an international organization follow through
with its promise. Clearly Hungary understood that a quick
response was crucial. None of the measures that shape the
current export control system are legislated measures, though
there is a basis for them in the law. This was a deliberate
course of action selected by the government because it was
clear that the sooner these measures were established the
better.
2. Social Aspects in Hunmgary
Hungary was the first country to move toward total
reform in 1989.15 It would be difficult to attriLute this
solely to their Magyar heritage, but clearly there are aspects
of the social fiber very different from its neighbors. This
difference is expressed, among other things, in how Hungary
emerged from the communist period, its view of the market and
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social welfare, and its outlook toward future integration with
the West.
a. [Question S-li Did the social legacy of the
communist period allow for a relatively smooth transition
period?
The Communists seized power in Hungary in 1949
with the help of the Soviet Union. Hungary then experienced
its own Stalinist period and the "years between 1949 and 1956
were the worst Hungary ever faced."' 6  Under the favorable
climate of Khrushchev's rise to power, as well as the apparent
acquý.escence to Polish reform proposals, Imre Nagy proposed
that Hungary leave the Warsaw Pact. On November 4, 1956
Soviet troops moved to topple the government in Budapest,
where the fighting lasted for three days, and by the end of
December all combatant remnants of the revolution were
quelled. Janos Kadar was placed in power by the Soviets that
very same evening.
One of Hungary's great compromisers Kadar
pursued a policy of accommodation toward the Soviet Union."7
Internally Kadar pursued a policy of privatization and enough
terror to make Hungary "the happiest barracks in the
concentration camp. "Is The Hungarian communist party appeared
to be on the cutting edge of reform until Mikhail Gorbachev
rose to power in the Soviet Union. On the 20th of May 1988,
reformers within the communist party removed Kadar from the
Politburo at a speciai party conference; exceeding even their
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most optimistic expectations. Prime Minister Karoly Grosz
then replaced Kadar as General Secretary.
A little less than a year after the ouster of
Kadar, Hungary announced that it would dismantle its border
alarm system. The result was a flood of East Germans fleeing
into Hungary on their way to Austria. This action would play
a pivotal role in the collapse of the communist system
throughout Eastern Europe. In Hungary, the Communist party
(HSWP) renamed itself the Hungarian Socialist Party on
September 7, 1989 and on the 18th of that month constitutional
amendments were adopted ending one party rule in Hungary. On
the 23rd of September Hungary officially renamed itself a
republic and dropped the name "socialist".
The 1989 revolution in Hungary was not the
tumultuous affair that some would have expected. Described as
a "Grey Revolution," the process of change in Hungary was said
to be "a rather grey, unflashy compromise - biased, boring,
and perhaps, even 'un-Hungarian affair."'9 This was due in
large part to the Communist party in Hungary itself. For
reasons that are described below the party was led by reform
communists who actually pulled Hungary down this path.
Finally, on November 11 a referendum was held on the
Presidency and direct elections for the President won by a
narrow margin. This would seal the fate of the communists,
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having opened the door to change "they failed to realize that
History never stops on the way out to tip the doorman." 20
As was noted before Hungary had the "best
barracks in the concentration camp." Better than that Hungary
had a communist party that could participate in change rather
than be a impediment to change. It had a communist party that
could implement the kind of policies that would show Hungary
was in line with the West. "By 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev's
policies were beginning to make Hungary's once daring economic
reforms look almost orthodox, but the debate in Hungary had
already moved on to the more explosive issue of whether
economic reforms could succeed without a more basic reform of
society."21 In short it had a communist party that could
dismantle the border surveillance system and make early
inroads with CoCom to gain greater access to western
technology and trade. Unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia,
Hungary by 1989 had not suffered a crippling loss of talent in
the Communist Party itself. There were people in the Party
bureaucracy, government and industry who were able to envision
broader reforms.• Mark Franklin writes,
the success of Kadarism had been never to push such
men and women so hard that they were radicalized
and took up dissident activities. Instead of
becoming members of an alternate society, as some
of their Polish counterparts had done, they waited
in the wings, potential leaders of what they
believed was the still suppressed real nation.Y
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Kadarism as a social aspect meant that Hungary could get a
head start on solving some of the problems that seemed to have
been frozen in time by communism. The Hungarian transition
from east bloc arms exporter to a responsible actor on the
world scene has been accomplished because Hungarian
leadership, both communist and democratic, have been able to
shape the issue in terms of the benefits of free trade.
b. [Question S-21 Was the demand for a strong
social safety net relatively high?
The demands on the state to ensure employment
for every single person varied from country to country within
the bloc. Hungary has shown the greatest willingness to move
away from a strictly planned economy. They are less intent on
preserving jobs for their own sake than any of the other
countries in the study. In 1968 the New Economic Mechanism
(NEM) introduced aspects of the market into the Hungarian
economy. The so-called "goulash communism" allowed for the
development in agriculture and small-scale industry so they
have been living with aspects of a market economy for a longer
period of time.
A May 1992 survey concluded that a significant
majority of the Hungarian population continues to be
disenchanted with the country's political and economic
situation.u The only party that showed any improvement in
popularity since 1990 was the Federation of Young Democrats
35
(FIDESZ), which received a huge jump in the May 1992 survey."5
Not only was there a jump in popularity, the survey showed
that FIDESZ would have received the majority of votes if the
elections had been held at that time.
What separates FIDESZ from the other Hungarian
parties is its outward approach and strong support of the free
market. They also promote an integration into a modern
Europe, champion a break with the past, are Thatcherice on
economics, but retain liberal views on some social issues.2 6
FIDESZ promotes greater reliance on free market mechanisms and
less of a reliance on the state to provide all the necessities
of life to the Hungarian population. Their popularity is an
indication that this is a widely held view.
If actions speak louder than words the Hungary
has said its peace on retaining arms industry jobs for the
sake of preserving a social safety net. The defense industry
work force, that once stood at 30,000, had decreased by 60% in
1990 and today stands at only 900 active workers.2 7
c. [Question S-31 Were the prospects and initial
hopes for full integration with Western Europe relatively
high?
Hungary's hopes for full integration with
Western Europe were not only high but were perhaps the driving
element in its foreign policy since around 1988. Not only did
their perception of the world in 1989 show a declining demand
for arms but it also offered real hope for the complete
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integration of Europe. Erecting an export control system must
have seemed a perfect way to announce that Hungary was playing
by the same rules as the West. (Especially if it could be done
at little cost) Hungarian officials declared that 1988 had
been a "year of approach between the EEC (European Economic
Community) and Hungary." 2' Additionally, in September 1989
Anders Bjork, president of the EC parliamentary general
assembly, stated that Hungary could become the first former
communist bloc country to receive full EC membership.'
Hungarians wanted a Europe that was fully integrated and they
could envision that soon their borders would be as open as the
border between Austria and West Germany. A fully integrated
Europe was the best solution to Hungary's most pressing
problem of ethnic Hungarians outside her borders. Even the
communist party in Hungary could envision sweeping change and
take action to bring it about.
Inclusion in a united Europe is especially
important to the Hungarians, for if the feeling of being left
out and excluded that is described in the introduction
prevails in Eastern Europe in general, then Hungary and the
Hungarians display a natural sense of being even further
outside. There has been an "unstable balance between
vulnerability and ambition that marked the Hungarians and
their history, for their small size and linguistic isolation
were compounded by the landlocked plain that Arpad, leader of
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the seven migrating tribes, chose to settle on at the end of
the ninth century."3 Hungarians have described their
homeland as "a little island with an exotic language.,"3' This
is the barrier that Hungary felt it would soon overcome in
1989.
In 1989 Hungary not only expected to become a
full member of the EC but they also had hopes for being
included in NATO. As was pointed out above, the process of
inclusion in the EC began in June 1988 with diplomatic and
economic agreements taking effect in December of that year.
After free elections in 1990, hopes of full integration in the
EC were bolstered by the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl,
in May of that year.n
The idea of joining NATO also has its roots
with the last communist government in Hungary, well before the
dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. In February 1990, again just
before the elections and the same time that the initial export
controls were established, the Foreign Minister, Gyula Horn,
declared that the principles laid forth in Helsinki meant the
idea of Hungary joining NATO could not be excluded. He added
that "the gap between East-Central Europe should no longer
widen, and Europe should become united and democratic." 3 3 The
hopes of entering NATO grew as the Rome Summit approached in
November of 1991 and the subject of admitting East European
countries was on the agenda.
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The early hopes of 1989,'10 became severely
tempered if not abandoned by 1991. In that year, responding
to criticism that Hungary was holding up the signing of the EC
associate membership agreement with tough negotiating, Geza
Jeszenszky, the new Foreign Minister, showed his frustration
with the EC when he said, "we do not need to prove our
commitment to western values, and do not need to be good boys
and more cooperative than necessary."3'
Even more crushing than the problems with the
EC, NATO's decision to deny Hungary membership led to the
realization that they were on their own in a hostile world.
In November 1991 NATO convened a summit in Rome to decide,
among other things, whether to include the counties of East
Europe. They decided against inclusion and the following
describes the impression the decision made on many in the
region
The leaders of NATO signalled clearly that Eastern
Europe was not thought to be ready to be judged
worthy of entrance into the defense and economic
community of the developed states of the West...
Belonging to the Council of Europe was one thing,
but belonging to a 'real' military or a 'real'
economic institution was quite another.35
Hungary's hope of getting over the age old
problem of being excluded from Europe, if not vanished, had
taken a beating. Furthermore the national security problem of
defending Hungarians outside the borders would not be solved,
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in the near future, through real collective security
arrangements. Hungary was left to seek separate bilateral
agreements with Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Ukraine and
Slovakia and the sense of security from these agreements waned
quickly as the problems continued in Yugoslavia.
3. Political Aspects in Hungary
There has been a dramatic divergence between the
underlying political expectations and realities of 1989 and
those of early 1993. In late 1989 the Communist Party in
Hungary (HSWP) considered that they had a chance for survival.
The party had reformed itself and was leading other reforms in
Eastern Europe. For any number of reasons the party did not
endure and they were replaced in 1990 by a coalition
government of parties lead by Hungarian dissidents.
a. [Question P-il Were the structural impediments
to the governments ability to make changes, in the transition
period, relatively high?
The two main parties that formed the coalition
government, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), are mainly led by former
dissidents. The MDF has an inward orientation and promotes
the new Hungarian middle class. They speak of "real
Hungarians and purer past times" and can be considered a
conservative nationalist party. Like the MDF the SZDSZ also
has an inward orientation but has a stronger stand on human
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rights issues; led by urban intellectuals SZDSZ is more
liberal than MDF.
Even though many of the leaders were
dissidents, they were dissidents who learned to live with the
old system and were coopted by communism. Just as Kadarism
produced a different kind of party member it also produced a
different kind of dissident that was destined to gain power in
the immediate post-communist period. They had not been
isolated and disengaged from the political process as in other
countries. They had a sense of what was politically and
economically feasible.
Not only were the vast majority of the people
brought into the new Hungarian government people who had
remained engaged in the political process, but these same
people have largely remained in place since 1990. The
Ministers who sit on the inter-ministerial committee
responsible for export licensing are all the same with the
exception of the Minister of Industry and Trade.3  So the
government has been very stable in terms of the same people
working on the same issues.
b. [Question P-21 Were political interest groups,for example defense industry workers, influential in the
debate over these questions?
Interest groups who become involved in this
issue generally fall into two categories; those without vested
interests but display a concern over the issues, and those
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with vested interests, who will be directly affected by the
decisions. These are groups, either in the government or
outside the government, that become organized and vocal on
these issues of national security, industry conversion and
arms exports.
In the first category there are those who will
not be directly affected by decisions concerning the future of
the arms industry, but are concerned often for ideological
reasons. Most frequently they take the form of political
activists who feel that arms production, in general, and arms
exports, specifically, are immoral. Opposing them generally
are the groups that will be directly affected. In this case
there are usually three groups that work in concert; these
being the arms export brokerage agencies, the defense industry
management and the defense industry labor force. Hungary is
best characterized by the absence of any real organization by
any of these groups and very limited interplay between the
ones that are and the government.
In the case of political activists morally
opposed to arms production and exports 1989 was already a good
year, export controls had been announced and the defense
industry had practically been declared dead. 3" However, prior
to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia the Hungarian
government and military did sanction the transfer of small
arms and ammunition to the Croatian republic. The uncovering
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of the "Kalashnikov Affair" caused Hungary a great deal of
embarrassment in the world community, and the government began
to respond to pressure about the it in February 1991.38 New
export control measures were announced, existing measures were
strengthened and a firm promise was given to adhere to the new
arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia. Though there was
public outcry in response to the "Kalashnikov Affair" the
whole episode was over before it really got started or before
it resulted in organized opposition to the government's
policies.
The three groups that had an interest in
expanding arms exports also never became well organized or
active. In the first group, the export brokers, there were
two firms that were representative; Technika Export-Import
Company and Industrialexport. Technika managed 98% of the
arms export deals and therefor had an effective monopoly.
Technika was under strict control of the state and the general
manager was nominated by the Ministry of Foreign Relations and
exchange. Until the 1980's the main mission of the Technika
Company was to barter for arms within the socialist community
to meet the needs of the Army and other armed organizations. 39
Only in the last decade did their role as a hard currency
trader really emerge. Still there is no indication that in
ever became active in securing its own position much less
promoting arms exports. By 1992 as many as 30 other companies
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had become licensed to conduct arms trade and Technika
Company's monopoly position had ended.
Even though there had been a number of attempts
made to organize the firms under a single representative
organization the managers were never receptive to this idea.
They certainly has cause to protect their interests since the
defense sector normally received 10% higher profits that
civilian producers. Perhaps this is due to the low numbers
involved and the difference in the structure of the industry
that is explained below.
Though never formally organized there is
evidence that they were able to successfully lobby the
government for action. In late 1991 the representatives of
the defense industry argued that the government should
guarantee 30% of Hungarian armed forces procurement needs to
the domestic industry, write off their bad debts and that the
government should choose 8-10 firms to be protected and
liberalize trade among the others.
The story of how the composition of the
committee responsible for export licensing has changed over
time may be an indication of the kind of influence the
managers had with the government. In February 1991 the
government issued Government Decree No. 48/1991./III.27./
Korm. stipulating that the committee would "include as members
the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of National
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Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of
International Economic Relations, and the Minister Without
Portfolio Responsible for National Security, or persons
designated by them."4 On May 21, 1991, only three months
later, this decree on export controls was amended to change
one sentence of one paragraph in Article 2. In effect the
amendment only changed the composition of this
interministerial cordnaitte-ý by adding the Minister of Industry
and Trade, thus finally providing representation on the
committee for the defense industry.
There are three more convincing indications
that the government responded to lobbying pressure on the part
of industry managers. First, On January 1, 1992 the
government established a Military Industrial Office, under the
provisions of Government Decree No. 85/1992, that had the
purpose of coordinating and promoting military production and
related activities in Hungary. Second, on March 26, 1991,
Karoly Janza, a department head in the Ministry of Defense,
outlined a plan to increase the purchase of domestic military
products from twenty per cent to thirty per cent. 41 The third
indication is Government Decree 126/1992. (VIII.28.), in which
the government determined which defense enterprises would be
retained by the government and which would be released. In
the end only seven defense industries were retained by the
government in 1992.42
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The effects of this lobbying effort, however,
appear to have been temporary. In May 1993 the Military
Industrial Office was closed down as an independent state
organization and its responsibilities transferred to the
Ministry of Industry and Trade. 43  Many of the other
concessions on the part of the government to aid the defense
industry, like 30t procurement from domestic sources, have not
survived the budget process.
Finally, the defense industry labor force in
1989 had good potential and reason to become organized and
effective in lobbying the government. However, in the end it
did not. In 1988 there were 30,000 people employed in the
defense sector, or about 2W of the working population. As was
the case in most of the Soviet Bloc the defense industry
workers received around a 10% wage supplement as well as other
privileges and subsidies normally provided by the factory. On
the down side defense workers had restricted mobility, both in
the labor market as well as traveling abroad. It is unclear
why they never became organized, perhaps for them the down
side of continued labor in the defense sector outweighed the
benefits.
C. [Question P-31 Do the national security
objectives dictate the maintenance of a domestic military
industrial base?
Hungarians in neighboring countries are the
largest single minority in Europe, aside from Russians in the
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former Soviet Republics." Irredentism is not unique to
Hungary but there is an aspect of the problem that is quite
unique. Most of the ethnic Hungarians that live outside the
borders of Hungary live directly on the border; being right
next door means the problem is very tangible and very visible.
In December of last year Prime Minister Jozsef Antall stated
that "In general, we only have problems where Hungarian
minorities are living and where their rights are not insured,"
adding that there are good relations with Slovenia and
Croatia, tensions with Serbia, Romania, and to a certain
extent Ukraine. 45 This problem of ethnic Hungarians outside
the borders has been a central factor in the discussions of a
future national security doctrine. A key goal of this
doctrine was to become involved in collective economic and
security organizations, therefor self-sufficiency would
naturally not be a key aspect of the national security policy.
Self-sufficiency in armaments production was
never a real option for Hungary anyway. Hungary traditionally
purchased only twenty percent of military hardware from
domestic sources relying on imports to make up the difference.
In May 1990 Lajos Fur, Minister of Defense, indicated that
Hungary did not need an independent defense industry and that
her needs could be satisfied with imports." However, in a
June 1990 press conference he also indicated that the domestic
defense industry would be involved in transforming the
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technology of the Hungarian Army, but when questioned on the
specifics it was clear that this really applied only to the
telecommunications sector.47  It will become clear in the
discussion of the economic factors below that Hungary will be
locked into a position of needing to import arms and the
portion of the industry that can be saved through domestic
production is very limited.
The best expression of the government's concern
that the defense industry is critical to national security are
the measures taken to protect it, and in this sense the
industry has not been protected. By the middle of 1991 a
government evaluation of the industry concluded that for most
firms they "either face or are undergoing bankruptcy, and only
the lucky few are offered financial rehabilitation, or are
able to survive on their own.""
4. Economic Aspects in Hungary
In addition to social and political aspects that
shaped the framework in which the decision to control arms
exports was made there was also an important economic aspect
to that framework. The economic aspects can be viewed both in
terms of policy makers perceptions about what the market and
the industry was in 1989 and what they would be like the
future. This would mean that the decision arrived at in 1990
was shaped by the structure of the industry and the forecast
of demand for arms in the world market.
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Two key assumptions were made at the time, first,
that the industry was easily convertible and second, that
demand for military hardware would continue to decline. The
process of conversion has proven to be more difficult than
anticipated and Hungary has had to reconsider its role as an
exporter of arms and the role its domestic industry plays in
national security.
While the development of the arms industry in
Hungary has many common threads with the two most similar
cases there are some particular aspects of its historical
growth that must be pointed out. Prior to World War I the
majority of armaments production in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire was located in the three provinces of the Czech Lands.
As a result of the Treaty of Trianon Hungary gained
independence but lost much of its land and Hungarian
population.
In 1938 the "Program of Gyor" Hungary initiated the
first independent armaments program." After the Second World
War much of the Hungarian industry that had not been destroyed
was removed by the Soviets. As in Poland and Czechoslovakia
the first large-scale postwar reconstruction took place
between 1950 and 1954.
After the 1956 uprising the defense industry was
reorganized and Hungary lost its separate Ministry of
Industrial Production and all the major decisions for Hungary,
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concerning this sector, were made in Moscow. All producers of
military equipment were subordinated to the Ministry of
Industry, with the exception of the Godollo Machine Factory
which fell directly under the Minister of Defense, and the
managers for the most important factories were directly
appointed by the Minister of Industry. However, following the
market-oriented reforms in 1968 the micro-electronics and
precision-mechanics sectors were able to extract themselves
from the tight control of the Warsaw Pact system.
There were around a total of seventy seven
enterprises involved in the manufacture of military products
in Hungary as of May 1989.-1 The majority of these firms
manufactured various products for both civil and military use
with the majority of production devoted to civilian products.
In rarer cases the majority of a firms production was for
military consumption. Most of the military hardware was
produced through license agreement with the Soviet Union.
a. [Question E-l b.Tre the prospects for converting
the defense industry relatively high?
Recall that the initial decree limiting arms
exports was signed in February of 1990, and at the time this
action was considered to be "irrelevant" because of the
decline in demand, and one must conclude, because their
outlook on conversion must have been quite hopeful. Though
Hungary has a long tradition in the production of arms (the
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Arms and Gas Appliance Factory marked its centenary in
February 1991) its historic role has never matched that of
either Poland or Czechoslovakia. 5' As one Hungarian official
described the situation in Hungary, "we do not even have
yesterday's technology but rather the day before yesterday's
technology."
There are a number of reasons for the cheerful
outlook on conversion in 1990 other than the general worldwide
consensus that this could be achieved. First the government
and many of the arms industry firms were working toward
conversion even before 1989. Second the structure of the arms
industry was such that conversion would have looked like a
relatively simple process since very few firms were involved
in the production of what was described as "warm weapons" or
firearms.
(1) [Question E-l.a] Were defense industry
firms already in the process of production conversion in 1989?
The impact of the 1968 economic reforms, as noted above,
allowed the micro-electronics and precision-mechanics sectors
to extract themselves from the overt control of the Warsaw
Pact. Most of the production, in these sectors and others,
was already concentrated in dual use items by 1989.
Though there was no formally announced
measures to convert the industry, many conversion efforts had
already been taken. Production of military vehicles at the
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former FUG factory located in Gy6r ended in 1982.52 Gun
barrel production at Gvozdika facility in Diosgy6r, including
57mm AA guns and 122mm artillery barrels, ended in 1989 and
mine production at the MM Mechanical Works ended in 1989.53
There are a number of examples of early
conversion efforts by the government and individual firms as
early as 1988 other than the examples given above of
production shut downs rather than conversion. Notably, in
December of 1988 the Godollo Machine Factory announced that it
was working on new production and marketing strategies. Part
of its long term strategy was to convert to the manufacture of
car components and excavators; there were even talks underway
with several South Korean firms at the time which never lead
to a concrete deal.5
In 1989 Lieutenant-General Dr. Gyorgy
Doro, vice president of the National Planning Office,
announced that in some cases of financial hardship companies
could apply for government assistance in funding conversion to
civilian production." It would become clear later that there
were no funds available from the government for this process
and that the defense firms were on their own. The
inclination, however, was to develop a conversion program and
this move began quite early.
(2) (Question E-1.b] Did the production
possibilities for individual firms allow for the shifting of
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resources? This is the brighter side of the conversion
equation; most of the defense firms in Hungary were in a
relatively good position to shift resources between civilian
and military production possibilities. In May of 1989 figures
released by the Ministry of Industry showed that 57 firms had
less than 10 k of their total production devoted to military
products. There were only 20 firms in which military
production exceeded 10 and in only two of these did military
production exceed 80W.56 In only one case, the Godollo
Machine Factory (Godolloi Gepgyar) was the entire production
devoted to military items." Moreover, in most factories,
machinery and other equipment used for military production was
normally located in a separate department from the general-
purpose machinery and equipment that could be used in both
civilian and military production.
In fact the majority of the firms
producing military hardware produced far more products for
civilian consumption than for the military market. For the
industry as a whole military products accounted for only
twenty two per cent of total net turn over for firms producing
military hardware in 1987.58 Therefore, in terms of
production possibilities for individual firms, it would be
relatively simple for firms to shift resources away from
military production. Easier anyway than if the firns majority
of production went to military use.
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The best way to illustrate the impact of
this is to describe the structure two firms than serve to mark
the opposite ends of the arms production spectrum in Hungary.
The Godollo Machine Factory and the Mechanikai Laboratorium
are two firms that were entrenched in the arms industry during
the 1980's but there are large differences in the structure
and background of each of these firms.
The first example is the Godollo Machine
Factory which was primarily involved in repair and renovation
of tanks and the manufacture of tank components; to include
components for Hungary's 90 T-34 tanks. 59 As was indicated
above 100% of its production was in military items. In 1989
70% of its total production was exported, most likely because
it was the only factory in the world producing parts for T-34
tanks.60 This factory was in a unique situation in Hungary
because it was owned by the Ministry of Defense and run by
soldiers.' 1  The director of the Godollo Machine Factory,
Arpad Adorjan, had no delusions of the factory's future
competitiveness in the arms market. He explained in 1989 that
"the Godollo factory's stocks are obsolete ... stocks are so
specialized that they cannot be sold, and this is where the
enterprize's money lies."'2
Contrast this to the Mechanikai
Laboratorium, a firm primarily involved in the production of
defense-electronics.0 In 1991 the firms director was
54
interviewed and noted his hopeful outlook on the future
because, unlike other defense industry firms that manufacture
products on the basis of Soviet license, the products of
Mechanikia Labratorium were "modern and solely
self-developed."' In fact in an interview with Major General
Damo, he praised the effectiveness of the Hungarian
direction-finding equipment during the Romanian revolution.
Praising Hungarian COMINT (Communications Intelligence) in
general, he added that this type of equipment was sold to
Iraq, India and Kuwait. 5  Though MG Damo does not mention
Mechanikai Labratorium by name, this is the only Hungarian
firm listed as a manufacturer of Electronic Warfare equipment
in Jane's 1992 edition."
b. [Question R-21 Was export specialization in
military hardware relatively high?
The second economic factor that would determine
their view of the importance of arms exports to the total
economy is the degree of specialization in arms exports.
Figure 1
CET WCWD WET
The equation in Figure 1 calculates the relative export
specialization in military related items for a given country.
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In the equation C represents the individual country, W is the
world, EM is arms exports and ET is total exports.' 7
Appendix C shows Hungary's relative export
specialization as compared to the top ten arms exporters for
the for the period 1985 to 1989. At .45 Hungary was much less
specialized in its arms exports than either Poland or
Czechoslovakia, 2.22 and 1.95 respectively. Though the data
required to calculate this equation are not available for the
Russian and Ukrainian SSRs separately, it is clear that- the
export specialization in arms for the former Soviet Union far
outstripped any other country in the world, almost three times
more specialized than the second most specialized country
Israel.
Table 1-2
Relative Export Specialization in Hungary from 1985-1989
Arn Total AEfTE Relative
Expor Exporu Export Specialization
yout
1915 220 13440 1.6 .64
1936 160 16130 1.0 .41
1937 240 18050 1.3 .56
1913 160 19050 .8 .42
1939 50 20210 .2 .13
soUrce u.5. Arlm Contot i Duwanlmet Agay (IWI), Table U
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The year to year examination of export
specialization between 1985 and 1989 show that the export of
arms became less important to the Hungarian economy over time.
Table 3-2 shows that Hungary's export specialization fell
dramatically from .64 in 1985 to just .13 in 1989.
d. [Question E-31 Was there a relatively high
degree of autonomy in the defense industry?
By their own assessment Hungary's plant and
equipment is not even based on yesterday's technology but
rather the day before yesterday's. This does not fnean the
Hungarians are not innovative; it simply means that much more
of their talents in this regard have been directed away from
the military sector.
(1) [Question E-3.a] Was domestic research
prior to 1989 relatively high? Research and development
expenditures were lower in Hungary than in any of the timilar
cases. For the ten years between 1974 and 1984 these
expenditures averaged only one percent of the reported
military budget. (See Appendix D) Bear in mind that this was
one percent of one of the smallest budgets in the region.
Domestic research and development
expenditures is a contentious issue in Hungary. Some sources
have denied any independent research at all, while others will
confirm only local technological developments on equipment
mass-produced under license. There were provisions made for
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enterprises engaged in military production that allowed them
to receive loans with a very low interest rate, or in some
cases interest free." However, in comparison to with the
other cases it is clear that Hungary devoted the least amount
to military research and development.
(2) [Question E-3.b] Were there a relatively
large number of defense products of original design? There
are very few example of the fruits of the Hungarian research
and development effort. Many of them like the FUG, which was
an armored reconnaissance vehicle, ended in failure. 69 There
are very few firms in Hungary that can claim to produce
equipment that is "modern and solely self-developed."
(3) [Question E-3.c] Is there a relatively
strong move toward cooperation with Western firms? There has
been the least amount of cooperation between Western arms
firms and the arms producers in Hungary. While the government
would like to expand the role of western firms in their
domestic arms industry the small size will make it difficult
to attract this type of involvement. There is perhaps a
chance for firm like Mechanical Laboratories who are already
somewhat sophisticated technologically.
c. [Question E-41 Was the outlook on continued
exports in 1989 rel&tively high?
Though the contribution to the world market was
small it was not insignificant and by the end of the 1980's
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Hungary achieved an export ranking that would solidly place it
in the upper half of the Tier III exporting countries.7 °
Appendix B shows Hungary in comparison to the top 12 exporters
from the period 1985 to 1989. The two Tier I countries are
the United States and the Soviet Union. Between the two of
them they accounted for over 60 per cent of all arms exported
between 1985 and 1989. The dollar amount of the sales for
each of these countries more than doubled the sales of the
next top ten exporters combined. Following the Tier I
countries are the Tier II exporters, or as roughly shown here
the next top ten exporters who make up roughly 25 percent of
the market combined. Sharing the remaining 15 percent of the
arms export market are the Tier III countries, where Hungary
would rank somewhere in the upper half depending on the year.
In terms of exports, communications equipment
and instruments account for 75 percent of Hungary's military
production, while artillery and infantry firearms and
ammunition make up 12 percent, vehicle and aircraft
maintenance contracts eight percent, and chemicals and light
industrial products for military use five percent.7  In a
1991 interview Major General Laszlo Damo characterized
Hungary's military exports,
Hungary basically does not export warm weapons -
firearms - but rather guidance technology
[iranyitastechnikail and radio equipment, radio
transmitters. Regarding firearms, we have
delivered most to Iraq, AK-74-type assault rifles.
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In addition, we have delivered ammunition, various
mines, pistols, and other small arms. 72
While eighty percent of military output was
exported, the exports went mainly to other socialist countries
in arrangements that called for payment in kind rather than
payment in hard currency.7 3  The Hungarian leadership clearly
reached the conclusion that the future arms market was a place
where they would largely be excluded. Because they planned
for reductions in the domestic market and eighty percent of
military hardware produced in Hungary was exported in 1987 it
was clear that major changes were in store for the domestic
arms industry. Here it is worthwhile to recall the statement
that accompanied the announcement of new export restrictions
for arms when the government declared that "1989 saw a
considerable drop in military production, with a 30 per cent
fall in orders, and the trend is likely to continue this year,
thus rendering the new restrictions largely irrelevant."7'
(1) [Question E-4.a] Did they have export
potential in expanding markets as early as 1990? (i.e. the Far
East of Middle East) Hungary did not have well developed
markets by 1990. The only real exception to this rule appear
to be Iran and Iraq up to through and after the Iran-Iraq war.
As noted earlier Hungary's experience with the Romanian
revolution showed that their radio intercept equipment was
relatively good and they pushed this equipment for export.7 5
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(2) (Question E-3.b] Did the prospects for
exports rise over time? The dim prospects for Hungary's
involvement in the future arms market have not gotten better
with time. Hungary's market is limited to specialized
finished products like their EW systems, and some consumable
items like spare parts which their plants are already tooled
for.
Where tie Godollo factory has very little
hope of even remaining open, let alone remaining competitive
in the arms market, the Mechanikai Labratorium appears to have
a future in the market. The problem Hungary faces is that the
general character of the Hungarian arms industry would be more
like the Godollo factory, although as a percentage of
production, many other firms were not as dependent on military
production. The fundamental similarity with the Godollo
factory and the majority of the remaining industry is the
production of outdated equipment through Soviet license.
5. Conclusions Relative to Hungary
Table 1-3 outlines the answers to each of the
questions and compares it to the anticipated model shown in
the introduction. All of the answers to the questions match,
indicating that this is the pattern of social, political and
economic that a country who has accepted the CoCom offer of




Conclusions for Hungary vs. the Anticipated Model
Questions Model Hungary
[Quaba S-1I Di social Wpoy of t cmmnia• period yes yes
allow for a mlveysmoh nsoimavow= period?
[Quesiim s-2 Wu thdo mdfor a no no
sUr social Ufety mOt relatively high?
[Queom S-31 Were do .poqmw Mind bo1os for W yes yes
uisgrtab with Western Europe relatvel hiOh
[qidamP-1 Won e do we• uih iouapdime.aus t ,.. no no
goverswa abflty to make clugng. w lb. lrmuion period.
(Qum P-21 Were poitc imreft groups, for e-apk no no
defaem isdia workers, Whiuset in dis debate over dibe
[Qseatm P-31 Do the natoial swe objeWe dicutte ihw no no
maamcs of a domsatic military idwutra baa?
[Qusm. E... We the prospects for U o,,m ,•vein , lb.d yes yes
[Question &-21 Was export "albudoini unldita hifdwmt no no
[Question 1-3] Was dhere a rlively bo dopgr of no no
OSOy ia the deese dui~y?
(Question E-41 Was the outook onepoca in 1919 rclativey no no
CoCom made its offer to the Central European
countries in 1990, Hungary had been working to get of f the
proscribed list since 1988, this meant that Hungary had a two
year head start on working out the problems associated with
establishing an export control system that fit the CoCom
model. The decision to erect some kind of export control
system was actually made in advance of the conditional offer
extended by COCOM.
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The last communist government in Hungary adopted the
decree establishing an export control system because of the
social, political and economic climate that was specific to
Hungary. Moreover it was adopted at a time when the
conditions appeared to show that this decision was in
Hungary's best interest. The structure of the export control
regime was then carried over by the first freely elected
government with a few modifications.
There are two reasons why this issue was so
important to Hungary and why there was such continuity between
the last communist and first democratic governments. First,
the most pressing national security issue in early 1990 was
the plight of ethnic Hungarians outside the borders. (This
was even before the outbreak of violence in the former
Yugoslavia) The way for them to tackle this problem was to
pursue a unified Europe initiative. In this context the
export control measures are a gesture to show that they can
live by the same rules as the West.
Second, Hungary defined this issue, much earlier
than anyone else, in terms of the benefits of free and open
trade. They had a fundamental understanding of the market
economy and this created a condition where the open access to
western technology became a policy directive that overrode any
other political consideration. It is unclear whether Hungary
has really benefitted from its new participation in the world
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economy. Certainly there is growth and investment, but there
is also a lingering sense that they are being blocked out of
many markets, particularly the common European market.
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IV. THE MOST SIMILAR CASES
A. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Unlike Hungary which first erected an arms control system
in early 1990, Czechoslovakia, and now the successor states of
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, have yet to establish an
export control system that fits the model advocated by CoCom.
1. Export Control Measures in Czechoslovakia
a. Review of Control Measures
Before the Czech and Slovak split on January 1,
1993, there were a number of measures established by the
federal government to control the export of military
hardware.'[Question E-41 Was the outlook on exports in 1989
relatively good? Federal Law 42/1980 was a basic law which
covered economic contacts with foreign countries enacted on 10
April 1980. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade Act
202/1988 on limiting exports of some chemicals became
effective on November 18, 1988.
The 1989 Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade Act
47/1989 was enacted to prohibit the export of certain plastic
explosives, particularly Semtex. On May 4, 1990 Federal Law
113/1990 replaced Federal Law 42/1980 and in conjunction with
Federal Government Act 256/1990 determined export and import
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of goods and other foreign trade activities that required a
license. This act was latEr redefined by Government Decision
147/91 which required export licenses for the export of
certain products to be obtained from the Ministry of Foreign
Trade. 2 On January 1, 1992 the Commercial Code No. 513/91Sb
was enacted which liberalized trade and effectively replaced
a number of export regulations noted above, with the result of
then creating a very weak arms export control system. 3
After the 1993 split the Czech Republic
attempted to retain the same export control structure as the
federal government. Under the provisions of the of the
legislation governing the Czech and Slovak split, effective
January 1, 1993, a permit to export arms was required from the
Foreign Ministry. 4 However, in April 1993 the Czech Deputy
Foreign Minister, Alexandr Vondra, admitted to the press that
the existing measures regulating arms exports were
insufficient. To rectify this new legislation was being
drafted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade for presentation
to parliament. Until that time, however, the export of arms
was to be controlled by decree although the decree had yet to
be enacted. The legal basis for the new legislation was to be
the January 1, 1993 law on separation of powers. 5 On June 11,
1993 the Czech Minister of Industry and Trade, Vladimir
Dlouhy, stated that the government had done away with the arms
export regulations and was crafting a new comprehensive law. 6
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Slovakia, embroiled in domestic political and
economic problems has taken no moves to tighten the export
control measures since the split. A new law was in front of
the Czech parliament as of November 1993 but there was no
formal system to control arms export in either the Czech
Republic or Slovakia. Table 2-1 provides a chronoiogical
listing of the key export control measures.
Table 2-1
Chronology of Czechoslovak Export Control Measures
April Federal Law 42/1980 Law governing economic
1980 contacts with fcreign
countries
November Federal Min. of For. Limits exports of certain
1988 Trade Act 202/1988 chemicals
September Federal Min. of For. Prohibits the export of some
1989 Trade Act 47/1989 plastic explosives, namelySemtex
January Foreign Minister
1990 Dienstbier announces that
Czechoslovakia will cease
arms exports
May CoCom offers to take
1990 Czechoslovakia off the
proscribed list
May Federal Law 113/1990 Replaced 42/1980 as the
1990 basic law governing foreign
economic activity
May Federal Govt. Act Established the legal basis
1990 256/1990 for regulating foreign trade
activities
January The Federal Government
1991 relinquishes authority
for export controls to
the Republics
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January Czech Republic Govt. Placed responsibility for
1991 Decision 147/91 managing export licenses
under the Minister of
Foreign Trade
January Commercial Code No. Measure liberalizes trade in
1992 513/91Sb general and replaces many of
the measures above
January The Czech and Slovak
1993 Republics officially
split
June The Czech Republic
1993 announced that it was
setting aside previous
export control measures
November Principles of the Law on As of November 1993 the bill
1993 Foreign Trade in Military had to pass through two
Material is before committees and approval was
committee in the Czech anticipated by January 1994
Parliament
b. Background
The "velvet revolution" occurred in November
1989. Prior to this the only measures established to control
arms were specifically related to chemical munitions and
explosives. When the Communists relinquished power in
November 1989 a transition government was established until
elections could be held in the middle of 1990.
In an interview with the New York Times in
January 1990 the Foreign Minister of the transitional
government declared that,
Czechoslovakia will simply end its trade in arms
without taking into account what the pragmatists
will say, that it will be a blow to the state
coffers, that those people will get arms from
somebody else anyway if we don't supply them. That
hasn't been officially announced but it simply will
be done and weapons just won't be sold anymore.'
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This statement would fuel a huge internal debate over the role
that the defense industry played in the federal economy. It
would also become a major bone of contention between the Czech
and Slovak Republics as Slovakia began to once again assert
its own nationalism. Since then Czechoslovakia, and the
successor states of the Czech ReDublic and Slovakia, has had
a number of problems instituting an arms export control policy
and their troubles have received the most attention in the
Western press by a wide margin.
The battle between liberal dissidents and more
pragmatic minded members of the Czechoslovak federal
government is described below. Also described is how the
issue of deciding the fate of the arms industry became an
issue of national sovereignty for the Slovaks.
2. Social Aspects in Czechoslovakia
It is difficult to detail the social aspects of this
problem in Czechoslovakia. Some of the aspects are common to
both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, others are not. Both
republics have a shared heritage and history, both have the
legacy of the communist period, but their impact on the
expectations for entering into a new Europe after communism
collapsed are somewhat different.
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a. [Question S-i1 Did the social legacy of the
communist period allow for a relatively smooth transition
period?
As one of the "Gang of Four" Czechoslovakia
resisted many of the reforms initiated by Mikail Gorbachev,
and later the Communist government tried desperately to stem
the tide of change in 1989.8 Demonstrations against the
Communists grew larger and larger until a large demonstration
in Prague on 17 November resulted in wide scale violence
against the demonstrators. Having put up a fight the
Communist Party finally gave up its leading role on November
25th and authorized free multi-party elections. The delays in
reform on the part of the Czechoslovak Communist Party meant
that Czechoslovakia could not get a head start on solving some
of the problems that seemed to have been frozen in time by
Communism. They were not proactive about ushering in a new
age in Czechoslovakia as was the case in Hungary.
The Communist system in Czechoslovakia was very
different from the one in Hungary. Far from having a system
that allowed people to make reforms from the inside, the
communist system forced people out and radicalized the
dissident movement. During the "velvet revolution" the main
opposition group to emerge was the Civic Forum which was an
informal alliance of existing opposition and human rights
organizations. As a result, when free elections were finally
held there were large numbers of people brought into the
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government that had spent years outside the political process.
The best example is Jiri Dienstbier.
Dienstbier reentered the political process as the Foreign
Minister for the transitional government, at that time he was
a 52 year old former dissident, who two months before had been
shoveling coal at the menial job he had been given by the
communist government. Dienstbier, like many other dissidents
who came to power in the former Eastern Bloc, had been
disengaged from the practical political process for some time.
Looking back at his January 1990 announcement
to the New York Times, there are three things that warrant
close examination. First, is the obvious ingenuousness of the
statement itself and the real belief that this was a
legitimate policy option. Second, is that this policy
decision, which had such far reaching consequences for
Czechoslovakia both politically and economically, was made in
an interview with the New York Times and not in domestic
press. (In what other country could the Foreign Minister make
an announcement that was one, a radical change in policy, two,
made to the foreign press, and three, threatened the jobs of
around 150,000 domestic workers.) Finally, note also that
Dienstbier points out the fact that this "hasn't been
officially announced but it simply will be done and weapons
just won't be sold anymore."
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When the elections finally took place the
struggle over this issue began to center on "antimilitarist"
members of the Czechoslovak government and pragmatic-minded
economists and businessmen."19  The pragmatists argued that
Omnipol, the country's monopoly weapons trader at the time,
accounted for 50 percent of foreign currency profit in the
past few years. Opposing this view the antimilitarist members
of the government extolled the morale virtue of the
decision.'°
The leadership of the Federal Government was
divided into two camps over this issue. In one camp, arguing
for strict export controls on moral grounds, was the President
and the Foreign Minister. Opposing them were Prime Minister
Calfa, Minister Klaus, Minister Barak and Minister Dlouhy.
These two groups struggled for control over export policy but
the problem with the process, as it evolved, was that it left
no room for conciliation and compromise. By taking such an
extreme initial position Dienstbier and his allies radicalized
the opposition.
The starting point for this battle was
Dienstbier's January announcement to the New York Times. The
day after the papers publication the policy was confirmed to
the domestic Czechoslovak press by a Foreign Ministry
spokesman.'" Also on the 26th of January a radio commentary
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by Milan Suchanek for the Prague International Service urged
the rest of the World to follow Czechoslovakia's example.) 2
In the commentary there are three statements
that reflect how Dienstbier, and to a great extent Havel,
viewed the relationship of arms exports and the world in 1990.
The first assumption was that the decision would raise the
"moral credit" of the Czechoslovak government. In -his
context at least part of the Czechoslovak leadership was
anxious to show the West that they could, not only be a
responsible actors in the World community, but that they could
take the lead on moral issues. The second assumption was that
this decision "guarantees the speedy conversion" of the
defense industry to civilian production. In other words all
that had to be done was to stop arms exports and demand for
civilian goods would quickly fill the void. Finally it was
stated that "the arms trade was in contradiction with the
climate of easing world tensions," an indication of the belief
at the time in the peaceful nature of the "New World Order."
The timing of the statement is also important because it
clearly must have been made in anticipation of the upcoming
James Baker visit to Prague on February 7, 1990.
It is difficult to determine the extent of the
debate concerning the course of the Czechoslovak defense
industry prior to 1989, but the struggle that erupted after
Dienstbier's statement indicates that it had deep roots. The
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official retreat from this position did not wait for the Baker
visit. The statements of the 25th and 26th were so
extravagant that a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry was
later forced to clarify and then retract much of the promise
by saying, "the Foreign Minister's statements have to be
understood in the context of Czechoslovakia's new foreign
policy." Notably he added, "the system of arms trading would
be thoroughly examined in relation to existing international
agreements," and that "the conversion of Czechoslovakia's arms
industry" would have to be taken into account."3
On February 9 of that year, while on a visit to
Jerusalem, Josef Hromadka, Czechoslovak Deputy Premier,
announced that they intended to halt its exports of arms
"stage by stage." 1 4 The no arms sale policy was again
challenged on April 17 when the Minister of Foreign Trade,
Andrej Barak, declared the "decision will not be taken
immediately.", 5  Even Havel himself signaled a retreat from
the earlier position while visiting in France on March 19,
when he redefined the position that arms deliveries would be
halted to "all totalitarian regimes and dictatorships"
although shipments to democratic states would continue "for a
little while."16
Minister Barak was one of the first to outline
the "pragmatic" arguments that Dienstbier had discounted. In
April he outlined three of the fundamental arguments presented
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against Dienstbier's proclamation and the assumptions on which
it was based. First, he argued that the economic and
technological progress connected with arms production and
development could not be discounted. Second, he stressed that
Sweden, Switzerland and France were comparable models for
Czechoslovakia since they were also socialist based economies
and arms exporters. Finally, he pointed out that there was
future trade potential, notably with China, for Czechoslovak
arms producers.
By September it was finally clear that
Dienstbier's proclamation had gone too far, but because it had
been such a sweeping gesture, any backing away from the
position appeared to be a victory for the old ways of central
planning and communism. This was certainly something the
dissident elite was reluctant to do. Sill the government
began floating a number of justifications for continuing arms
sales. The Deputy Foreign Minister Lubos Dobrovsky declared
the rationale for continued exports was the need to fulfill
existing requirements.17  The pressure to expand into new
markets and new contracts, however, soon outstripped this
rationale.
In early May 1991 the federal government
confirmed tank sales contracts with both Syria and Iran.'s
Along with the confirmation, the Prime Minister of the Federal
Republic announced to Israeli radio that they would "sell
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tanks to anyone."" Immediately following this there was a
running battle in the Czechoslovak press between these two
groups that lasted about two weeks. In the end the contract
was completed with Syria, but not Iran.
Based on legislation prepared in December 1990,
the Federal Government relinquished authority over export
controls to the Republics. In the Czech Republic authority to
issue export permits were given to the Ministry for Foreign
Trade, and the Foreign Ministry could only make
recommendations.20 The basic law was amended in an attempt
was made to establish a system for issuing licenses in 1991.21
In April of 1991 it was clear that
Czechoslovakia had been negotiating for the sale of tanks to
Syria and Iran.22 The new rationale for expanding arms export
commitments was then outlined in April by Josef Fucik of the
Economics Ministry. Now the official position was that the
domestic industry would only produce enough for the
Czechoslovak Army and then export enough to buy what it could
not produce.3 When the U.S. objected to the planned
shipments in May another rationale was presented; that exports
must continue in order to fund the conversion process.2 4 On
July 12, 1991 Oldrich Carny, advisor to President Havel,
testified before the U.S. Senates Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations and presented the two alternatives the
government felt were possible for the arms industry. He told
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the committee that first, "the defense industry could
theoretically be completely liquidated." The second
possibility was "to combine conversion to civilian manufacture
with the continuation of production of armaments equipment
that can be used both for limited export and meet the
requirements of the Czechoslovak army." Adding that the basic
rationale for this approach was to keep Czechoslovakia from
becoming completely dependent on foreign suppliers he
concluded that the second alternative was the only option."5
Marion Calfa, the Federal Prime Minister stated during an
interview on McNiel/Lehrer in October 1991 that "we have no
other way to get the means for conversion to civilian
production than to export the very weapons themselves once
again." 26
b. [Question S-21 Was the demand for a strong
social safety net relatively high?
Perhaps there was no greater concern for the
social safety net in Czechoslovakia but there was a strong
association between the arms industry and social security.
Furthermore the association was much stronger in Slovakia than
in the Czech Republic. In an announcement concerning the
Slovak governments decision to pursue a different export
policy than the Federal government the Slovak government
spokesman directly tied the social security of arms industry
workers to the continuation of arms exports. In their
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estimation the Federal government's decision would cost 10,000
jobs in the defense sector and the impact would be felt by
another 60,000 workers in Slovakia.27 Much greater efforts
were made to maintain jobs, even at the cost of tying up
valuable resources, in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.
In the Czech lands the roots of
industrialization are much deeper than in Slovakia and there
is greater optimism about the potential benefits of
cooperation with the West. There is greater optimism about
economic growth through innovation and efficiency and fewer
efforts to retain inefficient production methods for the sake
of saving jobs.
c. [Question S-31 Were the prospects and initial
hopes for full integration with Western Europe relatively
high?
Czechoslovakia's prospects for inclusion into
the EC and NATO were very high in early 1990 and during a
February 7 meeting between Juri Dienstbier and James Baker the
all-european process and the new role of NATO were high on the
agenda. 2' After the breakup, however, the prospects have not
remained equal for the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Slovakia's chances for entering the European comnmunity are
very dim while the chances for the Czech Republic are perhaps
the best in the region.
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3. Political Aspects in Czechoslovakia
The political battle over this issue in
Czechoslovakia was epic, and certainly contributed to the
split between the Czech and Slovak republics in January 1993.
Control over industrial and export policy became an issue of
national sovereignty for the Slovaks. This was fueled in Dart
by the defense industry work force which was much better
organized and active than their Czech counterparts.
a. [Question P-i1 Were the structural impediments
to the governments ability to make changes, in the transition
period, relatively high?
The greatest structural problem was the
question of jurisdiction over the defense industry and defense
industry exports between the Federal government and the
government of Slovak Republic. Here again the starting point
was the January 1990 declaration that all arms export would be
stopped.
The basic ideological and political differences
would have been trouble enough for the Czechoslovak government
in 1990, but there was also another problem, perhaps more
difficult, with which they would also have to contend. This
centered on the disproportionate impact the decision had in
the Slovak republic in general and in the V~g river valley
specifically. The January 25th proclamation was not well
received in the Vdg (Waag) river valley. Stanislav Neboska,
deputy director at ZTS Martin declared that "when we first
85
heard the news we couldn't believe it.'' 2 9 He was shocked by
the proclamation as were many other workers in the region
whose expressions also reflected the position of the
pragmatists that Dienstbier had discounted in January. For
example, a graying 46 year old assembly line worker in Lne
Slovak town of Martin told the western press "if only
Czechoslovakia ceases to export arms, then the export markets
we have will just be taken over by other rich countries. We
are not such a rich country that we can afford to do this."'30
The real turning point in the jurisdiction
question came in January 1991. Less than a year after
Dienstbier's original pronouncement, the Slovak Assembly won
decision making authority for economic and industrial matters
in Slovakia. On January 8, 1991 the Slovak government decided
to slow down the conversion process and to continue exporting
arms. 31  (This is much the way the situation has remained
since early 1991; attempts to legislate the basic
administrative policy have ended in failure) In March 1991
Slovakia established its own brokerage firm, Unimpex, to
challenge the traditional monopoly in arms trade held by
Omnipol."
In announcing this new policy, and referring to
the policy of the Federal Government that emerged after
Dienstbier's February 1990 statement, the Slovak government
spokesman Jan Comaj said,
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The fact remains that the political gesture got
ahead of economic measures and interfered with the
material needs of the state and also with the
social security of the people. Even the most
developed countries, respecting traditional
democratic principles, have not stopped the
production of weapons, and they do not manufacture
weapons only for themselves, but also for sale.3'
Changes after the June 6, 1992 elections have
made consensus building on this issue impossible and the
Czech/Slovak split in 1992 has left Slovakia in a position of
starting with almost nothing in terms of export controls.
b. [Question P-21 Were political interest groups,
for example defense industry workers, influential in the
debate over these questions?
Recall that there are generally three groups
that would have a vested interest in continuing arms exports,
among these would be the arms brokers. In Czechoslovakia
Omnipol had been the country's monopoly arms exporter
throughout the communist period. While it may be difficult to
judge the potential political impact Omnipol could make on new
government in 1990 the potential economic impact was clear; at
its high point Omnipol accounted for 50%- of the foreign
currency profit made through foreign trade. 34 In March 1991
a second brokerage firm, Unimpex, was granted a license to
engage in foreign trade activity. Unimpex is based in Martin
and was established as a direct rival to Omnipol for the
87
representation of products coming out of Slovakia." Both of
these firms lobbied for continued exports although their
direct effects are difficult to judge.
A clearer indication of a deliberate and
effective lobbying effort is seen by the industry management
in Slovakia. Here they became much better organized, and
politically active much sooner, than their Czech
counterparts.3  On February 17, 1990 just after the
announcement to halt arms exports by Foreign Minister
Dienstbier there was a Saturday morning meeting held between
the Slovak Premier Milan Cic and representatives of Heavy
Engineering Works Combine headquartered in Martin Slovakia."
Heavy Engineering Works Combine was a holding company
officially under the federal government for not only the large
tank factory in Martin but also many other industrial firms
throughout the federal republic involved in both weapons and
civilian production.
Overall only half of the combine's to,..al
production was related to weapons, but two of its larger
plants in Martin and Dubnica were almost totally involved in
this type of production. In addition, with 85 percent of its
workers located in Slovakia, and a good portion of them
located in the plants mentioned above, it is clear that they
felt they could apply greater pressure to the Slovak rather
than the Federal government and did so. Just two weeks after
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the announced federal policy the representatives from Martin
demanded that the Slovak government pressure the Federal
government into rethinking both the conversion policy and the
arms export policy.
The defense industry labor force also played a
substantial role in the governments decisions vis-d-vis
exports controls, but here again the characteristics of the
labor force, and their involvement in the issues of conversion
and exports, are quite different between the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. Peak employment, for both republics in the mid
1980s, had reached 120,000 to 150,000 arms industry related
jobs. In 1987, for example, the arms industry employed 73,000
workers directly, and another 70 - 75,000 in supporting
industries. 3' This direct employment represents around 2k of
the total work force and around five percent of all workers in
industry. 3 9 As was the case throughout the communist bloc the
defense industry workers were better paid but they lived with
more restrictions.
By 1991 there were 44- 46,000 defense industry
workers in Slovakia compared to 26- 28,000 defense workers
employed in the Czech Lands.4 Defense industry workers in
Slovakia accounted for 5.4 percent of the total labor force
versus 1.7 percent in the Czech lands.41 Moreover the defense
industry labor force in Slovakia represented 16 percent of the
total employment in industry and was in turn very concentrated
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geographically. The Vdg river valley in Slovakia contained
32.6 percent, or about one third, of all defense workers in
the federated state.42  The large numbers and geographic
concentration of the Slovak workers contributed to their
strong political impact, especially with the Slovak
government. Moreover, the Slovak workers maintained more of
the organizational structure carried over from the Communist
period.
The defense workers employed in the Czech
lands, on the other hand, did not have the same political
capital with either the Federal or Czech government. Not only
were their numbers much smaller as shown above but they were
employed in much more numerous and much smaller firms than in
Slovakia. Of the 111 firms, the majority, around 71, were
located in the Czech lands.43  These 71 firms accounted for
only forty-nine percent of total defense industry production
as compared to sixty-one percent for the forty firms in
Slovakia."
The lobbying effort on the part of those
favoring continued exports did show signs of success. After
the February 17 meeting the Slovak Government stated that they
had a "unequivocal moral and political responsibility" to work
out a fair solution with the Federal Government. 45  In fact
Juri Dienstbier himself traveled to Slovakia on April 30, 1991
and visited two of the largest factories in the V~g river
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valley. There he announced that the exports to Syria of newly
produced tanks would be allowed to go ahead.Y The impact was
greatest in Slovakia and never really got off the ground in
the Czech Republic.
c. [Question P-31 Do the national security
objectives dictate the maintenance of a domestic military
industrial base?
There was very little discussion on this point
in Czechoslovakia, either before or after the breakup. The
defense industry in Czechoslovakia was considered much more an
economic recourse than a national security resource, and the
arguments made to maintain the industry both in the Czech
lands and Slovakia have focused on the economic rather than
security impact.
Given the geostratigic positioning this view is
understandable; the borders are not in dispute and they are
surrounded by friendly and relatively stable countries. This
is especially the case for the Czech Republic since the split
which is tucked in between Germany and Austria. Far from
taking measures to retain portions of the industry under state
control in the Czech Republic Prime Minister Klaus has taken
the position to privatize the industry and allow them to sink
or swim on their own merits. In August 1993 Klaus said that
"the only thing we did is that we did not order the demolition
of factories producing this or that arms product. This means
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those factories exist, are functioning, and if they find
buyers, let them sell their products - if they fail to find
them, that is simply tough luck.47
4. Economic Aspects in Czechoslovakia
During the communist period the main production
enterprises were administered by the Federal Ministry of
Metallurgy, Engineering, and Electrotechnical Industry. There
were il1 production firms in this category by the end of 1989
and arms production was 8.3 percent of total in 1988.48 The
arms industry was also quite profitable, with profits doubling
civilian enterprises.' Production of military durables
accounted for an average of 7.9 percent of gross machinery
output from 1972 to 1981. This represented the highest
percentage among the three with Hungary averaging .46 per cent
and Poland averaging 6.4 per cent during the same period.50
The economic structure of the defense industry in
Czechoslovakia is, however, the most complex case to outline.
There were, in effect, two separate and distinct industries;
one in the Czech lands and on in Slovakia. The differences in
the labor force are outlined above but there are a number of
other significant structural differences like the demographics
of production, size of industry, structure of the individual
firms and the degree of sophistication. Because there were
different regional characteristics in the industry, it
naturally followed that very different views would emerge
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about how easy it would be to convert the industry. Different
views emerged, in fact, even about even the necessity to
convert the industry since many Slovaks felt that there was
still a market for their arms.
a. [Question E-l Were the prospects for converting
the defense industry relatively high?
In May the Czechoslovak biweekly "Reporter"
outlined how much more dependent Czechoslovakia was on weapons
exports than France, FRG, China and the U.S. and indicated
that conversion would be much more difficult than anyone had
imagined. 51 Later the Czechoslovak economic daily-
"Hospodarske Noviny" (Economic News) stated that although
"conversion" had become a new and commonly used term it was
clear the this would not apply to all firms or all items of
"special production" (the common reference to military
production),.
While there were problems for defense industry
conversion in both republics the problem was more acute in
Slovakia. Table 2-2 indicates some of the other structural
differences between the industry in the Czech lands and the
industry in Slovakia. Using 1987 as the index, year the data
shows a steady decline in arms production that had decreased
64 percent by 1991. Through this period Slovakia retained the
majority of arms production in all years except 1989. The
data also shows that as the total production decreased, the
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Slovak percentage of military production increased; from 60
percent in 1987 to 68 percent in 1991. Whether che
differences were real or perceived the Slovak government
claimed in 1991, that as a result of the structural
differences between the two republics, the decision to halt
arms exports would have an impact on the Slovak enterprises
five times greater than in the Czech Republic.5
Table 2-2
Selected Official Data on Czechoslovak Arms Production, 1987-92
Year 1987 Mill 1988 1989 1990 1991
Production
Total armaments production 29,298 26,737 18.996 15,107 7,673
(mill CS crowns)
Indue 1987 - 100 100 91.3 64.8 51.6 26.2
Rqo"al Dhtstrotion
Czech arms production 11,557 12,331 10,587 7,515 2,417
(mill CZ crowns)
% Total output 39.4 46.1 55.7 49.7 31.5
Slovak arms production 17,741 14,406 8,410 7,592 5,256
(mill CZ crowns)
% Totw outp-u 60.6 53.9 44.3 50.3 68.5
Saol to... (M)
...Czech Army 22.4 28.7 35.8 47.7 32.5
...former socialist states (CMEA) 58.2 56.6 58.8 41.7 20.6
...oh0dr countries 19.4 14.7 5.4 10.6 46.8
mill CZ crowns frem sales 5684 3930 1026 1601 3591
to other countries
SUtt Fed&aW MrMy of Einy, " Cahm nvumim Si AMMMM Pm~dUm w ft Caw- M Swink Famni RasAbM". =@ MMure at ftU NATO-CeMj ald
Ema Smp•m Coamam hDe. D•myu Canmuim Semm, Bgiu.g 2-22 May 1992. p. 21 •.'
(1) [Question E-1.a] Were defense industry
firms already in the process of production conversion in 1989?
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In the Czech Republic the firms were already structured such
that the majority of production was in civilian products.
This is especially true of the large Skoda Work were, prior to
the 1960s, military production accounted for the majority of
production. In this case it appears that the enterprises in
the Czech lands did in fact begin a more spontaneous
conversion well before 1989.
In Slovakia, on the other hand, no
industry to speak of existed until the Soviet initiative to
build production facilities in Slovakia because it was
strategically more defendable than the Czech land. The
problem was that both the origins and the legacy of industry
in Slovakia is centered on the defense industry. There were
some attempts by the Martin tank factory to shift production
into civilian goods but this normally resulted in goods that
were worth less than the resources used to produce them.
(2) [Question E-l.b] Did the production
possibilities for individual firms allow for the shifting of
resources? Just as there are differences in the number, and
concentration of employees there is a definable difference in
the structure of individual fi-ms.
Military production accounted for over 20 per
cent of total output in only one third of the firms in
Czechoslovakia, and far fewer firms devoted more than half of
the production to military items. 55  However, in the three
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largest factories located along in the V~g River, ZTS (Zavody
Tazkeno Strojarstva) Dubnica nad V.gom, ZTS Martin, and ZTS
Trencin the percentage production of military equipment was
much higher than the average. Production of military
hardware, primarily the T-72 accounted for 60 per cent of
production at ZTS Martin, and at ZTS Dubnica, where they
produced the OT-90 and its variants, it was 70 per cent. 56
The challenge of conversion is much greater in Slovakia than
in the Czech Republic simply on the basis of the varying
structure of the firms.
b. [Question E-21 Was export specialization in
military hardware relatively high?
In terms of export specialization,
Czechoslovakia had the sixth highest degree in the world, with
a degree of specialization on a comparable level with the U.S.
and mainland China. (Appendix C) This means that the whole
economy of the federated state was heavily dependent on the
export of arms for continued growth. Given the structure of
the individualized firms in Slovakia and the fact that defense
firms represented a greater proportion of the entire industry
it is reasonable to conclude that Slovakia was even more
dependent on arms sales than the Czech Republic.
Looking at relative export specialization over
time as reflected in Table 2-3, it appears that arms exports
were becoming less important over time, although not a sharp
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decline, until the crucial year 1989 when there is a
significant increase. While there is an danger of making too
much of a conclusion based on ACDA data that is not available
after 1989, the trend is corroborated by other data presented
in Table 2-2. Arms exports to countries outside the former
CMEA became increasingly important to the shrinking defense
industry between 1987 and 1991.
Table 2-3
Relative Export Specialization in Czechoslovakia from 1985-1989
Aomu Total AE/TE Relative
Exports Exports % Export Specilization
Year
1985 1600 29370 5.4 2.2
1986 1400 34770 4.0 1.6
1917 1300 36660 3.5 1.5
1933 925 33450 2.4 1.3
1939 375 13130 6.6 4.4
SMM U.N. Aim CAMM 1 AP Y (IWII. IaMO U
While one can argue that nobody sat down and
calculated out relative export specialization figures and
therefor they were not a factor in the decision process it is
clear that they had some sense of the importance arms exports
played in the economy. The Czechoslovak biweekly "Reporter"
published an article in May 1990 that declared the
"Czechoslovak economy is much more dependent on weapons export
than its principal world competitors such as France, FRG,
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China, U.S.A and the Soviet Union."57  When export
specialization jumped to 4.4 in 1989 this statement was true
in all cases except the Soviet Union.
C. [Question E-31 Was there a relatively high
degree of autonomy in the defense industry?
Czechoslovakia had the highest degree of
autonomy in the arms industry between the Central European
countries. This is reflected in both the higher expenditures
on domestic research and development and the variety of
products that emerged as a result of that effort.
(1) [Question E-3.a] Was the level of
domestic research prior to 1989 relatively high? The figures
in Appendix D indicate that the research and development
investment in Czechoslovakia was much higher than either
Poland or Hungary. During the ten year period from 1974 to
1984 the research and development expenditures were in the 7%
range of total expenditures which was more than double the
percentage in Poland and seven times greater then the
percentage invested in Hungary. 5"
The data is not available to show whether the
research and development money was spent predominantly in the
Czech Republic but there are a number of indications that this
was exactly the case. An examination of the numbers and types
of products that emerged from the two regions should show the
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differences in the research and development effort in each
region.
(2) [Question E-3.b] Were there a relatively
large number of defense products of original design? There
are numerous example of products domestically designed and
produced in Czechoslovakia that were of world class quality
and competitive in their niche markets. These products
covered the range of chemical explosives, small-arms,
aerospace products, radar technology and heavy weapons. Most
of the products of original design emerged from the Czech
lands rather than Slovakia.
Perhaps the best known Czechoslovak
innovation was the almost undetectable plastic explosive
Semtex favored by the IRA and Arab terrorists. In late 1989
the VCHZ (East Bohemia Chemical Works), located outside
Pardubice, employed 9,500 workers and produced at its peak 350
tons of Semtex a year.59 Exports of the product were halted
by government decree in 1989 after the 1988 downing of Pan Am
Flight 103. Following this the firm began work on developing
a chemical marker for the product and in 1993 exports of the
explosive for industrial use resumed.6
A number of other firms in the Czech
Republic produce items that have been developed domestically
and are not simply reproductions of Soviet products through
license agreements. In the late 1960's Czechoslovakia had
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developed a modern radar system that was superior to the one
designed by the Soviets. The Soviets, however, were able to
force procurement of their system in the Warsaw Pact by
playing off the smaller members."' In 1990 there was
confirmation about a lesser known product, the MCS-90 TAMARA
radar system, which the Czechs contend is able to defeat
"Stealth" technology at a range of 400 km.02 The TAMARA is
designed and built by Tesla Pardubice which is located in the
same region as East Bohemia Chemical Works. 63 The system has
been sold to former CMEA countries and the predecessor system,
RAMONA, was delivered to Syria.
The L-39 Albatross is another example of
a domestically developed item. The L-39 Albatross is a tandem
seat jet trainer with armed and combat versions and is
manufactured in Odelena Voda by AERO Vodochody Akciova
Spolecnost (Areo Vodochody Aeronautical Works Ltd). Since its
introduction it has been exported to many countries all around
the world." Recently there have been a number of
improvements to the L-39, including the addition of American
avionics.6'
The Bohemian Armament Factory has been a
producer of small arms since the turn of the century and today
the nine millimeter pistol Type 75 is in service around the
world. Anticipating acceptance into NATO the Czechoslovak
government awarded a contract to the Bohemian Armament Factory
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to design and produce small arms that could accept the NATO
SS109 round in 5.56x45 caliber. The design work was
subcontracted to the Prototypa design firm in Brno in late
1990 and completed 18 month later. 6
The Prototypa design office has been designing small
arms since the 1920s. It has designed such weapons as the
Model 26 (Bren) and 37 (Besa) machineguns as well as the Model
59 and Model 61 Skorpion sub-machineguns, all of which enjoy
a worldwide reputation. The new family of weapons, consisting
of a sub-machinegun, an assault rifle and a lightweight crew-
served machinegun, were the first small-arms in Czech history
to make use of .omputer-aided design.67
The factories in Slovakia, on the other hand,
produced heavy, land weapons systems. These systems were not
items that had been domestically developed but were rather
systems produced under Soviet license or their modifications.
These included the T-72 Main Battle Tank, the PRAM-S 120 mm
Self-propelled Mortar System, and the OT-90 Armored Personnel
Carrier, which is a variation of the Soviet BMP. The only
item produced in Slovakia of original design is the 152 mm
Self-Propelled Gun/Howitzer Dana, which is a Gun/Howitzer
mounted on a Tatra truck chassis. (The chassis is built in
the Czech Republic) There is nothing comparable to the
systems of original design that have been developed in the
Czech Republic.
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(3) (Question E-3.cl Is there a relatively
strong move toward cooperation with Western firms? There have
only been a small number of announced cooperation programs
between Czech and foreign enterprises and since early 1993 no
foreign firms have shown a willingness to enter into joint
ventures with the firms in Slovakia. The French firm SOFMA
has announced that it plans to cooperate with the Czech
industry umbrella organization RDP in offering an upgrade
package for the T-72. 68
d. [Question E-41 Was the outlook on continued
exports in 1989 relatively high?
While the global demand for military hardware
has been on an aggregate downward course since 1985 both the
Czech Republic and Slovakia have had an opportunity to compete
in certain areas of the market. Ladislav Nemec, Director for
the Administration of Special Technology at the Ministry of
Metallurgy, Engineering, and the Electrotechnical Industry
detailed for the press and the public a number of products
that had good potential for export and hard currency."
Czechoslovakia was the seventh largest arms
exporter in the world both in 1989 and for the cumulative
period of 1985 to 1989. Czechoslovakia was also fifth among
the Tier II countries, with export totals comparable to those
of West Germany. (See Appendix B)
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(1) (Question E-4.a] Did they have export
potential in expanding markets as early as 1990? (i.e. the
Far East of Middle East) Though the bulk of Czechoslovakia's
exports were to the CMEA, there were a number of traditional
customers around the world; in Europe exports were made to
Yugoslavia and Austria, in Asia to China, India, Indonesia,
and North Korea, in Middle East to Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq
and Syria, in North Africa to Algeria, Libya, and Morocco, as
well as countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and to Cuba.
Czechoslovakia, as a whole, enjoyed the best
export potential in Central Europe; the military hardware that
came out of Czechoslovakia had worldwide respect and they were
established players in all the major arms markets. In 1990
there were ongoing projects with Libya, India, Algeria,
Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and
Pakistan that had earned the industry 238 million crowns."
(2) [Question E-4.b] Did the prospects for
exports rise over time? By the middle of 1990 it is clear
that Czechoslovakia understood the aggregate downward trend in
arms sales, however, they would point out the fact there was
some expansion, both for the less innovative products from
Slovakia and for the more innovative products from the Czech
lands.
The conventional wisdom holds that arms
exports throughout the world dramatically decreased from 1985
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to 1989. This is clearly what the aggregate data published by
ACDA reveals.7 1 Not everyone in Czechoslovakia trying to make
a decision on this issue, however, looked at the aggregate
view. Certainly some looked at the impact changes in the
market were having on Czechoslovakia alone and here there is
a very different story. Certainly arms exports and their
associated revenues were going down for the country, but not
to the same degree as the rest of the world.
Examine the trend in exports to counties
outside the former CMEA from 1989 to 1991 (Table 2-2); zhe
percentage of total sales rises from 5.4 per cent to 46.8 per
cent. The CZ crowns earned from sales to other countries is
even more illuminating. While the value of total arms drops
from 18 billion CZ crowns to seven billion, the revenues from
sales to other countries increases from one billion to about
3.5 billion CZ crowns. These are sales to the very countries,
of the very items that the government was proposing to cut
off.
This potential for arms export continued
even after 1990. In 1991, the federal government confirmed
that potential tank sales to both Iran and Syria were being
negotiated. The Slovak government announced separately that
Saudi Arabia was interested in their military hardware.7
While sales to the former CMEA had all but dried up, the
increase in sales to countries outside the CMEA actually
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resulted in increased revenues. In the period 1987 to 1991
while total production decreased, revenues went from CZ crowns
1026 to Cz crowns 3591. (See Table 2-2) Clearly sales
outside the CMEA was where the growth was by 1991. In
February 1992 the current Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir
Meciar, said that the government export restriction policy was
"irresponsible," and that Slovak arms factories had "such
large orders we could live off them for seven years.",73 From
their perspective it probably did not matter that the general
demand for arms around the world was decreasing, what mattered
was that there was a demand for what they produced.
Adjustments were also being made to offer
more technologically advanced products. In June 1990 the
director of the Special Equipment Department in the Ministry
of Metallurgy, Engineering, and the Electrotechnical Industry
declared that, while overall demand for arms is decreasing,
future production would concentrate on military hardware that
has the best export potential.7 4
Since the 1993 split it appears that the
Czech Republic has the best chance to compete in an emerging
market. Their products are original, inexpensive and reliable
and they produce the products that address the needs of many
of today's major customers. The Czech Republic also has the
best chance of integrating and combining their own capable
technology with more advanced western technology to produce a
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very competitive product for the new market. (The L-39
Albatross already incorporates American avionics.)
The prospects for Slovakia's continued
participation in the global arms market are not as bright;
there are very few, if any, products of original design.
Furthermore, Russia and Poland are able to produce the very
same products cheeper than the Slovak factories. It is likely
that the market itself will prevent Slovakia from exporting
significant numbers of arms well before the political elite is
able to legislate export controls.
5. Conclusions Relative to Czechoslovakia
Table 2-4 compares the conclusions for the former
federated state of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia against Hungary, which acts as the model. The values
listed under "Czech/Slovak" represent the overall assessment
for the former federated republic, and the final two columns
represent the values for each republic separately. Prior to
the breakup the state of Czechoslovakia displayed a pattern
far different from the model Hungary. Some of the critical
differences included the difficult transition from communism,
the structural problems in the political process, particularly
with regard to the matter of jurisdiction between the Slovak
Republic and the federal government. In addition the overall
prospects for continued arms exports, while the two industries
continued to cooperate were very good.
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In comparing the two republics separately it is
clear that the Czech Republic has moved much closer to the
model than Slovakia. This appears to be in keeping with the
real situation. The Czech Republic could pass the legislation
establishing a comprehensive export control system by January
1994, Slovakia on the other hand is still far from making
these moves.
Table 2-4
Conclusions for Czechoslovakia the Czech Republic and Slovakia
vs. Hungary
Questions Hungary Czech/ Czech Slovaki
Slovak Rep a
(Qua•w S-11 Didwal- kpoof M Y onmin p- yes no no no
allow for a Melawtvely u amoah bso n•d?
[Queb eS-2 Was d for a no yes no yes
arcut -OWia safey oft -h& WAg?_ _ _ _ _ __ _ _
I[u.8 S-31 Wer e pmwe -d w" hos for Nl yes yes yes no
ofmpim with Wowna Eutcp relatVel qhih
[Quatm P-11 Wa m MualmdiW to do no yes yes yes
5avmeala abil it mse cahe n, ia do srmai penod,
(Q•a.m P.21 wesepoldea w tgupa, fo- -Wk no yes no yes
defms xAdmy woetma, mlhamno w th debafe a done hs
(Quem P-31 Do IM naumd =ay obi-mes dwtft tf no no no no
.aininmo Ma d&=W milikaz iaahial baae?
[QUM &! Wen. ffhrow" for cmaft ft M=f yes no yes no
( mB&21 w- wpm eiatm m mnma afft- no yes no yes
-h& hig? _ _ _ _
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The best chance the Federal government had to
establish an export control system, along with associated
legislation, was in 1990. While still enraptured by the
euphoria connected with the revolution of 1989, there was a
chance to set many of the economic arguments for continuing
arms exports aside. if the political elite had chosen then to
pursue a course of moderation and conciliation there was
probably a chance to build consensus on this issue.
Instead the dissident elite chose to pursue a policy
that was so extreme and so one sided in its impact that it
could do nothing but polarize the country. The structure of
the industry would have made this difficult to achieve but if
there was any possibility of defusing the political impact of
the defense industry workers, so tightly congested in
Slovakia, it would have been through a process of moderated
and slow change rather than the shocking blow that was
delivered in February 1990.
These internal problems were not, and are not,
receptive to the "carrot" and "stick" approach extended by
CoCom. There was no way that this mechanism could compete
with the ideological struggle in the leadership of the federal
republic or the nationalist tendencies of the Slovaks. The
policies that have been adopted in these two countries in the
past three years arise from a whole host of factors, social,
political, and economic that are very resilient to change at
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all. Even relatively small policy changes like this cannot be
separated from the general background. If they are not
included 4 n the social, political and economic fabric of the
West then they will be forced to turn elsewhere and pursue a
separate course.
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B. POLAND
Since CoCom's 1990 offer, none of the four Solidarity
lead governments in Poland have been able to establish a
definitive arms export control system. The government lead by
Prime Minister Suchocka had come quite close to passing
relevant legislation through parliament, but could not
accomplish this task prior to the change of government in
October 1993. It is unclear at this point what steps the new
government will take in this dirtection.
1. Arms Export Control Measures in Poland
a. Review of Control Measures
The Communist government in Poland, like
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, had taken some steps to control
the transfer of arms prior to 1989. On 23 December 1988,
Poland passed the Act on Economic Activities (Ustawa o
dzialalnosci gospdarczej) which was the basic law governing
domestic and international trade.' Later that month on 30
December 1988, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
issued Order No. 43 which required permits for foreign trade
in dual-use substances which could be used directly or
indirectly in the production of chemical weapons.' Most of
these measures were established outside of any common
framework or goal, like establishing the kind of system that
could get Poland off the CoCom list.
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The next year on 17 April 1989, the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations issued an order concerning the
establishment of a list of goods that required official
permission for export. 3 Following that, on 21 December 1989,
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations released a list of
goods and services which required official permission for
their transfer. This second list was divided into four
categories: military supplies of active equipment (weapons and
ammunition); auxiliary equipment; services; technology and
know-how.4 Shortly thereafter, tariff regulations were also
issued that introduced the requirement to get permission for
imports and exports of goods covered by official permits.'
Article 9 of the Customs Law, passed 29 December 1989, gave
the government authority to restrict exports of certain
materials.6
After the changes in 1989, subsequent
governments have taken only a few steps to control the
transfer of military related items. Executive Order No. 450,
of the Council of Ministers, dated 5 November 1990,
establishes temporary restrictions on the export of chemical
substances and dual-purpose explosive materials that may be
used in the manufacture of weapons. 7 Legislation to establish
a new comprehensive system was before the Sejm in October
1993, but its fate is unclear after the new parliament took
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over in November. Table 3-1 gives a listing of the
significant events in chronological order.
Table 3-1
Chronology of Polish Export Control Measures
December Act on Economic Basic law governing domestic
1988 Activities and international trade
December Ministry of Foreign Requires permits for Foreign
1988 Economic Relations trade in dual-use substancesOrder No. 43 which can be used directly
or indirectly in the
production of chemical
weapons
April Ministry of Foreign
1989 Economic Relations
order concerning the
list of goods that
required official
permission for export
December Ministry of Foreign The list was divided into
1989 Economic Co-operation four categories: military
released a list of supplies of active equiprent(weapons and ammunition);goods and services auxiliary equipment;
which required official services; technology and
permission for their know-how
transfer.
December Tariff regulations were
1989 issued that introduced
the requirement to get
permission for imports
and exports of goods
covered by official
permits.
December Customs Law Article 9 gives authority to
1989 restrict exports of certain
materials
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May CoCom offers to take
1990 Poland off the
proscribed list
November Executive Order No. 450 Establishes temporary
1990 restrictions on the export
of chemical substances and
dual-purpose explosive
materials that may be used
in the manufacture of
weapons
October Comprehensive Law on The bill was close to being
1993 Export Controls for passed in October 1993, but
yRelated Items he impact of new electionsMilitary eis unclear
b. Background
Although not codified _n a comprehensive
system, Poland had a export control structure that was
potentially very restrictive through 1989, in terms of the
numbers of actors involved. There was no need for a system of
licensing arms exporters even through about March of 1990
because Cenzin (Centrany Zarzad Inzynierii) had monopoly
control over negotiating and concluding contracts for arms
exports.' Cenzin was in turn subordinated to the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations (MoFER) and although Cenzin
negotiated all arms related foreign contracts, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs retained veto power over all export deals. 9
In January 1990, however, changes were
introduced that changed both the Act on Economic Activities
and Ministry of Foreign Economic Relation's 17 April 1989
order. 10  Like Hungary and the "Kalashnikov Affair," Poland
suffered its own media embarrassment in 1990 when the Polish
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ship Boleslw Krywousty was discovered to be carrying Polish
arms in the Red Sea unbeknownst to the Polish government.'
Following this affair the Minister of Foreign Economic
Relations, Marcin Swiecicki, convened an interdepartmental
conference on March 20, 1990 to determine changes to the
system." After the conference he announced that Cenzin's
trade monopoly in Polish-produced armaments would be
abolished; licenses for export would be issued to enterprises
directly involved in the production of arms, and that the
Foreign Affairs Ministry was to draw up a list of both
restricted materials and restricted destinations. He
indicated at that time that these changes were being made to
correct the "existing shortcomings" of the system that existed
in early 1990.11
In fact this proposed system, as announced,
contained many of the elements that CoCom was requiring for
elimination from the proscribed list. The proposed system
included a list of controlled items, a structure to license
export firms, the establishment of a list of proscribed
destinations and a mechanism to approve or disapprove each
transaction. Every contract involving either restricted
equipment or restricted destinations required approval from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This change of policy came
a month before the CoCom offer and it appears that Poland was
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making these decisions in a vacuum, unlike Hungary who had
been working closely with CoCom.
Just after CoCom made its offer to Poland, May
16, 1990, CENZIN was separated from the MoFER and established
as an independent trading company. The government retained
-majority holdings in the joint stock company and the remainder
of the stocks were distributed among domestic arms producing
firms. 14 A-round the same time, the trading company Cenrex was
also granted permission to negotiate independent arms export
contracts. The state held 76 percent of the Centrex's shares
and the Union of Farmer's Co-operatives held the remaining 24
per cent."
The result of these decisions was that by 1993
fifty one Polish enterprises were authorized to conduct
foreign trade in the military equipment that they produced
directly. In addition, there were three firms authorized to
broker a wide range of weapons, spare parts and services.'6
Fifteen other enterprises were authorized to conduct trade in
radioactive materials. Despite the growing number of firms
involved in the foreign trade of military material, Cenzin
17still accounted for 60 percent of all such trade in 1993.
Many of the different restricted materials
lists, like the list of dual-use chemical substances and
explosives list, were openly published in the Dziennik Ustaw.
(The Dziennik Ustaw is roughly comparable to the Federal
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Register.) In addition to the various restricted materials
lists, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained two
lists restricting destinations. The so called "negative list"
consisted of a list "A", which were states subject to a UN
embargo like Yugoslavia and Iraq, and list "B" which was
determined by Polish authorities but kept secret." As is
often the case the "B" list appears to be very politicized, in
referring to them the Minister of Industry and Trade pointed
out that while the "A" list is not open to question, "other
potential customers are a subject that should be discussed in
Poland, although not in a public forum, which is obvious.
Economic interests are sometimes as important as political
interests. ,,
In March 1992 five Poles were arrested in
Frankfurt on charges of attempting to sell weapons to Iraq.20
The "Rifle Affair," as it became known, had a significant
impact on Polish policy in two ways. First, it did force a re-
evaluation of the export control system in Poland, but second,
it also soured Poland's impression of the West. The affair
was considered by many to be simply an effort to push Poland
out of the arms market and those arrested were viewed as
practical businessmen tying to save jobs in their factories.
When asked to comment on the "Rifle Affair", Wieslaw
Niewiarowski, Minister of Industry and Trade, remarked that it
was "a manifestation of the struggle that goes on between
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rivals competing against each ocher. It is a question of
delivering a blow, of weakening the competition in the
marketplace, of creating more difficulties for the
competition." 2'
In April 1993 a bill was drafted by the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations to protect Polish
enterprises trading in arms. In addition a training program
was established for Polish firms so that they "do not fall
victim to the ambiguous activities of competitors and foreign
special services." 22 This final measure was an admission of
how confusing the Polish regulations were to follow.
2. Social Aspects in Poland
Like Hungary, Poland was a leader in the move toward
total reform in 1989. This was a greater challenge for Poland
because, unlike Hungary, Poland was the focal point of the
Soviet Unions efforts to keep Eastern Europe in line.
a. [Question S-il Did the social legacy of the
com•.nist period allow for a relatively smooth transition
period?
Poland had already instituted changes by 1989
that made the transition easier than in Czechoslovakia, which
had gotten of to a late start and was plagued by nationalist
divisions, but a bit more difficult than in Hungary where the
1968 economic reforms had brought them at least closer to a
market economy. There are two important legacies of the
conmnunist period that impact on the decision for Poland to
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establish an arms export control system. The first is the
move toward liberalizing society began on their own initiative
as early as 1982. Second, is the lock that Solidarity would
hold on the country in the initial transition period by virtue
of its being the champion for change prior to 1989.
Because General Jarulzelski had instituted his
own crackdown of Solidarity in 1981, he gained a relatively
free hand to institute modest changes even ahead of
Gorbachev's glasnost. 23 By 1989 there was a greater readiness
to sacrifice in Poland than other countries in the former
CMEA, as long as political concessions were also made. This
is reflected in how the population, in general, allowed deeper
measures in the initial transition period like the shock
therapy programs.
In Hungary there were no real dissidents and in
Czechoslovakia the dissidents had been removed form the
political process for some time, but in Poland the dissident
movement centered around Solidarity. Solidarity had become
much more than a labor movement by 1989, it attracted a wide
array of political activists. The cross section of political
thought that Solidarity represented in 1989 was much broader
than the range of thought that had been brought into the first
transition government in Czechoslovakia.
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b. [Question S-21 Was the demand for a strong
social safety net relatively high?
The demand to retain a strong social safety net
has been quite strong in Poland. As Louisa Vinton has
described the situation that, "while regaining individual
freedom was a great victory for the Poles, the concomitant
burden of responsibility for one's own fate has bred nostalgia
for the security of communism.' 24  The effect of this demand
was to limit the range of economic policy and to multiply the
impact of groups promoting a platform based on maintaining the
safety net. The Poles have been very willing to maintain jobs
for their own sake.
c. [Question S-31 Were the prospects and initial
hopes for full integration with Western Europe relatively
high?
Poland's expectations for inclusion into the EC
were about the same in 1989, as Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
The disenchantment with the EC that has gripped most of
Eastern Europe in 1993, however, has been most pronounced in
Poland. There is a strong sense that exports to the West have
actually dropped since the communist period."
The tide of expectation for inclusion began to
shift in 1992, which was a very disappointing year for Central
Europe in general, but very much so for Poland which is
potentially the largest economy. As Jan B. de Weydenthal, a
country specialist for RFE/RL Research Reports expressed,
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"more than anything else the (EC Summit in Junej served to
demonstrate once again the persistent differences between the
European Community and the Central European countries with the
regard to mutual trade while underscoring problems in
developing trade policies within the EC itself.1'16  On 29
April 1993 the Polish government issued a formal statement
critical of the EC. The statement said that the "'EC's actions
demonstrate... that the [restrictions on meat exports] are
merely an arbitrary instrument of discrimination and a
concealed trade barrier that violate the terms of the
association agreement.,,'
Expectations for inclusion into NATO were not
as high as elsewhere in late 1989 and early 1990. This is due
to the fundamental understanding that they were still the key
to East-West conflict because they are still the crossroads
between Russian and a united Germany. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however, a greater expectation for inclusion
in NATO has emerged. This is born out in the statement by the
former Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz that, "for the
first time in 500 years, we have no common border with Russia.
Therefore, Russia will first direct its claims at our eastern
neighbors, which separate us from this country." 2'
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3. Political Aspects in Poland
In Poland, the political battle over export controls
was dominated by two factors. First, as Solidarity became
less a social movement and more a traditional labor interest
group it began to focus its efforts on forcing the government
to secure jobs. Second, because of Poland's unique
geostrategic position the leadership became very conscious of
the need to maintain a viable defense industry not only for
the sake of jobs, but also t,, address real national security
concerns.
a. [Question P-Il Were the structural impediments
to the governments ability to make changes, in the transition
period, relatively high?
Poland had a very significant structural
problem with the government between 1990 and 1993. These
problems are a result of both the original roundtable
agreements and the 1991 election law.
As one political observer described the
situation, "since the round-table bargain of 1989 between the
Conmmunist party and the Solidarity opposition, the Polish
political system has been a jury-rigged structure, the product
of a hasty though often ingenious improvisation."'29 The issue
of arms export control has been examined and reexamined by
four different government coalitions. Whereas in Hungary the
same people have filled the ministerial positions that
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traditionally work on this problem the story in Poland has
been one of constant turnover in ministerial leadership.
The second stumbling block was the !991
election law and the "hyperproportional" representation it
caused in the Sejm. Poland has struggled with as many as
thirty different parties in Sejm; many of which represented
the most extreme views of the political spectrum. The Sejm
has largely been in a state of impasse since 1991 and
consensus building has been extremely difficult. 3"
The almost constant turnover of the Polish
government, boch in the council of ministers, and in the Sjem,
has prevented any resolution on the issues of export controls
or the future of the Polish arms industry. In February 1993,
Jerzy Milewski, secretary of state with responsibility for
defense affairs in the Presidential Chancellery, explained
that the restructuring plan for the defense industry, proposed
in July 1991, was delayed by the upcoming Sejm elections and
"then there was another government that devoted its attention
to something else, and then it was followed by another
government. ,31
b. [Question P-2) Were political interest groups,
for example defense industry workers, influential in the
debate over these questions?
As the issue of Polish arms exports became an
open issue and discussed in the press during the last months
of 1989 and the first half of 1990, many of the interviews
128
with government officials pointed out that arms sales were
"good business." There were of course a number of
commentaries written that opposed continued arms sales, but no
real examples of an organized political effort to influence
government policy to stop arms sales all together. 2 Just as
in Czechoslovakia, however, the initial post communist
government did have a large number of anti-militarist
representatives who had as a goal the total elimination of the
arms industry. These efforts were never well coordinated nor
was there a solid core of political leadership, as in
Czechoslovakia, that raised the issue to the top of the
agenda.
Cenzin and Centrex both fulfilled their
traditional role as lobbying organizations pressuring the
government to keep export controls weak. In terms of its
position vis-a-vis arms exports, they were clearly in favor of
maintaining expanded exports.33  They both, and especially
Cenzin, would have had considerable influence with the
government by virtue of their hard currency earnings. This
influence would have only grown as the EC and the West in
general began to lock out other Polish agricultural and
industrial sectors when Polish officials were desperate tor
foreign currency earnings.
The influence of Cenzin and Centrex might have
been diminished on July 6, 1990 when Swiecicki announced that
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the process would be further liberalized. The goal was to
allow companies that directly manufactured a given type of
weapon or equipment to conduct mediation for export themselves
by the end of the year. This liberalization only applied to
direct manufacturers of military hardware and did not allow
for further expansion of general brokerage firms like Cenzin
and Centrex.3" The real impact of the decision was to expand
the number of firms with a vested interest in continued arms
exports. These moves also had the unfortunate consequence of
leading directly to an ambiguous legal status for the plant
managers, which in turn lead to the problems associated with
the "rifle affair."
The third traditional group, with a vested
interest in expanded arms exports, is the defense industry
work force. In Poland, labor has the greatest degree of
direct influence with the government in the region. This
influence is directly tied to the impact of Solidarity.
To begin with, Poland has the strongest
traditions of labor activeness among any of the countries
studied, and there is no movement that equalled the scope and
power of Solidarity. Although Solidarity had become much more
than a labor movement by 1989, its roots were in the
representation of workers and workers interests. In the four
years since Solidaity wrested control of the government from
the Communists in September 1989, the story of Solidarity has
130
been one of transition from broad based political party to
traditional labor interest group.
At first, Solidarity acted as the "patron and
guarantor of the expected reforms," but since then there has
been growing disillusionment with Solidarity." It became
clear that Solidarity was acting on the principle that they
were a labor union rather than a political party during the
1991 Parliamentary elections. 36  Although there has been
growing disillusion with Solidarity it has remained a potent
political force. The coalition government, put together by
Hanna Suchocka in July 1992, gathered its legitimacy largely
from the good offices of the Solidarity deputies in
Parliament." Since then, however, Solidarity has lost many
of the leaders who gave it a moderating influence and kept it
on the track of reform, and on the heading of a political
party rather than a labor union."
During this transformation Solidarity has been
heavily involved in lobbying on the issues involving the
defense industry in the form of its National Defense Industry
section headed by Stanislaw Glowacki. 3' The numbers of
workers represented by this section are quite large. In 1989
there was a total of 260,000 defense industry related jobs. 4
In 1991 it was estimated that there were 180,000 workers
employed in the arms industry, of which around 40,000 were
employed in the production of final products. 41 Though there
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has been a reduction in the labor force, it has been
relatively small; it was reduced by only 22,000 jobs between
1991 and 1992.
Solidarity's impact is multiplied by zwo
factors: concentration geographically, and concentration of
labor force by firm. The largest concentration of defense
industry production is in the central and south-east region of
the country, particularly in Silesia and Poznan. The Bumar
Mechanical Equipment Combine, located near the city of
Gliwice, employed up to 20,000 workers, or eight percent of
all defense related jobs in one complex.4 2  Eleven of the
largest arms producers employed over 1000 workers each and six
of these enterprises, in turn, employed from 1700 to 7400
workers. 4
The ability of the Polish defense industry
labor force to gain access to and lobby the government is
unmatched in Central Europe. On May 6, 1993 a meeting was
convened by President Walesa that included Prime Minister
Suchocka, Deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski, the Ministers of
Industry and Trade, National Defense, Foreign Economic
Cooperation, the chief of the General Staff, Solidarity
representatives from the defense industry factories and their
managers, to work out the issues involving the defense
industry." A plan that incorporated the decisions of the
body was to be completed by the end of July and presented by
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Deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski to the National Defense
Industry section of Solidarity for review.45  Since the
government changed in October it is unclear what has happened
with these latest agreements.
c. [Question P-31 Do the national security
objectives dictate the maintenance of a domestic military
industrial base?
Of the three Central European countries, Poland
has made the greatest expression of the link between a viable
defense industry and national security. There is no illusion
of complete self-sufficiency, but the Poles are very cautious
about becoming overly dependent on either Russia or the West
for military hardware. On June 13, 1991, a special
interdepartmental Commission on Organizational Reform of
National Defense recommended the creation of a state defense
industry corporation which would operate under separate laws,
to include a ban on trade union activities. Under the
recommended plan the state defense industry corporation would
operate between eight to ten plants, but the Polish army would
be authorized to award contracts for supplies and equipment
directly to the private sector."
Not only were steps taken to retain crucial
portions of the industry but also to increase self-sufficiency
in military hardware since research and development was
planned to continue. The 1991 plans called for an increase in
domestic research and development for the production of
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aircraft, communications equipment, armor, ships, electronic
equipment and ammunition.4  The military modernization
program also called for a ten percent increase in the amount
of modern equipment used by the Polish Army.
In 1992 the principles of the program were
embedded in the new Polish defense doctrine creating a strong
link between the survival of the defense industry and the
nation's existence and sovereignty. In May of that year the
Sejm adopted principles for the restructuring of the industry
based on that doctrine.
In the end, the most likely organization of the
industry will place all firms into three categories: state
arms enterprises, joint-stock companies, and private
enterprises. The state arms enterprises would be those firms
that produce basic weapons and perform repairs. The 1993
plans propose that 19 enterprises will be directly retained by
the state. Eight firms will be subordinate to the Ministry of
Industry and Trade to produce battle tanks, small and heavy
arms, ammunition and other equipment. The remaining eleven
firms are to be subordinate to the Ministry of Defense to
perform major repairs and modernization of arms and equipment.
The government will remain the major share
holder in about 31 joint-stock companies, perhaps grouped
together into four separate holding companies.4s Decisions on
production, structure and trade policy will therefor be
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controlled by the government in these cases. All remaining
enterprises are to become privatized and out of the sphere of
direct government influence. 49
4. Economic Aspects in Poland
The structure of the Polish arms industry has been
shaped by a very complex history. An independent armaments
industry did not exist in Poland until the end of the First
World War, nor did the industrial infrastructure to support
one. When Poland regained its independence in 1918 one of its
first tasks was to set about the difficult task of building an
arms industry. The task was difficult because, although
government investments were concentrated in the armaments
sector, the old infrastructure had been destroyed, the former
markets disrupted, and the population was actually less
industrialized in 1929 than it had been in 1900. Industrial
managers were also attempting to develop along western lines
without the support of capital investment because of Poland's
low credit rating.50
Despite the difficulties several technologically
advanced armaments factories were established during the 1930s
in the Central Industrial Region of Poland, which is the
middle and south-eastern part of the country. (Arms
production remains concentrated in this region even today.)
The key factories and plants, located in Starachowice, Pionki,
Swidnik, Mielec, Rzeszow and Stalowa Wola, produced basic
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military equipment for the infantry, mechanized infantry,
artillery and air forces." The statistics for armaments
production in the interwar period would be Qketchy, if even
available, but with six concurrent wars between 1918 and :925
it is clear that military orders would have been high.
Increasing demand for armaments also had impetus in a growing
standing army that went from 266,000 in 1923, to 350,000 in
1935.52
The Second World War devastated Poland's entire
economy and the armaments factories build in the 20's and 30's
fared no better. In 1946 there were questions as to whether
Poland would even rebuild the shattered arms industry that had
been built only in the last thirty years. 53  After 1949, in
conjunction with Sovietization, the Soviet Union pressured
Poland into not only rebuilding the defense industry but also
developing an administrative system for the arms industry that
was a carbon copy of its own.4 In 1950 the six year plan
that was announced for the period 1950 to 1955 limited
military industry investments, to include workers housing to
only 2% of total government investments.-5 The turning point
for the Polish arms industry came with the outbreak of the
Korean War. In 1951 a supplement to the six year plan
stipulated that all military-industrial investments would be
fulfilled in two years and that "new investment programs were
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to be planned in conjunction with the Soviet Union for the
construction of a new modern weaponry base. 56
In 1989 Poland was the largest Warsaw Treaty member
and the defense industry was the most "Sovietized.,•07  One
hundred and twenty eight industrial, service and trade
enterprises were classified as part of the defense industry in
1989. The Ministry of Industry managed 84 enterprises, the
Ministry of Defense managed 36, while another three were under
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the remaining five
functioned as part of other departments. 58  For the firms
designated defense industry enterprises, management through
the defense industry association was mandatory. 59 However, at
least 19 of these enterprises were not engaged in production,
but were managed directly by the Ministry of National Defense
to conduct repair work.0 In 1993 there were a total of 350
industrial enterprises involved in the production of armaments
and military equipment, 120 of which manufactured final
products. 61
a. [Question B-i1 Were the prospects for converting
the defense industzy relatively high?
The prospects for converting the individual
firms in the Polish defense industry were widely
differentiated. Some firms got of to an early start during
the era of perestroika, others had a production structure that
allowed the easy shifting of resources. Still there was a
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core of enterprises that were concentrated geographically,
employed large numbers of people and whose production was
concentrated on military equipment making their chances for
conversion very poor.
(1) [Question E-1.a] Were defense industry
firms already in the process of production conversion in 1989?
The Ministry on Industry had drafted plans for the expansion
of "civilian" production by the defense industry enterprises
as early as 1987.62 In 1990, the Ministry of Industry was
planning for a 37 percent expansion of civilian production for
the defense industry firms.6  Despite the efforts on the
Ministry of Industry the tangible efforts to convert the
industry were small in scale even though they had clear
intentions to move in this direction." BUMAR-Labedy had also
initiated conversion programs, but the civilian products were
very expensive because they making inefficient use of the
means of production.
(2) [Question E-l.b] Did the production
possibilities for individual firms allow for the shifting of
resources? In total the defense industry enterprises were
utilizing only 40 percent of their production capacity for
military products and the other 60 percent for "civilian"
production. Very few of the defense industry plants used more
than 50 percent of their capacity for military and the
majority used under 15 percent. 5 In addition, according to
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the general trend in east bloc industry, machinery and other
equipment used for military production was normally located in
a separate department from the general-purpose machinery and
equipment that could be used in both civilian and military
production, so these departments could be separated out as
independent entities.
Table 3-2
Percent of Total Production in Military Equipment for Selected Firms
Stocznia Polnocna 95 Okecie 32
Przemyslowe Centrum Optyki 90 Warszawa-Wola 25
Radwar 84 Zaklady Radiowe 24
PZL-Swinik 81 Belma 22
Warel 81 Wisla 19
BUMAR-Labendy 71 Lucznik 16
PZL-Warszawa 69 Pronit 16
PZL-Rzeazow 67 Star SA 15
PZL-Kaliuz 65 Stalowa Wola 9
Pressta 60 Krasnik 6
Hydral 59 Nitro-Chem 5
PZL-Mielec 54 Gamrat 4
Dezamet 53 Niewiadow 2
Mesko 47 UNIbMR 2
Radmor 43 ERG-Tychy 0.6
Tarnow 35 Nitron-ERG 0.5
swim. MWlMg IWap m of am MM, Oif &imuowy Tmalt-
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For the 32 enterprises classified by the
government as major arms producers the story is somewhat
different. Of the eleven establishments under the Ministry of
Defense, overall military output accounted for 80-90 percent.
For the firms under consideration for establishment as a
joint-stock company the share of total military production
ranged from 60 to 90 percent. 7  (See Table 3-2)
b. [Question E-21 Was export specialization in
military hardware relatively high?
Poland had the highest degree of export
specialization in arms in Central Europe; roughly the same as
Czechoslovakia for the five year period 1985 to 1989 but more
than five times as specialized as Hungary. Not only was
Poland the most specialized arms exporter in the region it had
the third highest degree in the world, ranking only behind the
Soviet Union and Israel. (Appendix C)
Table 3-3 describes the trends in export
specialization over a five year period from 1985 to 1989.
From this perspective it is clear that although the ratio of
arms export to total exports declined dramatically between
1985 and 1988, Poland's position in the world arms market




Relative Export Specialization in Poland from 1985-1989
.Arms Total AE/TE Relative
Export Exports % Export Spectaiizhtion
Year
1985 1300 20160 7.3 2.3
1986 1500 25920 6.4 2.7
1987 1300 26560 5.3 2.3
1988 1200 32010 3.9 2.1
1989 400 28480 1.4 0.9
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One of the contributing factors to the high
arms export specialization was the difference in profitability
between military and civilian goods. In 1988, 200-300 zlotys
were required to cover the cost of production to obtain $1 in
hard currency export earnings for sales of military hardware.
In the automobile industry the same $1 in export earnings
required twice the cost in zloty and in the electronics
industry three times.68 This in turn was explained by the
fact that productivity was much higher in the arms industry
because of high-technology appropriations, a more disciplined
organization of labor and a substantial R&D content in
production inputs.' In addition, the firms, described as the
core of the defense industry, were very dependent on exports
for their production orders. For example, in 1987 and 1988,
eighty percent of the military production at the Bumar
Mechanical Equipment Combine was exported. 7 °
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C. [Question E-3] Was there a relatively high
degree of autonoay in the defense industry?
Poland's arms industry in total was much more
autonomous than the industry in Hungary and Slovakia and
perhaps comparable to the industry in the Czech lands although
much larger.
(1) [Question E-3.aI Was domestic research
prior to 1989 relatively high? Poland ranked in between
Hungary and Czechoslovakia for domestic research and
development expenditures as a percentage of total military
budget. (See Appendix D) The total military budget was
larger, however, and therefor there was an overall positive
effect on the development of independent polish products and
especially production techniques.
(2) [Question E-3.b] Were there a relatively
large number of defense products of original design? The
variety of original defense products is a good indication of
how fruitful the research and development effort was and in
this context it is apparent that Poland was indeed successful.
In September 1993 there was an exhibition
of Polish military products held in Kielce intended to show
the Polish military and the rest of the world the level of
Polish technological advancement in arms. Deputy Prime
Minister Pawel Laczkowski attended the exhibition and declared
at the closing ceremony that "the Polish arms industry
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enterprises have mastered highly advanced military
technology," adding that the Polish arms industry is able to
compete in international markets. 7" This statement was
obviously politically motivated statement but it was not
groundless.
The items displayed at the exhibit
included a wide array of items, designed and manufacture in
Poland, that are technologically sophisticated and militarily
viable. For example, the PT-91 (Twardy) tank, which is a
modernized version of the Russian T-72 built in Poland through
Russian license. There are a number of domestic improvements
like reactive armor, a laser warning array, and a thermal
sight.n The laser warning array for the PT-91 was designed
and produced by Radwar and PCO, two Polish electronics firms.
The thermal sight was developed in cooperation with the
Israeli company El-Op.7
Poland has been innovative in the design
and production of aerospace equipment. For example, the 1-22
Iryda twin-jet advanced trainer, manufactured by PZL-Mielec,
which is produced in both trainer and combat versions. The
Iryda with the K-15 engine is intended for both the Polish
army and for export.' Also PZL-Warszawa has designed the new
Scorpion attack aircraft for high maneuverability and
firepower. It has a fly-by-wire control system, can achieve
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an angle of attack greater than 50 degrees and the
manufacturer claims a projected warload of 4000 kg."
Poland is the only one of the East/Central
European countries that produces naval equipment. Here again
there are examples of the fruits of the Polish R&D effort.
The Polish Naval yard in Gdynia-Oksywie has been producing
glass-reenforced plastic (GRP) hulled minesweepers since 1981.
This year they launched a modernized version for testing new
types of sweeps and minehunting sonar.76
There are additional items that are being
offered for export the have yet to reach the production phase.
The Research and Development Center of Mechanical Appliances
in Gliwice has also developed a prototype of an armored
engineer vehicle based on the T-72 chassis and components of
the WZT-3 armored recovery vehicle. The vehicle has a front-
mounted V-shaped dozer blade and a telescopic crane arm for
erecting or dismantling battlefield obstacles.
Polish industry has also displayed a great deal
of technological innovation and modification in the means of
production. The director of the Bumar Tank plant claimed, for
example, that they could machine the tank frame on a single
machine tool; the same procedure required 15 separate tools in
other plants.7
(3) (Question E-3.c] Is there a relatively
strong move toward cooperation with Western firms? Poland has
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perhaps the highest degree of cooperation with western firms.
Poland recognized early that it has an opportunity to develop
military hardware that is both unique and technologically
advanced if it developed cooperation with Western firtms. As
early as 1990 there were indications that Poland was making
overtures to Western firms to enter into joint ventures that
could take advantage of domestic technical capabilities
developed in recent years."
The French have been among the most active
in establishing industry to industry cooperation. The Polish
firm Radwar and the french firm "Thomson-CSF" signed an
agreement in May 1993 on the production of military
reconnaissance and command systems. The goal, according to
the firm's president Giscard d'Estaigne, is to establish a
common defense industry in Europe.7 9 Other examples include
agreements between Polish and Swedish firms to cooperate in
the production of weapons and military equipment both for
their domestic markets and for export.•
d. [Question E-4] Was the outlook on continued
exports in 1989 relatively high?
Poland was the twelfth largest arms exporter in
the world in 1989 (tenth among the Tier II states) but eighth
for the cumulative period of 1985 to 1989. (See Appendix B)
The Polish army purchased 49 percent of the miliary goods, 5
145
percent was sold to Polish police agencies, and 46 percent was
exported to other countries."
Exports were considered very profitable, with
a rate of return approaching 40 percent. Poland exported an
average of 1.14 billion dollars worth of arms between 1985 and
1989. (See Appendix B) Two thirds of Poland's exports were
shipped to socialist countries were the trade was conducted on
a largely barter basis, however, other exports did earn Poland
over 300 millions dollars a year in convertible currency
during the late 1 9 8 0 s.2
(1) [Question E-4.a] Did they have export
potential in expanding markets as early as 1990? i.e. the Far
East of Middle East. Like Czechoslovakia their list of
customers was quite long, including many countries in the
Middle East, so they did have a broad customer base by 1990.
In 1990 a representative from the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations told the press that Polish arms
exports included, "ammunition, fire arms, armored vehicles,
tanks, naval craft, aircraft, radio tracking stations, radar
components. Very, very various things, some of which have an
enormous content of very modern technology." The official
added that there were countries like Syria and Iraq that still
owed Poland money, but that others like Iran had already paid
in full. Prior to 1990, however, countries outside the CMEA
did not account for more than 12 percent of Poland's total
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arms exports.14 The hard data on arms exports is not
available after about 1990 but there were indications that
Poland would be able to expand its base outside the former
CMEA.
(2) [Question E-4.b] Did the prospects for
exports rise over time? There are indications that :he
prospects for expanded exports of polish military production
has grown in the past few years. In January 1993, Poland
concluded a deal with Pakistan for the purchase of Polish T-
72's worth $450 million. 5 The U.S. opposed the deai and it
was apparently scrapped, but the Minister of Industry and
Trade indicated in July 1993 that the tank contract with
Pakistan might still be realized.M
In 1993 PZL-Warsaw received an order for the
delivery of over 100 "Wilga" training aircraft to be delivered
in south-east Asia. This order was in addition to another 20
aircraft delivered to two other countries. When asked to be
specific on which countries had purchased the aircraft the
director replied; "do you know why we did not sell tanks to
Pakistan? Because everyone knew that we were planning to sell
them there."'" PZL-Swidnik has also received numerous offers
for its Sok6l (Falcon) helicopter.
The Minister of Industry and Trade
expressed the belief that some sectors of the arms industry
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would came out of the crisis quicker because of export
potential, stating that,
The aviation industry will be the first. The
helicopters already have certificates - European
and American ones. New markets have appeared in,
for example, Africa. The industry processing
materials will pick up somewhat later, and that
will give a boost to the ammunition industry. The
electronics sector has bought new technology, and
that will yield results. The shipbuilding industry
is receiving an increasing number of orders.s8
In addition to sales of complete systems Poland
has good potential for expanded spare parts and services
sales. Many of the bilateral military agreements between
Poland and its neighbors include provisions for joint
overhauling of military equipment. This would give them an
opportunity to conclude service contracts on not only
equipment that they produce but also similar equipment
produced in Russia and elsewhere."
5. Conclusions Relative to Poland
Table 3-4 outlines the conclusions for Poland in
comparison to the base country Hungary.
Perhaps the driving factor in Poland is the firm
connection they make between the maintenance of a viable
portion of their defense industry and their national security.
This factor not only sets them apart from Hungary but also the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Because of this they will pay a
greater cost to keep the industry in tact and producing
military equipment. Because they are set on this course, arms
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sales abroad will always be a tempting way to lower that cost
even if it brings it into conflict with the U.S.
149
Tabio3-
Conclusions for Poland vs. Hungary
Questions Hungary Poland
[Quasut 3-I1 Did te soal eM of the counic period yes no
allow for a rWaively amooth i tmsa•c paeid?
S-21 Was *Adam" for a no yes
strn socia safey =e relatvely higb' _______ _______
[Qes l &31 Wes de pr"mpet and a" hop, tot W yes no
an-ausm wAt Wester Europe elatVel WOh?
lQuesum P-1l WeM h an1wueal impedu to tho no yes
gwarmum abilit to make ch~a.nes do the U trniaou e d.
- b _ __,_-_ __,
[Quetion P-21 Weax pol••al ktt pog. tf emanst no yes
dfe induoty woire. wMeal w the dea over thew
quau-?
(Quas •-Io 11-31 Do the natinl sur obiev dictae th no yes
mainuemm of a domtui y zilias mdmuWal base?
[(Quvtio &-11 We fhe proMem for cosveruus the defetn yes no
[Qusm B-21 W- wpm --- •-i-n a wltW hardwae no yes
- hIh? _ _ __high?
(Qusadtic &31 Was ther a relav* Wo deu, o no yes
[Question 6.41 Wa th otlook on ezpoiroin 1989 t no yes
There are other areas where Poland does not fit the
model. First, the structural problems with the political
process brought about by "hyper-representation", although the
new election law should ease the problem over time. Second,
while the effectiveness of Solidarity as a broad-based
political party has greatly diminished it is still very
effective as a traditional labor interest group. Finally,
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because the Polish defense industry was relatively autonomous,
with effective R&D and cooperation with Western firms its
export potential is perceived to be very good.
Poland may very well emerge as the major arms
exporter in the region five to ten years in the future. The
legislation establishing an arms export control system may
indeed pass through the Sejm but a strong propensity to export
arms will remain. There are three factors that contribute to
this conclusion.
First, Poland is determined to retain a large
portion of its defense industry for national security reasons.
It has no more desire to become dependent on the West f or
military hardware as it has to remain dependent on Russia.
Currently, the Army is financially strapped and unable to
procure new equipment but the government will take steps to
protect the industry for the time when the financial situation
is improved.
Second, Poland will use arms sales abroad, just as
many other countries do, to maintain its potential for both
continued development and production. The Army wants
equipment like the PT-91 and the Scorpion attack aircraft and
there will likely be a push to offer them for export both to
be the production line open but also to lower the eventual.
procurement cost.
Finally, Poland has been very aggressive in seeking
joint ventures with Western firms to produce technologically
advanced military hardware'. This drive, combined with their
own intellectual capital and comparative advantage in
production costs should make them competitive in certain areas
of market.
The internal factors that relate to Poland's
inability to establish an export control system are not ones
that could be influenced by outside pressure. For one thing
there was nothing that could have been done to prevent che
constant turnover in government. Aside from that, however,
Poland's views on maintaining a solid core of the industry,
the lobbying power defense industry labor force, and their
potential to find room in the future arms market will not be
affected by the stick of being left on the CoCom proscribed
list.
As well as being ineffective, the pressure to get
Poland to adopt these export controls has also had largely
negative consequences. Many in the polish government regard
the export control measures advocated by the West to be simply
protectionist moves intended to preserve the western military
industry also in a time of crisis.
In the years since Poland has broken away from the
conmunist bloc the fascination with and the popularity of the
Armed forces has grown. Although the military has always been
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popular there is today an even greater and open expression of
this sentiment. The Army wants to be modern and respected and
generally the population wants this for them although they are
concerned with the price. The Polish arms industry says it
can build and supply the Army with modern equipment today, but
since the government has no money to buy new equipment they
must turn to exports in order to survive till that day when
Poland can modernize its force.
Arms sales abroad are a matter of Polish pride, for
if someone wants to buy Polish military products it is a
statement that the industry is sophisticated, independent and
competitive. When efforts are taken to stop them from going
through with a deal it is perceived that the West is simply
trying to drive them out of the market.
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V. TIHE LEAST SIMILAR CASES
A. RUSSIA
1. Export Control Measures in Russia
The CoCom requirements for an export program can be
met by following the guidelines in the U.S. Department of
Commerce's A Guide for National Exoort Control Programs. The
manual was designed for use by the Republics of the
Commonwealth of Independent States to develop the fundamental
administrative and legal structure for an export control
system. To meet the CoCom requirements, an expansive program
will have to be adopted that enacts regulations, has
enforcement and supervisory provisions, has public awareness
policies, and adheres to international control regimes.
Because of its expansiveness, adopting CoCom supporting
legislation would have an influence on a wide number of
interest groups. Given the political volatility of Russia
since 1991, it is not surprising that such legislation has not
been promulgated.
A perspective on what should and should not be sold
is developing in Russia. There is a clear consensus that-
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nuclear, biological and chemical weapons should not be sold.'
Russian president Boris Yeltsin expressed his support for the
London guidelines on conventional arms sales.ý The State
Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation (GTVS) was
created in 1992 under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime
Minister Georgiy Khizha. The commission's task is to monitor
and promote the process of arms exports. The GTVS is also
tasked to develop a unified Russian policy in the area of arms
exports. 3 Minister Khizha also headed the Russian Federation
Export Control Commission. This commission, an interagency
group formed in 1992 by Presidential decree, gives final
approval for exports of military equipment, technology and
services. Thus, initially, Russia demonstrated its desire to
tie together the arms export efforts with the need to control
and monitor the sale of weapons. Yet, the Russian
government's removal of Minister Khizha from the GTVS and the
Export Control Commission does signal an emphasis on arms
sales. The issuing of export licenses is controlled by the
Ministry of External Economic Relations with input from the
Export Control Commission. 4
Even with these structures in place, Russia still
has to develop sufficient enforcement and supervisory
abilities at the state level. The state has still to develop
programs to educate potential arms sellers on state laws and
restrictions. Russia also needs to create bureaucracies which
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are efficient enough to take away the incentive to circumvent
the established state structures. Finally, Russia will have
to report arms sales and transfers to a degree exceeding the
voluntary requirements of the United Nations conventional arms
register.
2. Social Aspects in Russia
a. [Question S-i1 Did the social legacy of the
communist period allow for a relatively smooth transition
period?
The greater a country views conventional
weapons as a symbol of their sovereignty, the less likely the
country is to adopt non-proliferation legislation. For some
members of the Russian government production of conventional
arms was and still does reflect the glory of the State and
should be protected. This should not be surprising. For many
years the engineering and weapons sectors of the economy
received the best of materials and personnel. Their products
were held up as proof of the Soviet Bloc's ability to be able
to compete with the West. Those perceptions die hard.
The old Soviet fear of being surrounded by the
West has reemerged with a new twist. According to Anotoly
Shestakov and Vladimir Yurtayev, both members of Russian
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the creation of the
Central Asian Regional Union (CARU) is an effort to deprive
Russia of profitable commercial and economic partners and
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access to world markets for goods and raw materials especially
Russia's profitable military-technical cooperation with Iran.'
The same sentiment is intertwined with the idea
of prestige when on 19 August 1993 Russian Federation Premier
Chernomyrdin said that his government:
has no intention of going with an outstretched hand
to ask for any kind of help. Russia wants equal
cooperation on the world market in every direction,
including the sale of arms. But those who run the
world market are not one bit interested in seeing
the country make progress. They want Russia to
fall apart, but they will not see that
6
The same conspiracy theory was held by the previous Russian
Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov. Dr Khripunov, Senior Scholar
and Co-director of the "Newly Independent States Export
Control Project" at the University of Georgia in Athens,
Georgia, contends that conservative members of Parliament have
been able to argue for the conspiracy theory because projects
supporting non-proliferation have been funded by the Pentagon
from the US defense budget. 7
Echoes of the East/West conflict have taken
shape in the debate to sell arms. Hence, Vice President
Aleksander Rutskoi said "the remainder (non-soviet type
weapons sold to Middle East countries) were not sold by God
descending from the heavens but by real producers, including
the chief one - the United States. And only our rival's
lobbyists can push Russia toward a unilateral reduction of the
arms trade." 8 He is pointing out that the selling of arms is
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a zero sum game in which the U.S. is attempting to increase
its market share at Russia's expense. Deputy Defense Minister
Andrei Kokoshin pointed out that "if other countries would
have started reducing arms deliveries this would have had some
effect, but it turned out that most democratic countries are
not stopping arms sales but increasing them ... Naturally,
it's very disappointing to our arms producers to see ... other
countries advancing on our markets."' 9
The leadership in Czarist as well as Communist
Russia had a strong desire for secrecy. During the Gorbachev
period, secrecy hindered the exchange of information needed to
scrutinize the VPK. Public debate about the VPK was also
missing which made it difficult to achieve genuine reform of
the military/industrial complex (MIC). Information on ý:he MIC
became more accessible in the first year of the Yeltsin
presidency but seems to have become more restricted in the
later part of 1993.10 The Russian desire for secrecy seems to
be reasserting itself and is most noticeable in those Russian
officials who don't want to join an arms control regime that
will demand a great degree of transparency.
As Hufbauer and Schott pointed out, CoCom
restrictions in the past played a relatively uninfluential
role in the economic troubles of the Soviet Union." Internal
mismanagement and the inherent contradictions of the Marxist
system were far greater factors. 12 This perception has
165
carried into the post Soviet era. Nowhere were Russian elite
attitudes about CoCom restrictions better displayed than at
the July 93 G-7 meeting at Tokyo. At the concluding press
conference, President Yeltsin said:
Not all the components of the package proposed by
the G-7 are of equal significance. They are not
all in keeping with the way we see the problem; we
attach special significance to the removal of trade
barriers and the repeal of economic documents that
discriminate against Russia. The process here has
been less appreciable than it is in politics. The
prohibitions within the framework of the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (CoCom) have not yet been lifted
At first, President Yeltsin's remarks seem to express his
belief in the importance of CoCom restrictions. But that was
not, nor will be the case because Yeltsin views the CoCom
sanctions as an anachronism that must pass as the political
and economic relations of Russia and the United States are
regularized.13 At the G-7 meeting, he suggested a timetable
of about two years to remove the restrictions to Russian-
American trade."4
Even if the restrictions have credibility, many
Russians have the perception that the restrictions are a
temporary event. Since 1990 the number of items on the CoCom
list has been reduced. One main reason is in a statement from
the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany which said:
"In an age where via dialogue and cooperation we try to assist
reform processes in Poland, Hungary and the USSR, CoCom is
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outdated"15  This same opinion was expressed in an article
about the restrictions hindering access to the Russian space
launch market. Two writers for the business paper Kommersant
Dail have noted that:
The main thing, however, is not that the CoCom
restrictions can be gotten around, but that they
themselves, now an anachronism from a political
standpoint, must, with time, be removed as the
political and economic relations of Russia and the
United States are regularized"6
Such an attitude is noteworthy because the
potential for growth in the space industry is so great. Not
only does Russia produce the "Energia" rocket, Russia,
including Ukraine launch vehicles, has the capabilities to
perform almost 60% of the world's commercial launches but is
only performing 3% of the commercial launch market because of
the CoCom restrictions.
One is clearly left with the impression that
the CoCom restrictions are of minimal economic impact on the
Russian economy, except for the space sector where Russia has
suggested lifting CoCom restrictions in exchange for Russia
joining the less economically intrusive Missile Transfer
Control Regime (MTCR).
The Socialist legacy of providing each person
a job disguised a great deal of hidden unemployment. Add to
that the dynamics of industrial dependent towns or regions,
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the prospect of cutting military industrial production will
present sever economic, political and social problems.
The Soviet period of Russian history reinforced
Russia's perception as a great power. Russia must now decide
how it will define great power status and to what degree it
will pursue that status. Additionally, Russia must now decide
what will be its rational for adopting international norms.
It is not possible to define exactly how Russia will play its
great power role, but there are indications that Russia is
following a policy, common during the soviet era, of using
arms exports to increase the influence of Russia in other
countries.
For example, in Azerbaijan, Russian support
helped 2nd Azeri army corps commander colonel Guseynov lead a
successful revolt that toppled the Popular Front Government of
President Elchibey and brought to power the former Communist
Party chief of Azerbaijan, Haydar Aliyev. 1 7 The Armenian army
has received spare parts for weaponry through the Black Sea
port of Bitumi which were then brought to Armenian forces
along truck routes that pass through Russian army garrisons
and under Russian army control.'s In Georgia, covert military
support was provided to Abkhasian forces to limit the success
of Georgian forces. In October 1993, Russia also provided
weapons to the Georgian government of Edward Shevardnadze
during a critical juncture in Shevardnadze's war against
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Zviadists. Russia supplied weapons to the Georgian army in
order to get Georgia to join the CIS and to curtail the
influence of Zia Gamsakhurdia who was considered a protege of
Turkey.19 The examples above show a pattern of Russian arms
sales and grants designed to facilitate the return of Russian
influence into regions previously controlled by the USSR.
b. [Question S-21 Was the demand for a strong
social safety net relatively high?
Russia also suffers from the social norm that
the state factory had to provide for all its members. The
attempts by factory managers to insulate their workers from
the harsh effects of conversion and cutbacks has added impetus
to the overall drive to sell weapons on the arms market. Any
politician who would adopt legislation to restrict arms sales
would have to show how the arms enterprise workers would gain
by reduced arms sales. After the last two years and the
failures in conversion and privatization, this would be a very
difficult task for any politician.
c. [Question S-31 Were the prospects and initial
hopes for full integration with Western Europe relatively
high?
The more the political leadership of a country
has the expectation of being part of regional trade and
security organizations the more willing they will be to adopt
non-proliferation legislation that is in line with the adopted
policies of the organizations to which they hope to gain
admittance. This in turn is predicated on the degree to which
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the party, or leadership in power, desires to become a member
of a regional trade or security organization.
Russia is a member of North Atlantic
Cocperation Council and an associate member of the North
Atlantic Council. Russia's admission into the Council of
Europe (CE) is being held up until the adoption of a new
Constitution and parliamentary elections. Opponents of
admission into the CE point out that Russia is too large and
contains too many problems for the Council co effectively
handle. Opponents further argue that the Council of Europe
would have to alter its present structure and increase its
budget.-0 Membership in NATO is seen by Russia as a possible
long term goal. The Russian Foreign Minister's remark that
Poland could act as a "neutral bridge" between Russia and
Germany highlights Russia's perception on membership. 21 The
minister's remark was made as preparation for President Boris
Yeltsin's statement that Russia would not object to Poland's
admission into NATO. Even without the Russian Draft Doctrine
which reportedly recommends blocking Polish membership in
NATO, it is clear that none of the European organizations have
had any effect in influencing Russia towards adopting
restrictive arms control legislation."
CoCom restrictions were a tool in the arsenal
of the West in its battle against the USSR during the Cold
War. Originally designed to deny the "threat" access to
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western technology that would increase Soviet military
capability, eventually there developed an attitude that it was
repugnant to trade with the enemy. This attitude can be seen
by the CoCom restrictions that went beyond cost-benefit
analysis. Thus the line between economic restrictions which
were designed to influence a country and economic restrictions
which highlighted a state's repugnant nature became blurred.
To some degree that taint of CoCom restrictions
must carry over to the post-soviet present and seems to be
illustrated in the nationalist statements such as the
following by Vladimir Gerasimov. In Pravda he is critical of
the West's frustration of Russian attempts to enter the high
technology markets. He sarcastically remarked that:
all Russian attempts to break into the world market
with achievements in science have been blocked.
Now there are bright prospects: the elimination of
CoCom and the lifting, in ten years, of
restrictions on Western countries' trade with
Russia. But that's another 'penalty kick' into one
side's goals
3. Political Aspects in Russia
a. [Question P-l1 Were the structural impediments
to the governments ability to make changes, in the transition
period, relatively high?
In the absence of political power or in the
face of the perceived weakness of the State, the state
creates an impression that trading can go on unencumbered by
state restrictions. A firm may also feel that it must take
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care of itself in the absence of a supportive state structure.
The ineffectual policies of the Russian state is evident in
the comments of Mikhail Bazhanov, chairman of the Russian
Federation State Committee for Conversion. Commenting on the
plans for establishing working places for displaced military
and civilian specialists from the military-industrial complex,
he noted that plans have been adopted but can't be implemented
for lack of funds. He then made an indictment of his
government's ability to make plans but not act upon them:
G6bbels is known to have grabbed for his pistol at
the word 'communist'. I want to do the very same
thing when people say 'plans', 'plans for
measures,' and 'commissions' to me, for if you
intend to disrupt matters, just set up a commission
or write a plan. We produce heaps of measures, but
where is the execution? I believe what is needed
is not write plans, but to work specifically.
Russia would have difficulty enforcing arms
control legislation because the state does not really know how
many weapons it owns or what is carried out of its borders.
The military commentator for Cgeodnya, Pavel Felgenhauer,
suggested that the Russian figures to the UN Arms Register
identify three problems with arms control in Russia. First
the General Staff may not even know what it has, second
weapons are being sold through unofficial channels and third
Russia can ship weapons to Ukraine for export and then not
have to be responsible for their accountability. 24
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Russia would be foolish to adopt arms cor.nrol
legislation that it could not enforce. Russia can not police
its own borders. Moscow does not really know what weapons it
owns nor what is being produced. The Russian Federation has
republics developing their own weapons programs. The military
is authorized to sell weapons and has sold weapons without
authorization from Moscow. Factory managers and workers
unions are actively seeking commercial arrangements. Russia,
by signing a formal and international agreement, would be
creating a situation where the Russian government's
inadequacies are constantly highlighted to the West.
b. [Question P-21 Were political interest groups,
for example defense industry workers, influential in the
debate over these questions?
The greater the degree of political influence
held by internal political groups that are morally or
philosophically opposed to arms sales, the more likely Russia
will adopt non-proliferation legislation. The converse is
also true. During the first two years of Russia's statehood
the preponderance of influential actors are in favor of arms
sales
The Civic Union, a moderate to centrist
political group, proposed a new economic union which would
include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Civic Union
claims that the leaders of centrist forces in each country
support this initiative.' A main component in such an
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economic integration would be the rejoining of the arms
production structure. This supports the contention that the
reconstitution of the empire will find its roots and basis of
support in economic integration.
General Mikhail Malei, Russian State Counselor
for Conversion, strongly supports the sale of arms but wants
to limit sales to regions of tension and emphasize the export
of defensive weapons.2- The clearest example of the
government's pro-arms position was the firing of the previous
Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, Petr Aven. President
Yeltsin said that Aven's failure to promote Russian arms sales
had cost him his job. According to RFE/RL staff writer,
Stephen Foye, the more recent resignation notice of the
standing Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, Sergai
Glazyev, was partially due to pressure he was receiving over
a policy to impose stricter control on the export of strategic
raw materials and military technology. The pressure was being
exerted by Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko, a
supporter of Boris Yeltsin.2 Aside from demonstrating the
government's position on arms sales, his resignation
highlights the Russian government's desire to sell all types
of weaponry.
Yeltsin has demonstrated for what ever reason
that he is unwilling or unable to pass a law that restricts
arms sales. He realizes that the arms sales question stands
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far in line behind other more pressing problems. in the face
of a budget that will increase the deficit by at least !2% of
GDP before adoption of populist measures proposed by
Parliament, parliament is making hash out of his economic
policy.:8 Parliament is threatening to bring privatization to
a halt, and pronouncements about Sevestapol are undermining
the credibility of Russia as an international partner. The
above types of problems will demand Yeltsin's attention before
any questions on arms sales.
The need to form coalitions and political
alliances at this key juncture in Russian internal politics
forces Yeltsin to avoid any policies that would further
antagonize his relationship with industrialists in Russia.
Yeltsin's decision to withhold rocket motors from the Indian
government brought him criticism from the industrialists and
nationalists who objected to Russia giving in to American
pressure. The adoption of legislation that would deny him
political backing when he needs it most would be a foolish
political move. In the public referendum conducted during
April 1993, the following question was asked - "Do you think
it necessary to have new parliamentary elections?" Of those
who voted, 67% answered "yes". For Yeltsin this is
encouraging but not a clear mandate to act against Parliament.
He must still subordinate his foreign policy goals to the
realities of domestic power politics.
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As a populist leader, Yeltsin must attend to
the public demands. At the same time that he might be
decreasing arms sales, he is faced with demands such as those
from the Vorkuta miners. They demanded the government develop
a program of real social guarantees for those who lose their
jobs to government directed coal pit closures. A reduction in
arms sales means less money for social demands such as above.
This condition will continue during the difficult process of
conversion, deregulation and especially during the conflict
for control of Russia's political future.
If weapons production and sales have some
political utility then there will be pressure by Russian
officials against adopting the CoCom supporting legislation.
Structurally, the market is such that the political utility of
conventional arms has decreased. In commenting on the
international arms trade system from 1980 to 1992, Dr. Edward
Laurance has pointed out that:
Although some supplying states may continue to
believe that arms transfers create structural
influence, only in extreme cases does a structural
arms transfer relationship guarantee that
established supplier-recipient relationships and
their resulting political and strategic alignments
will be maintained. As the political visibility of
commodities being traded on the international arms
market has declined, so has the utility of arms
transfers as a political instrument.2
With the exception of the Near Abroad, this
trend is continuing as part of the post Soviet arms trade
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because the decrease in the number of arms purchasers
concurrent with the increase of the unit price of the items
being purchased has created conditions for a buyers market.
The ability of Russia to use weapons as a foreign policy tool
in bilateral relations is therefor limited.
The utility of weapons sales and production
changes considerably with the introduction of a third party or
another state. In this arena the Russian government 4s
demonstrating that weapons do have a degree of political
utility. One has only to look at the Russian use of nuclear
weapons to appreciate the political utility of weapons. The
proposed sale of cryogenic rocket engines to India illustrates
the same point.
The political regions within the Russian
Federation are demanding a piece of the arms market. For
example, the Republic of Udmurtiya is being converted into an
enormous military complex, in as much as they work on labor
intensive, high technology products. 30 Another example of the
influence of the political regions of the Russian Federation
is that the Russian arms show for 8-13 September was organized
by both the Russian Defense Ministry and local government
officials. 31 The former Tatar autonomous republic, where is
located many important defense industries, has declared itself
independent of Russia. The same can be said of the Chechen-
Ingush autonomous republic, whose president, Dzhokhar Dudaev,
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claims control over the former soviet forces stationed in the
republic.32
To make matters more difficult for the Russian
central government, many republics have been holding back or
reducing their tax receipts to the central government. As a
result, Professor Jacques Sapir, Foundation de la Maison des
Sciences de L'homme in Paris, believes the Russian central
government is practically broke but the many regional
governments have money. Of course, money is power but that is
only one card that the regions can play in order to have
influence in the arms market.
Vitaly Shlykov, former Deputy Chairman of the
Military Committee of the Russian Federation, claimed that the
MIC is using mobilization reserves to continue production
lines. To use his words, there is in Russia a shadow economy
which "uses up the economic fat, accumulated over the last
fifty years in the form of different stockpiles and other
assets." 3  Naturally, these reserves are located in the
regions. Even though the Yeltsin government issued several
decrees forbidding the use of the stockpiles, the regional
leaders are allowing the MICs access to the mobilization
reserves.
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c. (Question P-31 Do the national security
objectives dictate the maintenance of a domestic military
industrial base?
The connection between national security
objectives and arms sales begins with Russia's new view of the
term "security". According to Dr. Evgueni Volk, Deputy
Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, the
Law of the Russian Federation "On Security" signals a change
in the Russian definition of security. The principle
challenges to Russia's security will be from communal turmoil,
massive corruption, separatists trends and economic crisis.
These threats will replace the narrow militarized
understanding of what is national security. The implication
of this change is that weapons sales can be justified as a
means of insuring Russia's economic security.34
In the 29 April 1993 issue of Nezavisimaya
G Vladislav Chernov, the deputy director of the Russian
Federation Security Council's Strategic Security
Administration, made a connection between arms sales and the
security function they provide for the Russian Republic. In
his explanation of the basic provisions of the Russian foreign
policy, he noted that in the economic sphere, Russia faces a
continual threat of being crowded out of a number of foreign
markets and an ongoing restrictions on access to high
technologies. This set of restrictions in combination with
threats of a military nature (especially the continued
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qualitative arms build up in the West) are reasons why Chernov
has said that "special emphasis is placed on precluding any
action that would undermine Russia's strategic stability and
defense potential and its position in world arms markets.",3 5
In an article in Novoye Vremya, the author
noted that "almost 70 percent of the scientific and technical
potential from among high-level specialists, mainly designers
and scientists, have already left or intend to leave in the
near future. 36 To underscore this point the Economist noted
that of the 440,000 immigrants to Israel from the old Soviet
Union, 90,000 had some kind of engineer, medical or scientific
degree. 37  The writer's conclusion is similar to director
Chernov's; "by the end of the nineties Russia will not be able
to catch up in the area of arms production - the only area
where Russia can compete in the international arena." 3
A more parochial view on the same theme was
expressed by an engineer at the St. Petersburg Rubin Central
Naval Equipment Design Bureau. He noted that a portion of the
profits from arms sales needs to be funneled back to support
the Russian naval shipbuilding industry or else Russia may
lose her position achieved in arms development as well as the
upgrading process. The lack of funds will ...
throw us backward and require considerably greater
expenditures for eliminating the natural lag which
will take us more than a decade to overcome. Most
importantly, we are depriving our Motherland of the
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potential of a reliable defense of her borders and
the protection of her own interests.3'
The ideological conflict has been replaced by
the economic conflict. With respect to the arms trade, Maley
said:
Protecting such profitable business against
competitors is a paramount task for the authorities
of any country. How else to explain that the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls both impeded the penetration of military
output from the country under the red flag onto the
world market and is impeding it now, although the
state does not exist, and Russia has changed its
flag, abandoned communism, and embarked on a
democratic path. That can be explained by economic
interests.40
The factory manager for the Tela small arms factory expressed
a similar sentiment when he said "the dynamics of technology
require constant attention - If we stop producing modern
ammunition we'll fall behind the technically developed states
in just one year."'41 This could be read as an attempt to
justify his job but if it is repeated often enough it will
assume its own validity.
4. Economic Aspects in Russia
As in any country, Russia's need to have a modern
capable armed force should be related to their perceived
security environment. The need for modern weapons can be met
in Russia by either producing what is needed or by purchasing
weapons on the open market. The later would require hard
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currency which Russia does not have to spare. Producing
their own weapons is an attractive alternative until one
considers that Russia can hardly afford that option either
unless the weapons industries can produce with economies of
scale to make production profitable. Here is the economic
motivation to export part of their arms production.
Even though Russia has not sold much equipment in
its two years as a szate, the prospects for sales have always
seemed to be in the wings. The negotiations between China
and Russia for the sale of the tanks has held out the promise
of more weapons sales. The same can be said of Russian arms
sales to Malaysia and the opening up of the Pacific Rim
market. Russian aviation equipment was chosen for the first
time to participate in a special test program of U.S. models
of arms. As a result of the test some Russian equipment will
be used by American armed forces.42
a. [Question E-1] Were the prospects for
converting the defense industry relatively high?
The greater the prospects for successful
conversion, the less demand there will be to sell arms. In
reality, the process of conversion in Russia has reflected
the general confusion accompanying the change from a
communist state. In short, conversion has not been
successful enough to act as an alternative to arms production
and sales. 43
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Russia was not initially prepared for
conversion. As stated earlier in the paper, in late 1991 and
1992 Russia did not have the military doctrine and conceptual
framework for the armed forces in which to guide equipment
needs. In many cases firms just produced according to
resources available and old demand levels. Additionally, as
in the Central European states, there were misconceptions on
the ease of conversion; but instead of giving support to tne
adoption of non-proliferation legislation, it gave way to an
unstructured process of conversion and arms production.
The production possibilities for individual
firms did not allow for the efficient shifting of resources
from military to commercial production. During the 1980s,
the defense industries were utilizing about 50-60 percent of
their production capacity for military products and the other
40-50 percent for "civilian" production. In addition,
according to the general trend in east bloc industry,
machinery and other equipment used for military production
was normally located in a separate department from the
general-purpose machinery and equipment that could be used
in both civilian and military production, so these
departments could be separated out as independent entities.
By 1993, the civilian component of the MIC output has risen
to more than 80% of the total defense industry output. This
argument which seems to support conversion is not the full
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story. Because the civilian component of the VPK's
production was not planned for a consumer market, but rather
as filler for wartime defense expansion, the commercial
products coming from its assembly lines were very low quality
and inefficiently produced. The same problem exists today
in Russia." The civilian products are of such low quality
that they can not compete on the unregulated market. Thus,
production of defense related products appears to be the most
efficient use of basic resources.
Part of the confusion surrounding the
conversion process is due to the scale of conversion -
approximately 68 percent of the arms industry.4 5  By way of
rough comparison, the annual conversion rate in the United
States has been targeted between 3-5t. During that process,
many plant directors claim to had been blindsided by the
conversion program. They certainly have a valid claim
because the Soviet government did not give ample time for
factories to adjust to the loss of state subsidies. Without
reopening the debate about whether the economy should have
been lead through conversion by the state or allowed to be
shaped by the marketplace, the end result was one where many
weapons producers felt they had to rely on their own
corporate skills. The director of the Tela Small Arms plant
had the following to say in response to planned governmental
support of the arms industry "we are relying on ourselves
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most of all, counting on our production and scientific
potential. We have excellent people, and that's what keeps
us going"4
The result was a unstructured process where
weapons plants tried conversion to products for a saturated
market. The confusion during the conversion process prompted
the writing of one article titled "Tanks to Tractors or How
Many Stainless Steel Salad Bowls Can One Family Need?" In
the article, the author explained how one factory decided to
produce stainless steel bowls because it seemed a good idea.
So good was this idea that other factories decided to produce
the same thing at the same time - unbeknown to each other.
Eventually, all the producers tailed because of over
production.
In addition to market management problems, the
arms factory managers were tasked to find work to replace the
lost governmental orders. Now, individual plants are having
to seek clients, conclude contracts, and carry through deals,
often without the government's interference much less
support. The priority was to find orders and retain jobs.
Thus, western diplomats in Beijing have commented on the
number of Russia defense industry people operating in China
without the knowledge of the Russian embassy in Beijing.4
Difficulties in conversion gave rise to debate
on the worth of conversion. That debate has pitted
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reformists against a block of conservatives and
industrialists. The reformers view conversion of the
military-industrial complex (MIC) as a synonym for economic
reform. For the reformers, conversion and privatization are
closely linked. The program for privatization though has
been held hostage to an anachronistic political system which
attempts to delineate relationships between the president and
the parliament at time when the two political groups are
competing for control. Hence the law to regulate 1993's
program of privatization has not been presented to Parliament
as of July 1993 because the government assumes the anti-
reform majority would block it. 48
The industrialists see the MIC as a viable
part of the national economy which should be supported and
expanded. Many leaders in Russia see the industrial sector
as a viable entity to compete on the world market and can't
understand why Russian leaders would give up a comparative
advantage? In fact, the MIC was viewed as the area of the
economy that the rest of the conversion program could be
built upon. Mikhail Maley's description of conversion is:
the transformation of the military-industrial
complex by selling the output from it which is
bought on the world market. Conversion is
liberation of the meager Russian budget from
expense on the military-industrial complex and the
swelling of the budget with currency in cashe9
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Some have pointed out that the amount of sales
needed to stay solvent are surprisingly small. An economist
at the U.S. and Canada Institute, Sergai Somuylov, cited the
case of the Uralvagonzavod which he claims needs only to sell
about 200 T-72 tanks for hard currency in order to survive -
and convert to civilian production. 5" Multiple interviews
with industrial managers bear out this same perception that a
small amount of sales will keep the industry alive. Partly,
this is due to the exchange rate and a cut in social services.
From the interviews one gets the sense that they feel that
during better times the arms industry will be able to compete,
not just survive.
Proponents of arms sales draw strength from the
argument that arms sales are a legitimate means of supporting
conversion. This idea grew naturally from the set of
misperceptions about the costs of conversion and the
projections for earnings from arms sales. The projected cost
of conversion over ten years was $150 billion at an exchange
rate of R100:$1. 51  State appropriations for 1992 were
approximately R40 billion at the rate R100:$1. Projections
for earnings of arms sales in early 1992 were $8-12 billion.
At such a rate it was conceivable that arms sales would be
able to fund conversion. In 1993 it is obvious that the above
formulation will not come true. First, the exchange rate is
settling at about R1000:$1. Second, the Russians were only
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able to earn about $1-3 billion from arms sales in 1992 with
hardly better prospects for 1993.
There are a multitude of other difficulties
associated with the type of Russian arms sales that could
support conversion. The internal inhibitors include:
The long lead time for licensing. This
requires nine separate signatures, including the president,
the MoD, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Security, Ministry of
Economy, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations. Their collection can take up to
15 months.5
The difficulty in receiving reliable raw
materials and components which is exacerbated by the forming
of monopolies to control supply and prices as well as the
Russian government's inability to break up monopolies and form
competitive suppliers. Once again the arms trade is held
hostage to Russian internal politics.
The evolving political structure has lead to
public statements by Russians that undermine a possible arms
recipient's confidence in Russia. Top Russian officials
talking about possible civil war in the country does not help
secure long term contracts which require partial funding
before construction.
Anarchy will reign in the absence of a
legitimate system to control arms sales. The Ministry of
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Foreign Economic Export has two affiliates to officially
handle the advertising and contracting for the government-
"Oboroneksport" and "Spetsvneshtehknika", yet a bounty of
other firms, producers and intermediaries have sprung up in
the vacuum of governmental enforcement. In many cases this
has caused haggling among Russian sellers trying to underbid
each other for the right to sell Russian equipment." The MiG
sale to Malaysia highlights this characteristic of the Russian
arms industry.
The Malaysian Defense Minister decided in July
1993 to send a air force team to Moscow to evaluate the
technology which is to be part of a pending purchase of 18
MiG-29s to Malaysia. 54 The Malaysian decision seems to be in
response to fighting among Russian defense contractors who
each claim to hold the rights to sell the aircraft to
Malaysia. This confusion between defense contractors,
according to writer Petr Vasilyev, stems from the dissolution
of the Russian governmental department which oversaw the
Russian arms trade. 55 Apparently, the Malaysian government is
concerned that the Russian squabble in the MIC will leave them
on the short end of the stick and have made confirmation of
the deal conditional on warranties on improved aircraft
performance and guarantees of future maintenance and
technology transfers.56 Russia will also have to be able to
provide all the support aspects of a weapon's sale. Their
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ability to provide a "package" of training, simulators,
modernization and special design features to go with the
purchased piece of equipment is evidenced by the Varshavyanka
57class submarine. With Russia's internal political scene,
this type of coordination among different republics or regions
within Russia will be more difficult to effect.
One reason for the downturn of arms purchases
in the world market is the world wide constraint of capital.
The western arms dealers have been able to adjust to this
development with creative financing schemes vis-a-vis the
potential buyer. Russia's economic difficulties do not allow
Russia to extend such loans and credits to its potential
customers. The need for hard currency has reduced the Russian
options for creative financing as a method for helping arms
recipients bridge the high cost of arms purchasing.
Retooling and equipping problems which hamper
the drive towards worker productivity and competitiveness are
first and foremost affected by inflation which is not going
down in the near term. The Russian Supreme Soviet has adopted
a Law on Grain. One third of the cost of producing a ton of
grain as well as 50% of the expenditure of other supporting
activities will be paid by the state. 58 The Central Bank is
planning to recreate a system of central banks which will have
monopoly authority to allocate funds to specific industries.
This will monopolize the credit markets forcing inefficiencies
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which will lower the effectiveness of the money issued and
result in pressure to increase the money supply.5 9  The
outcome will be a reduction in the amount of capital available
for conversion. The probability of legally developing
investment capital is being frustrated by high taxes,
inflation, lack of preferential terms for investment, lack of
turnover funds, high prices for equipment, a weak banking and
investment ethos and a negative balance of payments in most
industries. Funds are also constrained by the rising cost of
energy and materials. Volatility as a result of deregulation
has added to an business environment where it is difficult to
project future costs and profits. The air of uncertainty
leads managers to stay with low risks enterprises.
Inexperienced factory managers have also hurt
the process of conversion. Managerial ignorance is evidenced
in statements such as "Less cost means more efficiency."60
In fact many managers were reticent to support privatization
of their factories because they feared the new owners would
fire the workers as a step towards efficiency.
On top of all these difficulties is the reality
that the debate over conversion is being conducted in the
crucible of domestic power struggles and has naturally become
a politicized issue.
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There are several external inhibitors to
Russian arms sales that constrain Russia's ability to sell
arms to fund conversion. They include:
1. Uncollectible foreign debt to the old Soviet government
left some production firms without capital for conversion or
future production. Of the $146 billion currently owed to the
Russia from old contracts, more than 40W of that figure Russia
will probably not collect. 61 The paucity of the Russian state
does not allow for the allocation of state credits which would
make up for the loss of foreign revenues.
2. The Gulf War increased the prestige of American weapons.
Russians have labored to show that their weapons have the
qualities of American weapons. Hence an advertisement in
Tekhnika I Vooruzheniye for the 1L219 'Zoopark-l'
counterbattery radar finished with a positive comparison to
the American AN/TPQ-36 counterbattery radar.62  The same
glaring effort is evidenced in an advertisement in Military
T where a MTLB variant armored personnel carrier is
being advertised under the title "Whatever the weather-rely on
a storml" 63
3. The Russian have a desire to curry favor with Western
Powers for specific issues. The Russian decision to not sell
rocket motors to India seems to have been tied to U.S. aid for
the development of the Russian oil and gas industry and an
agreement to cooperate on space exploration.
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For Russia, the reduced world arms market is
exacerbated because of arms embargoes on Iraq, Libya and the
former Yugoslavia. Add to that the glut of Soviet style
equipment from the former socialist countries and the
republics of the former Soviet Union.
b. [Question E-21 Was export specialization in
military hardware relatively high?
There are other reasons, from the Soviet era,
that predispose Russia to sell arms and not adopt restrictive
treaties. First, the USSR was number one in arms exports from
1985-1989 and had a relative export specialization which was
four times the specialization of the United States (see
Appendix C). Given the structure of the Russian arms market,
arms exports would have constituted an influential portion of
the total Russian export market.
Table 4-1 shows that the Soviet Union was
becoming less dependent on arms exports as a percentage of its
total exports as it approached the pivotal year of 1991. This
trend is partly due to the policies of Michael Gorbachev and
probably would have followed him into house arrest had not the
USSR fallen apart. Much more telling is the data on relative
export specialization. There the Soviet Union was increasing
at the same time that other nations of the world were moving
in the opposite direction. Russia would develop as a state
with this upward trend of relative export specialization
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already established as a significant element in its economy.
So after 1991, when the other countries of the world were able
to sustain themselves through a diverse group of products for
trade, Russia entered the world market with very few viable
manufactured, exportable products.
Table 4-1
Relative Export Specialization in the USSR from 1985-2989
Arms Total AE/TE Relative
Exports Exports V Export
Year Specialization
1985 17100 87200 19.6 7.84
1986 21300 97050 21.9 9.13
1987 22600 107700 21.0 9.13
1988 21600 110700 19.5 10.2
1989 19500 109300 17.9 11.9
Source U.S. Anns Coto•W d Otha mment AEny (1991),
C. [Question E-3] Was the outlook on continued
exports in 1989 relatively high?
Russia is playing a part in the world's arms
trade, albeit a reduced role. The future of its
participation, and thus its desire to adopt arms control
legislation, is influenced by Russia's outlook on the export
market, its ability to find a spot in that market and the
country's ability to successfully convert its arms industry to
other lines of production.
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The international and domestic arms market has
shown a steady down trend for Russia, but it is not a closed
market, and it is one in which both Russian officials and
private enterprises see some possibilities. Many of the sales
possibilities stem from the structure of the arms market as it
was developing under the influences of the Gulf War and the
breakup of the Soviet Union.
First of all, markets appear to be opening up
to former Soviet bloc countries that were not previously open
during the Cold War. The major market is in Asia. Malaysia's
announcement on June 29, 1993 of the planned purchase of 18
MiG-29s represented a first for the former Soviets in what is
potentially a hugh market." The mixed purchase of both
American F-lB and Russian MiG-29 type aircraft could be a good
sign for former East Bloc countries trying to break into
traditional western arms markets. The Malaysian deal never
went through. 5 Whether it was the Malaysians inability to
trust Russian production promises, lack of a spare parts deal
with India or simply the Malaysians trying to bid down the
price of American fighters is difficult to ascertain.
Clearly, there were enough reasons for the Russian
industrialists to continue in their belief that Russian
weapons have export potential.
There are some limitations on this belief that
Asia will be a new arms market for the Russians. Russian
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efforts to offset its interest on its debt to South Korea with
shipments of weaponry was not accepted by South Korean
officials. South Korea cited its wide ranging defense ties to
the U.S. as a primary reason for the refusal."
Optimistically, Russian arms merchants can point out that the
traditional Soviet arms recipients, i.e., Iran, Syria, Libya,
etc., are not likely to turn to the West for arms.
Admittedly, in 1991 the United States dominated, the Middle
Eastern arms market but East Bloc weapons dealers could point
out that if the U.S. arms are excluded, then the overwhelming
number of weapons ordered by Middle East countries in 1991
were Soviet designed equipment. 67 But as the example above
illustrates, traditional recipients of western arms may now
look to the former Soviet block for weapons since there are no
ideological and few political consequences. In May 93 Russian
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev visited Turkey to initiate a
contract for armored personnel carriers and helicopters, thus
becoming the first NATO country to outfit itself with Russian
equipment." The preeminence of economics over politics as
the motive for arms sales will open up more markets to the
former Soviet states.
In the short term, this trend will be offset by
the lack of hard currency available in the countries who used
to trade with the Soviet state, but hard currency will not be
this constrained indefinitely. In many cases, barter has
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acted as a substitute for hard currency but is not as
desirable a form of trade for the former Soviet states,
however it will keep production lines open.
Another systemic aspect of the market demana is
that countries or groups at war, or faced with the immediate
prospect of war, will be looking for inexpensive but effective
weapons. The former Soviet stockpiles of weapons which are
now free as a result of CFE arrangements can fill that market.
That is what happened in 1992 when Kazakhstan sold excess
military equipment to Afghanistan. Even the new military
equipment p:.'duced by Russia is less expensive than the
western equipment and could reasonably be the first choice of
a country in a state of war where capital is scarce.
The former Soviet states could have success in
the market not only because their equipment is inexpensive but
also because it can be upgraded with a host of packages which
then will give it a level of quality which is equal to western
equipment. Often this can be accomplished while still
undercutting western prices.
The Gulf War has spurred the market for high
technology weapons, especially missiles. The effectiveness of
the air war has influenced the sale of SA-10 and SA-12
missiles as alternatives to the Patriot missile." Another
example of the market demand opened up by the Gulf war is the
SS-N-22, a 100km-plus infrared and active radar homing missile
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designed for anti-shipping combat. It represents some of the
most current Russian technology.
The SS-N-22 also represents a new market for
Russian weapons. The American military intends to purchase
six of the missiles for testing purposes so that an effective
counter to the missile can be developed.7 0  This does not
represent a long term market. But at hundred million dollars
per missile, the Russians can clearly see a lucrative market.
The Gulf War also highlighted the dynamics of
technology and how it would increase the demand for military
equipment. It is no coincidence that the Russians exhibited
their X31 and X35 missiles at the International Defense
Exposition-93 (IDEX-93). Both are anti-ship missiles. The
X31's anti-radar version can be used to attack AWACS type
aircraft. It has a passive radar homing seeker head which
represents a significant step in the level of weaponry a
country can purchase. In the air to ground mode, it can
target missile control radars. The Patriot missile's guidance
radar was specifically mentioned. 7 1 The X35 missile is named
the "Harpoonski". Its similarity to the American "Harpoon"
anti-ship missile is such that the missile is advertised as a
target for defensive training. These few missiles represent
only a fraction of those in production or the R&D phase which
are for sale. Clearly, the Russians see a market in weapons
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systems designed to counter the western technologies cf the
Gulf War.
d. [Question E-4] Was there a relatively high
degree of autonomy in the defense industry?
In a variety of subtle ways, the old soviet
arms system influences the present government of Russia and
its populace to not adopt restrictive arms control measures.
What will follow is a review of some of the salient features
of the Soviet weapons procurement and sales system and its
effects today.
The most outstanding aspect of the Soviet arms
production industry was the dependance that the Republics had
on the Russian SSR. Weapons production was not centered in one
location. Reflecting the lessons learned during WWII,
production was dispersed throughout the Republics. By
distributing production facilities the Soviet state was able
to motivate its citizens to populate inhospitable locations,
justify the movement of ethnic Russians into other
territories, and fulfill the Socialist pledge to provide a
better future for the Soviet people. The result was a system
where a ship such as the Heavy Air-Capable Cruiser Kuznetsov
could be built in Ukraine but still require the input of 169
separate ministries and departments and over 3,500 basic
enterprises throughout the USSR.7
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On the surface this appears to be a system of
interdependence until one notes that the preponderance of
final assembly plants were located inside the Russian SSR and
in the Ukraine. With the exception of the Petropavlovsk final
missile assembly plant in the Kazakhstan SSR, the Chkalov
aircraft plant in the Uzbekistan SSR, and the T'bilisi
aircraft plant, all other final assemblies were performed in
either the Ukrainian SSR or the Russian SSR. When one
considers that nearly three fourths of the former Soviet
Union's military research, development and testing facilities
were in the Russian SSR, the argument for interdependency
looks weak as the Russian SSR could have adjusted for the loss
of a major component producer with production or development
in another Republic. In reality, many plants produced the
bulk of their subassemblies and stockpiled materials in order
to avoid any disruptions in meeting production quotas. Though
weapons factory managers can be criticized for many things,
one thing for which they strived was to circumvent the
obstacles to production that they saw at their level,
regardless of the goal of interdependence or efficiency. This
determination by factory elites to "meet the plan" has been
supplanted by the need to "meet the market". Often this
involves factory elites entering the market on their own.
Another aspect of the defense industry in the
Soviet Union was its highly vertical integration. The output
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of a military industrial facility as well as the amount of
inputs and sourcing of sub-components was centrally directed.
This had a marked influence on the development of the Soviet
defense industry. This shielded the local managers from the
burdens of plant management known in the West. At the same
time, the plant managers were also shielded from the knowledge
and experience needed to run a successful plant. There was no
formal requirement to develop independent arms industries in
each of the former Soviet Republics. In fact, the former
Soviet State seemed to have been planning against such
developments. Finally, the level of sophistication and
understanding, by members of the different Soviet ministries,
about the requirements of arms trading was minimal because
decisions on arms exports were made in Moscow, by the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Affairs with limited input from Defense
officials, industry ministers nor their foreign trade
organizations.3
This aspect of Russian decision making
bureaucracy was illustrated in Russia's adoption of its new
defense doctrine and shows how the lack of experience of new
Russian bureaucrats has hampered the efforts at conversion and
privatization. According to the Russian "Law on Defense", the
Russian president confirms the state programs and plans of
armaments' development. With that authority, President
Yeltsin instructed the Security Council of the Russian
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Federation to develop a military doctrine that would guide the
conversion and privatization efforts of Russia. Twice,
President Yelsin had to reject the proposed Draft Doctrine
because it did not contain guidance from which long term
defense guidance, and thus conversion, could be derived. The
doctrine had no political vision because the writers of the
document lacked experience from the communist period.' As a
result of having inexperienced personnel in the Security
Council, only the military provides information to the
doctrine writers. The military's position as information
source is secure because Russia's "Law on Security" does not
allow independent academic institutions to vet the military's
contribution to Russia's military doctrine. According to Dr.
Shlykov, this structure will be preserved with the new Russian
Parliament.
All of these structural developments created an
uninformed group of bureaucrats and industrialists who have
unreal expectations about the ability to sell arms and the
benefits of arms sales. To many people the benefits of arms
sales are apparent. Mikhail Maley, advisor to President
Yeltsin, believes that profits of 300-800 percent can be found
in arms trade." Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the Russian
Commission of Defense Industries, Roskomoboronprom, thinks
that Russian defense industries can sell $3-3.5 billion worth
of arms in 1993.76 More optimistic projections of $30-32
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billion are projected if the country can solve its supply and
customer problems." Both sums are optimistic but telling in
light of the importance attached to the 3 billion aid package
offered at the G7 meeting at Tokyo in 1993. The supply and
customer problems cited by Glukhikh are significant and
highlight the dependency concerns of the weapons producers
within Russia.
5. Conclusions Relative to Russia
Of all the countries in the study, Russia varies the
most from the test case. None of the factors in Russia are
the same as in Hungary (see Table 4-2). Not surprisingly,
Russia is not expected to adopt any meaningful arms control
measures in the near future.
The internal factors that relate to Russia's desire
to adopt weak control system measures are not ones that could
be influenced by outside pressure. Russia's position on
maintaining a solid core of the industry, the lobbying power
defense industry labor force, and their potential to find room
in the future arms market will not be affected by the stick of
being left on the CoCom proscribed list.
As well as being ineffective, the pressure to get
Russia to adopt these export controls has also had largely
negative consequences. Many Russians regard the export
203
T"bl 4-2
Conclusions for Russia vs. Hungrary
Questions Hungary Russia
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jasurati WiA Weauw, Eurove relaOO tovlyhi
(Quabton P-1Il Wene die struietijrl Wapediments to the no yes
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defense industry workers. macstah in die debate over ___ye
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ndmateance of a domecstic military industrial base?
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(Question &-21 w-asepoet speeaslizaton in military barfd~ta no yes
-olvl bigh?
[Qusaio 5-31 Was 6=er a relatively hig degree of no yes
[Question E41 Was die oudloa* on exports, inIM relatively no yes
control measures advocated by the West to be simply
protectionist moves intended to preserve the western military
industry. More importantly, the line between what is
international business competition and what is international
political competition can become a grey area given the
difficulties of reform in Russia.
Regardless of the road taken by the political
process, Russia will develop with a core of highly advanced
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weapons producers. Russia is determined to retain a large
portion of its defense industry for national security reasons.
Russia has defined its history by its feats of arms. The
military is a part of Russian culture and will remain so in
the future. Currently the Army is financially strapped and
unable to procure new equipment but the government will take
steps to protect the industry for the time when the financial
situation is improved.
Russia will use arms sales abroad, just as many
other countries do, to maintain its potential for both
continued development and production. The ground work for
tieing arms developments and modernization in Russia to the
export of those same products is taking place right now in
Russia. The trend is only tempered by the inefficient
economic structures presently in Russia. Once the Russian
economy, and the Russian arms industry in particular, gets on
its feet, the West may have to deal with a Russia that has
learned the future of security and force modernization is
married to foreign sales.
Russia may indeed adopt a full panoply of arms
control measures but a strong propensity to export arms will
remain. This propensity will remain in the short run because
the exchange rate and the access to inexpensive stockpiles of
raw materials makes the production of weapons a "profitable"
business. How things will develop when the raw materials are
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used up is difficult to determine but undoubtedly the stakes
for the military-industrial complex will be more severe.
Therefore, now is the time for supporters of reform to put in
place measures that will insure the government's control over
the military-industrial complex.
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B.UKRAINE
As with Russia, the U.S. Department of Commerce's A Guide
for National Export Control Programs demands an expansive set
of programs that will affect many different political and
interest groups. If this where a front burner issue for the
Ukrainian government (it is not) then the political divisions
in the country would undoubtedly make it a difficult problem
to solve. But the question of how and when Ukraine will adopt
arms control restrictions will be even more complicated still.
It will be complicated because the answer to the question will
be decided in the shadow of many other influences. The most
noticeable influences will be the relationship between Russia
and Ukraine, the West's treatment of the nuclear question and
how that treatment is perceived in Ukraine, Ukraine's
definition of independence and the future of Ukraine's
economy. All of these influences are undergoing change. For
this reason it is difficult to forecast the future of
Ukrainian conventional arms restrictions. One observation can
be made with some certainty. As in Hungary, the more
restrictAive the arms control measures, the less confidence one
can have that they will be followed.
1. Export Control Measures in Ukraine
Ukraine has shown an intention to adopt export
control measure in several ways. By participating in the
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sanctions against Yugoslavia, Ukraine has shown its good will
to follow international obligations. As some Ukrainian
officials have pointed out, in relative terms, the sanctions
cost Ukraine much more than they cost the western countries.
Following the issue of Presidential Decree No. 3 on
January 3, 1993, the State Commission of Export Control (SCEC)
was established. The SCEC is not a permanent body but
assembles, as necessary, to make final approval on the
granting of export licenses to companies.' Members of the
SCEC are drawn from the various governmental ministries. The
membership of the SCEC illustrates the high degree of
influence that the President, Prime Minister and Parliament
exercise over the SCEC. The decisions of the SCEC are also
influenced by political fighting between the Parliament,
President and the Prime Minister. This structural aspect of
the SCEC results in the SCEC being a relatively ineffectual
commission. Presidential Decree No. 3 also created the
Expert-Technical Committee (ETC). This committee is a
permanent body responsible for technical advice to the SCEC,
consulting the appropriate ministries for their evaluation of
export licenses, and preparing decisions for the SCEC. 2
Valery P. Kazokov, Ukrainian Deputy Minister of the
Military-Industrial Complex and Industrial Engineering, said
that while Ukraine is not a member of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), Kiev will abide by its guidelines
215
.. ..•• •, - ! •1. W
provided the MTCR does not interfere with the commercial sale
of weapons for peaceful purposes or with the Ukrainian space
program.'
Ukraine has sent two members of its Foreign Ministry
to the CIS Non-Proliferation Project at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies. They have studied issues of
conventional and nuclear non-proliferation. The two students
were Eugene P. Sharov, First Secretary of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Directorate and Anatoly Scherba, Head Non-
Proliferation and Export Controls Department. The
governmental positions held by each student demonstrates the
Ukrainian government's desire to become more informed on
export related issues.
These measures not withstanding, Ukraine has many
problems in the area of export control of conventional
weapons. Ukraine still needs to develop its programs for
training of future specialists, understanding of other export
control systems as well as needing both technical and
financial assistance.' Ukraine will also have some difficulty
with the enforcement of material crossing their rather porous
border. A general crime law has been adopted which has
provisions and punishment guidelines for export violations but
has not been tested.
Other problems exist with Ukrainian export measures.
Export licenses can only be given to state owned companies.5
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This gives the existing defense industries a strong position
over newly emerging non-defense industries which are
restricted in export potential. In the battle for the
influence of political actors in Ukraine, the defense
industries will be better placed. Members of the SCEC are not
technical experts and the ETC is only starting to build a
group of technical specialists to evaluate export contracts.6
Thus, the ETC must turn to the company wanting to export the
goods to get an appraisal of the material. This can result in
a situation where the fox is asked to guard the hen house.
Finally, the fact that all export control legislation has been
passed as decrees, not laws, points to the weak legal ground
on which export legislation now stands.
2. Social Aspects in Ukraine
a. [Question S-li Did the social legacy of the
cozu.u-ist period allow for a relatively smooth transition
period?
The greater a country views conventional
weapons as a symbol of its sovereignty, the less likely it is
to adopt non-proliferation legislation. For some members of
the Ukrainian government production of conventional arms was
and still does reflect the glory of the state and should be
protected. This position is evident in groups such as the
Union of Ukrainian Officers (UUO). The UUO is often referred
to as a nationalist group but they claim to be formed only to
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protect the rights of servicemen. Their pro-production
position should not be surprising. For many years the
engineering and weapons sectors of the Soviet economy received
the best of materials and personnel. Their products were held
up as proof of the Soviet Bloc's ability to be able to compete
with the West. Those perceptions die hard. The reductions in
state orders left many engineers out of work and with a loss
of prestige. The movement of these engineers to other sectors
of the economy or to other countries is viewed as a threat to
national security.
Many Ukrainians feel Ukraine needs to define
itself in terms other than the historical model of being
Little Russia. This means embracing all forms of statehood.
At present, Ukraine uses nuclear weapons to highlight its
emergent status. The leader of Rukh, (the Ukrainian Popular
Movement for Restructuring), Vyacheslav Chornovil, set the
tone for this motivation when, in response to Yeltsin's call
for all nuclear arms to Russia, he said nuclear arms and
Ukraine's desire to become a non-nuclear state would serve as
"good incentives" for resolving the problems connected with
the creation of a Ukrainian national army and for securing
international recognition of Ukraine's independence. 7  The
idea of using the negotiations surrounding nuclear disarmament
to reaffirm the new order of the former Soviet Republics is
captured by Ukrainian Foreign Minister official Andrii
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Veselovsky. He said that Ukraine "still aspires to be a
non-nuclear state, but this could only happen after a process
of negotiations with all nuclear powers"3 President Kravchuk
reinforced this point during the G7 conference. "You see how
the G7 meetings are held? Everything is directed towards
Moscow. But today this means only Russia. What about the
other states, such as Ukraine?"9
At this time Ukraine uses nuclear weapons to
highlight Ukrainian statehood and independence. In the
future, this mantle may be taken up by conventional weapons.
Elements of this process are evident in the statement above by
Valery P. Kazokov about MTCR. Additionally, Anatoly Scherba
has said that the United States must be willing to play by the
same export rules that it demands of Ukraine." l He means
that the United States must allow Ukraine the same freedom to
inspect U.S. facilities as the United States will have in
Ukrainian facilities. This comment by Mr. Scherba is an
unveiled demand for recognition as a sovereign state expressed
in the area of export controls.
b. [Question S-21 Was the demand for a strong
social safety net relatively high?
Ukraine also suffers from the social norm that
the state factory had to provide for all its members. The
attempts by factory managers to insulate their workers from
the harsh effects of conversion and cutbacks has added impetus
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to the overall drive to sell weapons on the arms market. Any
politician who would adopt legislation to restrict arms sales
would have to show how the arms enterprise workers would gain
by reduced arms sales. In the last two years, this has been
a very difficult task for any politician.
c. [Question S-31 Were the prospects and initial
hopes for full integration with Western Europe relatively
high?
The more the political leadership of a country
has the expectation of being part of regional trade and
security organizations the more willing they will be to adopt
non-proliferation legislation that is in line with the adopted
policies of the organizations to which they hope to gain
admittance. This in turn is predicated on the degree to which
the party, or leadership in power, desires to become a member
of a regional trade or security organization. Ukraine has
announced many times its desire to be part of European
economic and security structures. Ukrainian officials have
underlined this desire during negotiations on nuclear
disarmament. Dmytro Pavlychko, head of the Parliament's
Foreign Affairs Commission has put it more poetically. He
said Ukraine "will embrace Europe. Our dream - to enter the
common European home."" Ukraine would like to depend on a
multi-country security arrangement to mitigate the need to
produce or acquire arms. This idea was alluded to by
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Tarasyk when he said "the
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future of stability in the central region of Europe is tied to
the resolution of growing ethnic divisions. Some sort of all-
European security system was the solution to this growing
threat."02  Left unstated was that Ukraine would have to
prepare for that threat by itself if it did not have a
security arrangement. Furthermore, the more that trading
blocs close their markets LG che products of Ukraine, the more
likely Ukraine will take advantage of other export outlets
i.e., arms sales. To date, the possibility of Ukraine
entering into a meaningful security and trade organizations,
with the exception of the CIS, has been minimal.
The future prospects for Ukraine entering the
European body of nations also appears dim. On 27-30 September
1993 the United Nations held a symposium about security and
disarmament issues relating to the former soviet states. 13 In
a discussions about the developing of relations between the
CIS countries and possible regional organizations, the
participants highlighted several points germane to Ukraine's
future role in Europe. First, it was acknowledged that there
is a growing complexity to the term "security." Security is
being defined by much more than military power. There is the
growth of economic interdependence, shared values, and
integrated environmental threats that force security problems
to be political problems. Because of the interdependent
nature of these problems, the countries of the West have to
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unite to enforce the resolution of these problems. Thus, at
the UN conference, Ukraine was faced by a coalition of
countries that wanted to keep Ukraine out of European security
structures until Ukraine adopted more international norms of
arms control. The European Community representative
reinforced this perception by pointing out that Ukraine's
membership in the European Community is :rot even projected
until some time in the next century.
3. Political Aspects in Ukraine
a. [Question P-i1 Were the structural impediments
to the legislative process, in the transition period,
relatively high?
If weapons production and sales have some
political utility then there will be pressure in the Ukrainian
government to forgo restrictive arms export legislation.
Structurally, the market is such that the political utility of
conventional arms in a bilateral relationship has decreased.
In commenting on the international arms trade system from 1980
to 1992, Dr. Edward Laurance has pointed out that:
Although some supplying states may continue to
believe that arms transfers create structural
influence, only in extreme cases does a structural
arms transfer relationship guarantee that
established supplier-recipient relationships and
their resulting political and strategic alignments
will be maintained. As the political visibility of
commodities being traded on the international arms
market has declined, so has the utility of arms
transfers as a political instrument."
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This trend is continuing as part of the post
Soviet arms trade because the decrease in the number of arms
purchasers concurrent with the increase of the unit price of
the items being purchased has created conditions for a buyer's
market. The ability of Ukraine to use weapons as a foreign
policy tool in the bilateral, supplier/recipient relationship
is therefor limited.
The utility of 4eapons sales changes
considerably with the introduction of a third party or another
state. In this arena the Ukrainian government 4s
demonstrating that weapons do have a degree of political
utility.
Ukrainian sensitivity to arms sales and their
political implications is apparent in the following exchange
between Russia and Ukraine. During the week of 10-14 May 1993
a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation headed by Speaker Ivan
Plyushch had been visiting Tehran, Iran. During the visit,
Moscow's Ostankino TV broadcast a story about Ukraine possibly
selling rockets to Iran. The story resulted in an immediate
rejoinder from Radio Ukraine. Radio Ukraine a'-cused Ostankino
TV of deliberately spreading disinformation.'j
This exchange demonstrates that not only does
the Ukrainian gover.ment understand that a political
relationship exists with respect to arms sales, tne government
seems predisposed to make the most of it. There is no better
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demonstration than in the ongoing issue of possession of
nuclear weapons.
There are many reasons why Ukraine is motivated
to possess nuclear weapons. Many of these reasons can be used
to justify a conventional capability. The following set of
reasons might reasonably be used in a similar debate over
conventional arms sales:
1. Ukraine can use the nuclear weapons or material as a source
of hard currency and is holding up the release of weapons in
order to see how much the West will pay. 2. Nuclear weapons
will enhance Ukraine's prestige and national standing. 3.
America and Russia have substituted arms control talks for
politics and have, therefor, encouraged Ukraine to foiicw
their example. 4. Nuclear weapons and conventional arms
provide security for the new state. 5. A militarily strong
Ukraine can form the basis of a Central European security
sphere. It is easy to see how some conventional arms,
especially missile production, could be used for the same
political goals. Ukrainian leadership has demonstrated both
an understanding and a willingness to use the relationship
between politics and arms sales.
b. [Question P-21 Were political interest groups,
for example defense industry workers, influential in the
debate over these questions?
The greater the degree of political influence
held by internal political groups that are morally, or
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philosophically opposed to arms sales the less likely Ukraine
will adopt non-proliferation legislation. The converse is
also true. Making any assessments of a strong political
constituency is perilous at this juncture in Ukrainian
political development, but it is sate to say that during the
first two years of Ukraine's statehood the preponderance of
influential actors were in favor of arms exports.
President Kravchuk has publicly supported the
sale of arms abroad. Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign
Affairs Commission, Dmytro Pavlychko, said the rate of
conversion will not be high hence the need to sell weapons to
fund conversion"6  Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma was former
director of the Yuzhmash missile plant and stated his desire
to "supply missiles to any republic of the CIS or any other
country".17
The military is supportive of arms sales."s
The military sees benefits in a smaller military force. The
savings from not maintaining such a large military force could
then be applied to upgrading the level of military equipment.
The newer equipment could then be sold on the world arms
market for hard currency which would constitute the main
source of funds to meet the social needs of the servicemen.
The money could also be used to complete the construction of
a Ukrainian aircraft carrier." Many of the military
commanders also support the idea of selling CFE excess on the
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international arms market. Furthermore, the military wants to
cautiously consider which plants are marked for conversion. 0
To assist in selling military hardware a "trading center" was
formed within the Ukrainian military. 10 percent of the
profits will go to che armed forces, 25 percent will go to the
state budget and the remainder will go to the Defense
Ministry."' Evidence of a political union between the
military and the industrialists is the military newspaper
Ches (honor) which is being funded by industrial
enterprises."2
The arms industry employs enough people to
constitute an influential force in the new state.
Furthermore, the industry, being well established by the
Soviet system, had the lead on other emerging political groups
as an influential actor.
In January 1992 a new coalition of left wing
groups was formed with the name "New Ukraine". "New Ukraine"
believes that statehood would come first from economic reform
and through cooperation with the rest of the former Soviet
Union.2 Another political group, The Ukrainian Labor party
was born in Zaporizhzhya and one of its goals was to prevent
the final split between Russia and Ukraine. That was not
surprising given the amount of interrelated military
production which occurred at the Zaporizhzhya facilities.2'
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The political support for reintegration is very
hard to accurately determine. Many political groups have
fractured on the issue of joint Ukrainian/Russian industrial
production. Although there are those who see an economic
future in closer economic ties with Russia, cthers fear that
close economic ties to Russia will be a precursor to full
reintegration and a loss of sovereignty. This split is
apparent in the political fortunes of Ukrainian Minister of
Machine Building, the Military Industrial Complex and
Conversion, Victor Anotov.
In 1992 Mr. Antonov signed several documents on
cooperation between his defense enterprises and those in
Russia. At that time he was considered an "enemy of the
people" by several groups who were opposed to the developing
relationship with Russia.5 By January of 1993 Antonov
remarked that "even the most radically minded deputies,
including from Rukh, have approved the closer ties of the two
country's military-industrial complexes"' Antonov may be
generally correct but a month after his statement the
political parties, Rukh, KNDS, the Ukrainian Republican Party
and the Democratic Party of Ukraine formed a coalition called
the Anticonmmnist and Anti-Imperial Front of Ukraine (AAFU).
Among the tasks set for itself were the following: combatting
the attempts to draw Ukraine into the superstate structures of
the CIS, and taking a conmnon stand against the communist party
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nomeclature, many of whom were in management jobs in the
military industrial complex.Y
The diversity of political parties has made it
difficult for the Ukrainian government to adopt the
enforcement provisions of an acceptable export control
program. An example is the formation of the Export Control
Committee for the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian
Government. This committee will be responsible for conducting
the technical verification of items on an Ukrainian export
control list. As of November 1993, the committee was still
waiting for funding for office space in Kiev. The reason the
Ukrainian government has been so slow in funding this
committee is some members of Parliament have been holding up
funding until they could get their supporters a seat on the
committee so they can have influence on its direction."
The demographics of Ukraine make the adoption
of arms export controls a serious political problem. Eastern
Ukraine is highly Russified where as western Ukraine is the
seat of Ukrainian nationalism. This difference is exacerbated
by the location of the major final assembly plants and major
component producers in Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine has the bulk
of these facilities. In fact, only two final assembly plants
and one major component plant are located in western
Ukraine.2 A limitation on arms sales would affect the
eastern region directly and would threaten the stability of
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Ukraine. Ukrainian officials are sensitive to the politics of
the region as evidenced by the Government's concessions to the
Donbass miner's strike in 1993. Additionally, the government
must adopt policies that won't increase the support of the
influential pro-communist and Russian oriented forces which
are trying to form an autonomous "Novorossiia" region that
would include the Donbass, Crimea and the "Dniester Republic".
c. [Question P-31 Do the national security
objectives dictate the maintenance of a domestic military
industrial base?
During interviews with First Secretary Sharov
he mentioned that Ukrainian officials need more time to fully
understand, all the ramifications of an arms export
agreement. 30 He expressed a sense of hesitancy that reflected
the Ukrainian concern that export controls will give the
United States, or some other country, an advantage in the
production of weapons and thus a military advantage. David
Schlecty, Director of Foreign Affairs, Office of Technology
and Policy Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Export Administration,
reinforced this perspective. Mr. Schlecty pointed out that
Ukrainian officials have commented to him that the United
States has persued a policy on arms control designed to
strengthen the U.S. position in the market. First, the U.S.
government asks the FSU to restrict sales while the U.S.
continues arms sales. Second, the United States has raised
doubts about the U.S. reasons for wanting export controls
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adopted in the FSU. This confusion is a result of channeling
Nunn-Lugar money through the Defense Department and not
through the Commerce Department. 3"
Ukrainian confusion is further enhanced because
Ukrainian officials don't appreciate why the United States
wants economic support for export controls dependent on
resolution of the Ukrainian nuclear issue.3 For Ukraine, the
nuclear issue is a national security and military issue, not
a commerce issue. The U.S. attempts to tie the two areas
together in Ukraine creates the perception that the United
States wants export controls to enhance the U.S. economic
position, not to advance security. 'Thus, Anatoly Scherba,
Head Non-Proliferation and Export Controls Department, Foreign
Ministry of Ukraine said in an interview on this topic that
"export controls are a means of competition. It is seen in
MTCR where the U.S. wants Ukraine to follow the rules but not
become a member."
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4. Economic Aspects in Ukraine
The nature, the extent, and possibly the future of
the Ukrainian arms market is heavily influenced by the
structure of the now defunct Soviet arms industry. The
vestiges of the old Soviet system makes it difficult for the
Ukraine government as well as Ukrainian businessmen to manage
raw materials, subcomponents, profit shares, the pace and
extent of conversion and other economic variables necessary to
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determining if the arms industry is worth saving. Such
calculations are, of course, important to determining the cost
of implementing the CoCom legislation. At this point it is
important to review the legacy of the Soviet arms industry
with respect to Ukraine.
The most outstanding aspect of the Soviet arms
production industry was the dependance that the Republics had
on the Russian SSR. Weapons production was not centered in one
location. Reflecting the lessons learned during WwII,
production was dispersed throughout the Republics. By
distributing production facilities the Soviet state was able
to motivate its citizens to populate inhospitable locations,
justify the movement of ethnic Russians into other
territories, and fulfill the Socialist pledge to provide a
better future for the Soviet people. The result was a system
where a tank produced in the Russian SSR might be dependent on
tank barrels from the Ukrainian SSR and optics from the
Armenian SSR.
On the surface this appears to be a system of
interdependence until one notes that the preponderance of
final assembly plants were located inside the Russian SSR.
With the exception of the Petropavlovsk final missile assembly
plant in the Kazakhstan SSR, the Chkalov aircraft plant in the
Uzbekistan SSR, and the T'bilisi aircraft plant, all other
final assemblies were performed in either the Ukrainian SSR
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or the Russian SSR. When one considers that nearly three
fourths of the former Soviet Union's military research,
development and testing facilities were in the Russian SSR, It
becomes clear that the Russian SSR could have adjusted for the
loss of a major component producer with production or
development in another Republic.
The Ukrainian SSR was the only Republic that
could claim an interdependent military production relationship
with the Russian SSR and even then Russia was the dominate
partner. This limited interdependent relationship has had
multiple ramifications for the Ukrainian arms industry. The
relationship was close enough for intrested parties in Ukraine
to now call for closer economic union between Russia and
Ukraine. Still the split between Russia and Ukraine has hurt
Russian sales because the lack of a totally solid relationship
between them has caused potential buyers of Soviet style
weapons to look to other weapons producers.
The defense industry in the Soviet Union was highly
integrated vertically. The output of a military industrial
facility as well as the amount of inputs and acquisition of
subcomponents was centrally directed. This shielded the local
managers from the burdens of plant management known in the
West. At the same time, the plant managers were also shielded
from the knowledge and experience needed to run a successful
plant. There was no requirement to develop independent arms
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industries in each of the former Soviet Republics. In fact,
the former Soviet state seemed to have been planning against
such developments. Finally, the level of sophistication and
understanding of the arms trade among the Republics was narrow
because decisions on arms exports were made in Moscow, by the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs with little input from
the defense industry ministers nor their foreign trade
organizations."
a. (Question E-i1 Were the prospects for
converting the defense industry relativly high?
Ukraine's prospects for conversion reflect
their study of previous efforts by other countries as well as
the reality of their arms industry. In an interview with the
Minister for Machine Building, the Military-Industrial Complex
and Conversion, Victor Antonov, he mentioned three variants
for conversion. The first variant was "shock conversion". It
involved giving the market a free hand at conversion. A
second method was to sell military equipment abroad in order
to fund conversion. This idea was not fully adopted because
of Ukraine's dependency on components from Russia. He was
reflecting the concern that purchasers which was mentioned
above. The third variant for conversion, the Ukrainian
option, is a combination of the positive factors of the first
two. To use Minister Antonov's words "we are in favor of
stabilization at the macro level, and of using export
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capabilities, but in the process the state must provide
support to conversion." 3' Ukraine has made sales of military
equipment part of its plans for successful conversion.
Ukraine believes that the market demand is there because
Ukraine sees Russia and the West filling orders. In the same
article Antonov mentioned that one of Ukraine's strong areas
for attracting foreign interest was in the scientific-
strategic area. He hopes to involve western countries in
specific high technology projects which will result in
conversion of Ukraine's military-industrial complex. Two such
projects are the production of the TU-334 aircraft at the Kiev
Aircraft Plant and an advanced ceramic engine by the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences. 3'
Regardless of the plan finally followed in
Ukraine, the chances for any program of conversion to be
successful, and thus obviate the sale of weapons on the arms
market, appear slim. There does not seem to be a plan for the
selecting, financing and production of substitute goods on a
systematic basis. Factory managers are not experienced in
western, capitalistic methods and do not understand how to
produce for a demand economy.
Working capital for conversion is scarce. With
joint enterprise tax rates near the 70% mark, it will remain
the case. Interest rates in 1992 were above the 40% mark.
Ukraine's vulnerability to external energy sources has made it
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very difficult for the Ukrainian state to build up the funds
needed for conversion. 3 7  Ukrainian revenues will fall even
further when Russia completes the oil pipe line through Poland
as well as increases the percentage of fuel from Russia which
must be purchased at world market prices.
Raw materials are hard to find and even harder
about which to make cost projections. The difficulty in
finding raw materials is evidenced in the Ukrainian
government's decision to explore the use of fiber optic cables
in lieu of aluminum or copper cables for the reconstruction
and growth of state owned enterprises."'
On top of these difficulties, the breakup of
the Soviet Union and the advent of new borders now hinders
trade. Many of these problems will be solved with time but
they certainly argue against any expectation that conversion
will be easy and provide an alternative to the need to trade
arms.
In order to reduce concerns about the
reliability of Ukrainian military exports, thus increase the
demand for Jkrainian weapons as well as support conversion,
Ukraine is moving forward with economic ties to Russia. The
Russian Military-Industrial Complex Head Victor Glukhikh went
to Kiev on 12 January 1993 to sign a package of documents on
cooperation of the Russian and Ukrainian defense complex
enterprises. 39  Part of that package may have included
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proposals for the creation of joint venture defense
enterprises and a Russian-Ukrainian miliuary industrial bank
to ease the situation with reciprocal payments.'
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has made
many statements in favor of preserving and enhancing the
weapons complexes of the CIS." In May 1993, President
Kravchuk again pointed out the need for economic relations
between Russia and Ukraine.4  On 6 July 1993, delegations
from Ukraine and Russia meet in Kiev to discuss details of a
full scale treaty on friendship and cooperation. This treaty
included all aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations that have
emerged in the post-Soviet period.43 The need is there for
some type of cooperation because of the interrelated
production facilities. For Ukraine there is an added
incentive. The longer the links of interdependency are
broken, the less chance Ukrainian arms industry will have to
survive.
Regardless of any action taken by the Ukrainian
or Russian government, economics are forcing a split in the
Russian/Ukrainian production relationship. This split will
effect the conversion process and the Ukrainian ability to
produce weapons. It appears that Russia is severing the ties
with arms production facilities in Ukraine. One tank factory
manager in Karkov commented that he was forced to stop
production because Russia is producing the tank parts that his
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firm previously produced." Yuri Kostenko, Ukrainian Minister
of the Environment, also felt that Russia is pursuing an arms
production policy designed to reduce Russia's dependence on
Ukrainian arms manufacturers. 45
There are several reasons why the Russian
manufacturers would want to produce weapons without Ukrainian
support. First, the Russian firm could realize a greater
percentage of profit. Second, the work in Russia would
provide more jobs for idled Russian workers. Third, it would
follow a Soviet historical production trend of insuring access
to spares and component parts by producing them at the final
assembly plant. In this post-soviet period, the political
problems which have disrupted the previous production network
between Russia and Ukraine and caused shortages in component
and spare parts, is the catalyst for the decisions of Russian
factory managers to produce weapons exclusive of Ukraine.
Fourth, weapons built in Russia and without Ukrainian support
would be more attractive to foreign customers. The products
would be more attractive to buyers because the Russian firm
could more reliably predict delivery dates and insure product
support. There are two reasons that Russian manufacturers can
point to in order to justify not working with Ukrainian firms.
First, stated above, Russian orders for components are subject
to Ukrainian/Russian relations. Second, Ukrainian economic
structures are not sound. There is no real currency,
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inflation is growing, there is no banking structure, etc.
Both of these :easons impact how reliable a Ukrainian
enterprise can be on meeting it contractual arrangements.
Russian arms producers are aware of the need to
appear as a reliable agent. In 1993, Malaysia sent a
delegation to Russia to confirm Russia's ability to honor a
contract for 18 MiG-29 aircraft. Part of Malaysia's decision
to purchase the aircraft was based on getting an agreement
with India for maintenance and spare parts for the MiGs.4
During the International Defense Exposition-93 (IDEX-93) the
same concern of Russian delivery reliability was expressed."
Russian manufacturers are losing domestic as
well as foreign business because the FSB arms production
network is unreliable. Irene Rabinovich, legal councilor for
Trace Enterprises, is representing a Russian firm interested
in purchasing american aircraft." The Russian firm wants to
phase out its IL-86 fleet and replace it with western
aircraft. Even though the IL-96-300 recently received its
flight worthiness certificate, it is not being considered.' 9
Ms. Rabinovich mentioned several reasons for this decision.
The quality of Russian aircraft is less than in the West.
There is no product support. The price of the Russian planes
are approaching the cost of western aircraft, but the main
reason is the unreliability of Russian firms are too costly to
her client's business. If her client had purchased a Russian
238
passenger plane then the engines would probably have been
produced at a Ukrainian factory.
b. [Question E-21 Was export specialization in
military hardware relatively high?
Empirical discussion about the Ukrainian arms
industry is difficult because of a lack of current and
historical data. Ukraine reported to the UN that they did not
have any sales of military equipment for 1992.50 In terms of
relative export specialization, it would appear that arms
exports would constitute only a fraction of total exports and
therefore not be an argument against restrictive arms sales
legislation.
Drawing conclusions on the basis of 1992's
performance could lead to faulty conclusions. The USSR was
number one in arms exports from 1985-1989 and had a relative
export specialization which was four times the specialization
of the United States (see Appendix C).
Given the structure of the former Soviet arms
market, arms exports would have constituted a influential
portion of the total Ukrainian export market. Table 5-1 shows
that the Soviet Union was becoming less dependent on arms
exports as a percentage of its total exports as it approached
the pivotal year of 1991. This trend is partly due to the
policies of Michael Gorbachev. He would have probably
reversed this trend had he stayed in power. Much more telling
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is the data on relative export specialization. There the
Soviet Union was increasing at the same time that other
nations of the world were moving in the opposite direction.
Ukraine would develop as a state with this upward trend of
relative export specialization already established as a
significant element in its economy.
Table 5-1
Relative Export Specialization in the USSR from 1985-1989
Arms Exponu Total Expons AEITE Relative
% Export Specializauon
Year
1985 17100 87200 19.6 7.84
1986 21300 97050 21.9 9.13
1987 22600 107700 21.0 9.13
1918 21600 110700 19.5 10.2
1919 19500 109300 17.9 11.9
Sum U.S. Am CuAOM Wd DbUMO ASU (Mw).
c. [Question E-31 Was there a relatively high
degree of autonomy in the defense industry?
Ukraine inherited the second largest, and in
some areas, the most advanced portions of the former Soviet
defense industry. Ukraine has the only shipyard in the former
Soviet republics capable of building aircraft carriers. The
Dnipropetrovsk Southern Machine Building Plant has been the
sole producer of SS-18 ICBM and the SL-16 space launch vehicle
and the plant at Pavlohrad was the final assembly facility for
240
the SS-24 ICBM. Military production in the Ukrainian SSR
constituted an estimated one third of the total Soviet
military production and 38 percent of Ukraine's total
industrial production.5 It has been suggested that 1840
industrial enterprises and 2.7 million people-5 percent of the
population-are engaged in military production, with 700 of
these enterprises, employing 1.3 million people, producing
exclusively for the military.52 Other studies use a smaller
figure of about 500,000 employees directly employed in the
defense sector and another approximately I million people who
contribute to defense output. 53 Regardless of the exact size,
the industry employs enough people to constitute an
influential force in the new state. Furthermore, the
industry, being well established by the Soviet system, had the
lead on other emerging political groups as an influential
actor. Of further interest is the majority of the final
assembly plants are located in eastern or southern Ukraine and
are thus influenced by the politics of those regions.
Even though Ukraine has the ability to produce
final assembles of armored vehicles, missiles, aircraft, and
ships, it does not have a self-sufficient defense industry.
Its industry reflects the interrelation of the Soviet defense
industry. Though Ukraine has an armored vehicle production
capability, it lacks a systems capability and must import, for
instance, 60 percent of tank systems and 40 percent of
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communications systems.B On the other hand, Ukraine has the
ability to provide some key subcomponents such as tank
barrels, aircraft engines, avionics and missile parts. Many
of these subcomponents are integral to systems which are high
interest weapons in the international arms market.
Even though Ukraine has not sold much equipment
in its two years as a state, the prospects for sales have
always seemed to be in the wings. The aircraft carrier Varyag
(displacement 67,000 tonnes) is a case in point. Negotiations
for its sale to China have gone on for some time, keeping
alive the hope that its construction would prove to be
profitable. As of April 1993, the negotiations for its sa'L
stalled leaving Ukraine with the decision of trying to sell
the ship for scrape or holding out for a possibly sale.SS
There is also the share of the profits earned
by Russian arms sales where Ukrainian firms would act as a
subcontractor. Por example, the contract between Iran and
Russia for three KILO class submarines will require the
subcontracting of Ukrainian optical devices for the
periscopes. 56
Ukraine is playing a part in the world's arms
trade, albeit an small part. The future of its participation,
and thus its desire to adopt arms control legislation, is
influenced by Ukraine's outlook on the export market, its
ability to find a spot in that market and the country's
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ability to successfully convert its arms industry to other
lines of production.
d. [Question E-41 Was the outlook on continued
exports in 1989 relatively high?
The international and domestic arms market has
shown a steady down trend for Ukraine but it is not a closed
market and it is one in which both Ukrainian officials and
private enterprises see some possibilities. With the end of
the Cold War and the occurrence of Desert Storm, a good
possibility to sell Ukrainian weapons seemed on the horizon.
The prospects seemed most bright in 91-92, but even today
Ukrainian officials have a positive outlook on the future of
arms exports. There are many reasons why.
First of all, markets seem to be opening up to
former Soviet bloc countries that were not previously open
during the Cold War. The major market is in Asia. Malaysia's
announcement on June 29, 1993 of the planned purchase of 18
MiG-29s represented a first for the former Soviets in what is
potentially a hugh market. The planned, mixed purchase of
both American F-18 and Russian MiG-29 type aircraft could be
a good sign for former East Bloc countries trying to break
into traditional western arms markets. Additionally, the
traditional Soviet arms recipients, i.e., Iran, Syria, Libya,
etc., are not likely to turn to the West for arms. But as the
example above illustrates, traditional recipients of western
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arms may now look to the former Soviet block for weapons since
there are no ideological and few political consequences. The
preeminence of economics over politics as the motive for arms
sales will open up more markets to the former Soviet states.
In the short term, this trend will be offset by
the lack of hard currency available in the countries with whom
the Soviet state used to trade. Barter has acted as a
substitute for hard currency in many cases which is not a
desirable form of trade for the former Soviet states but it
will keep production lines open.
Another systemic aspect of the market demand is
that countries, or groups, at war or faced with the immediate
prospect of war, will be looking for inexpensive but effective
weapons. The former Soviet stockpiles of weapons which are
now free as a result of CFE arrangements can fill that market.
That is what happened in 1992 when Khazakstan sold excess
military equipment to Afghanistan. Even the new military
equipment produced by the former Soviet states is less
expensive than the western equipment and could reasonably be
the first choice of a country in a state of war where capital
is scarce.
The former Soviet states have had some success
in the market not only because their equipment is inexpensive
but also because it can be upgraded with a host of packages
which then gives it a level of quality which is enough to
244
rival western equipment. Often this can be accomplished while
still undercutting western prices.
The Gulf War has spurred the market for high
technology weapons, especially missiles. The effectiveness of
the air war has increased interest in the sale of SA-10 and
SA-12 missiles as alternatives to the Patriot missile.57
Another example of the market demand opened up by the Gulf war
is the SS-N-22, a 100km-plus infrared and active radar homing
missile designed for anti-shipping combat. It represents some
of the most current Ukrainian technology.
The SS-N-22 also represents a new market for
Ukrainian weapons. The American military intends to purchase
six of the missiles for testing purposes so that an effective
counter to. the missile can be developed. This does not
represent a long term market. But at hundred million dollars
per missile, the Ukrainians can clearly see a lucrative
market.58
The Gulf War also highlighted the dynamics of
technology and how it would increase the demand for military
equipment. Writing in the Ukrainian Officer's paper Golas
Ukrainy, two Ukrainian officers pointed out that the "rates of
science and technological progress in the military are such
that while tanks previously were modernized every 10-15 years
in peacetime, now it is done every 5-6 years." 59  Their
comment underlines the belief that the pace of technology will
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create its own demand. Ukraine, with its body of technical
expertise, would be able to meet that demand.
The demand for former Soviet equipment has been
tempered by the difficulties of divorce. The disruptions in
the former Soviet Bloc's ability to produce weapons has been
a result of political conflicts over resources. Strangely,
this conflict has not reduced the belief that Ukraine can
compete in the world arms market.
During a conversation with the plant manager
for the tank building enterprise at Kharkiv, the manager was
told that several Arab countries were interested in buying
Russian/Ukrainian military equipment but they were concerned
about the ability of the former Soviet states to be able to
reliably deliver equipment. The manager was asked him why the
Ukrainian government could not work out its differences in
order to take advantage of this market opportunity.
Sardonically, he responded that the government is stupid!
Undoubtedly, joint Ukrainian/Russian arms projects are second
to the overall Russian/Ukrainian relationship and at times
even held hostage to that relationship but as the plant
manager's conmment suggests; the perception still exists that
there is a viable place in the world arms market for Ukraine.
An article in Komsomolskaya Pravda expressed
the same idea that Ukraine could compete in the international
market. The writer was critical of Prime Minister Kuchma's
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decision to restrict funding for D-27, high thrust, high
efficiency, engine because
this policy could result in the fact that we have
to terminate work on the "fantastic" engines. Its
as if lagging behind is being planned-even in those
areas where the USSR and later the CIS were "ahead
of the entire planet". There are already
precedents: say, active development of a high
thrust engine has begun in the West and specialists
in independent Russia and Ukraine who are ahead of
many of their colleagues "from abroad" just gnash
their teeth: they won't give us the money. Do we
need to prove that even here savings will turn into
100-fold losses?6
The level of frustration by the writer as well as by Ukrainian
factory managers underscores their belief that Ukraine's
possibilities in the export market were good. Obviously,
Prime Minister Kuchma did not agree.
5. Conclusions Relative to Ukraine
Ukraine differs from the base case in every question
except the autonomy of the industry. (Table 5-2) Therefore,
it is worth looking at that question closer.
It is almost ironic that while other countries are
consolidating their arms industries in regional structures in
order to preserve some capacity, Russia and Ukraine have
separated theirs. The logic that has forced the development
of arms production consortiums in the West has not been lost
on the Ukrainian arms producers nor on President Kravchuk.
Given no political constraints, Ukrainian arms producers would
move towards a closer economic relationship with Russia.
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Conclusions for Ukraine vs. Hungary
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Indeed that will probably be the trend with a Ukrainian
Government which will quietly support the closer
Russian/Ukrainian relationship. It is difficult though to
forecast how that relationship will develop in light of
problems such as: rising nationalism in each country, conflict
over the Crimea and Dneister Republic, distribution of Soviet
state property, and control over nuclear weapons. The
Ukrainian government has made it clear that arms sales and
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arms export measures will be subject to politics. On the
other hand, increasingly politics is being subordinated to
economics. This is clearly the conditions for either
effective compromise or else intransigence.
Russia has made clear its intent to sell in the
international arms market. Once Russia overcomes its
political turmoil it should return to the arms market as a
significant member. But in the short term, it will need
Ukraine's participation to be competitive in key sectors of
the market. If a constructive relationship exists between
Ukraine and Russia then a majority of the Ukrainian arms
industry will share the benefits of an aggressive Russian
export program. If the Ukrainian arms industry is left
without Russian interdependence then tae industry will
probably follow the East European model of defining niches in
the market and diversifying. As explained in the section on
conversion, this process of separation seems to be occurring
at a brisk pace.
During the Soviet era, the arms industry received
the priority of resources. Some have wondered how might the
arms producers adjust to an environment of constrained
resources? So far this has not been a problem because
customers, not resources, has been the defining shortage.
Some producers have voiced bitterness about the cutback on
state orders. Others are angry about the unplanned and
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unsupporting manner the Ukrainian government chose to contract
the market. In their criticisms of the government, many
producers are unwittingly acknowledging the realities of the
new system. Furthermore, any move back to heavy State
subsidies would alienate that part of the arms production
lobby that supports the industry because of the industry's
perceived capacity to generate hard currency. In short, hay
state subsidies for the arms industry would be a mark of a new
political system which is different from the system evolving
right now.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
How can the West limit the impact of conventional arms
proliferation from the Former Conmnunist Bloc (FCB)? In the
prologue, this paper asserted that the old Soviet weapons
industries will survive and pose several problems in the
future. The FCB will fill the market with advanced technology
weapons and those weapons will be designed to counter western
high technology weapons. CoCom, whose original purpose was to
limit the FCB's access to technology, did serve a non-
proliferation function prior to 1989. Some argue that in the
post Cold War period CoCom can continue to serve a non-
proliferation role. Since 1990, CoCom has attempted to
fulfill this function by making free access to western
technology conditional on the establishment of export control
measures in the countries of the FCB. Some have argued that
since Hungary has adopted measures in line with the CoCom
requirements that this is now a viable model for CoCom in the
future.
The Czech Republic has come closest to establishing the
same type of control measures as Hungary, and these measures
are also being explored by Poland, Slovakia, Russia and
Ukraine. This study looked at a range of factors in each of
these countries that influenced or continues to influence
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The questions outlined in Appendix A were answered for
each country. (The overall results are presented in Table C-1)
Each of the case studies has highlighted the limits that a
policy of conditionality has had on the adoption of
restrictive arms transfer measures in the FCB.
Four factors seem to warrant special attention because
the responses in Table C-i are common in the four countries
showing the least proclivity towards adopting restrictive
conventional arms export measures. The same four factors have
similar values for the Czech Republic and Hungary and the
greatest divergence from the rest of the cases.
The first two factors, the demand for a strong social
safety net [S-l and the strength of interest groups in favor
of continued exports [P-2] are closely related. In Hungary
and the Czech Republic there was neither the willingness to
save defense industry related jobs for their own sake, nor did
the labor force in this industry mount an organized lobbying
effort to save their own jobs. In the remaining four
countries, however, those demanding a strong safety net were
closely allied, for different reasons, with the influential
and organized lobbying effort of the defense industry labor
force and management.
Two other factors, prospects for conversion [E-1], and
high export specialization (E-21 also have similar values for
Hungary and the Czech Republic. In both countries, the
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percentage of arms exports to total exports was low.
Additionally, the relatively small number of companies that
would be involved in a conversion effort helped to keep
conversion from being a contentious issue. These conditions,
which predict an effective export control policy, are missing
in the four remaining countries of the study. Defense
industries are such a key element in the struggling economies
of Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine and Russia that attempts at
conversion have tremendous economical/political ramifications.
In short, they produce weapons because they don't perceive a
viable economic alternative. Therefore, the policy of
conditionality is involved in a catch-22 situation where arms
are indiscriminately sold for lack of an economic alternative
and the very programs that would provide economic alternatives
are denied because the countries sell arms indiscriminately.
One additional factor also has a significant impact on the
problem. Only Poland, Russia, and Ukraine have made the
determination that retention of a solid core of the defense
industrial base is critical to their national security
objectives. Therefore, no matter how good the prospects of
conversion throughout the industry or how poor the prospects
are for export, military hardware will continue to be produced
in these countries. Some core of the industry will remain,
the only question is how large that core will be.
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Conditionality as a policy is in doubt both because of
its ineffectiveness and because the policy may in fact incur
many costs. Since conditionality will not change the focus of
FCB arms designers, they will continue to design and produce
what they know how to make and what the market will demand -
anti-western systems. Naturally, the western countries will
have to respond to this development with some degree of an
arms race. The driving motive of this arms race will not be
country related, but rather technology related. Either way,
it will be expensive.
Second, an aggressive and punitive export control system
will be used by conservative parties to gain influence in the
targeted countries. Since governmental decisions are being
primarily driven by domestic concerns, an aggressive export
policy will result in conservatives gaining strength. They
will make arguments such as the West is being hypocritical.
They will argue that an extension of CoCom is proof of a
hostile West. Meanwhile, export controls deny the struggling
entrepreneurs the opportunities to develop as a political
counter to the established nomenclatura.
Third, a strict export policy will cause tension in NATO
and will reduce the credibility of NATO. The carrot of
acceptance in NATO is a strong one for the West to use. The
West should avoid policies that reduce viability of NATO.
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Some may question the efficacy of NATO's military power, but
undoubtedly it has political utility.
Fourth, the United States could be locking itself out of
a potentially tremendous market. That market will be
important to U.S. firms who will want to take advantage of the
years of science and high intellectual education that are a
part of the FCB workforce. Not only will U.S. businesses be
more competitive, their stronger financial positions will
allow more company funds to be invested in research and
development. This will have obvious security benefits for the
United States.
Two methods for limiting the effects of FCB arms sales,
which do not have the costs associated with export controls,
are cooptation and monitoring. Generally, cooptation means
the United States would develop a positive relationship with
the seller country such that the US could influence the arms
export policies of the seller country. Cooptatior recognizes
the domestic considerations inherent in arms export measures
and the developmental stages that the FCB countries are in.
Cooptation could have any of the following four aspects.
First, bring FCB countries into joint economic or
security structures that prescribes common defense production
standards. The Standard Nato Agreement (STANAG) is a good
example of this technique. This will reduce the number of
weapons systems which are produced specifically to counter
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Western systems. The West should license out production of
Western defense products to the East's ailing industries. The
military products licensed out should be of similar design to
what the East Bloc military industrial complexes would
normally produce and require a minimum amount of
infrastructure development. This approach recognizes that
there is a tendency among arms producers as well as elites to
maintain traditional links with the old economic structures
rather than gambling on the uncertain dividends of conversion
and general economic reform. The goal is not to foster new
plant development, but rather to allow the East Bloc
industries to serve a portion of the West's demand for
weapons. This conversion process must be in areas that
provide an immediate job for defense workers.
Second, cooptation does not mean control of the coopted
state nor absolute compliance to export norms. The United
States should strive for passive assent by the FCB to arms
export measures. Such a policy allows room for the exporting
government to shift alliances and build coalitions among the
different political groups. All the states in our study have
demonstrated generally poor levels of support for the
political process. This is a result of the difficulties that
are characteristic of any post-communist state as it grapples
with falling living standards. Cooptation attempts to reduce
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some of this political cynicism by providing jobs and thus
speeding the pace of political party development.
In this thesis we have stressed the importance of
maintaining friendly, influential relations with each country
in the study. Again, the thinking is that eventually a
country will always be able to get the materials needed to
produce conventional arms.' If the United States wants to be
able to affect where those weapons go, the U.S. will have to
work with the selling country, not confront the selling
country. This thesis concludes that it is better to target
the violating enterprise or item, not the state. What good
does it accomplish to follow a policy which controls the
export of conventional weapons but aids the accession of
political groups who wish to sell weapons? By targeting the
offending enterprise or business, instead of the government,
CoCom members retain the flexibility to continue trade and
development projects in the FCB which will strengthen the
political power of reformers and entrepreneurs.
Another method to limit the impact of conventional
weapons sales is to focus on the weapon's production and
distribution network. This is termed monitoring.' What must
be avoided is a country X developing a military capability
that American force planners are not aware of. This assumes
that the United States can counter any enemy conventional
technology capability. A weapon's production and distributic..
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network needs to be monitored closely for those items which
are essential to the production of the critical weapons
systems. In order to interrupt the flow cf weapons to an
aggressive country, the United States would focus on the
critical components of the exported weapon. By tracking
critical production nodes of a weapon system as well as the
final user of high technology weapons from the FCB, the United
States will be able to focus its own arms development and
procurement process to more efficiently counter future world
arms sales.
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J. The idea that the states of the FCB will be able to produce
high tech weapons regardless of export structures erected against
them is taken from the comments of Professor John Barton,
Stanford Law School during the CISAC Workshop Export Controls on
Dual-use, High Technology: Implications For National/Economic
Security on 18-19 October, 1993 at Stanford University.
2. The structure of a monitoring system that would serve as an
alternative to export controls is developed by Lt. Daniel Green,
"Monitoring Technology Proliferation: An Open Source Methodology
For Generating Proliferation Intelligence", (Master's thesis,




A. Pertaining to Social Factors
1. [Question S-i]
Did the social legacy of the communist period allow for a
relatively smooth transition period?
2. [Question S-2]
Was the demand for a strong social safety net relatively
high?
3. [Question S-31
were the prospects and initial hopes for full integration
with Western Europe relatively high?
B. Pertaining to Political Factors
1. [Question P-i]
Were the structural impediments to the governments ability
to make changes, in the transition period, relatively high?
2. (Question P-2]
Were political interest groups, for example defense industry
workers, influential in the debate over these questions?
3. [Question P-3]
Do the national security objectives dictate the maintenance
of a domestic military industrial base?
C. Pertaining to Economic Factors
1. (Question E-1]
Were the prospects for converting the defense industry
relatively high?
a. (Question E-1.a]
Were defense industry firms already in the process of
production conversion in 1989?
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b. [Question E-l.b]
Did the production possibilities for individual firms allow
for the shifting of resources?
2. (Question E-2]
Was export specialization in military hardware relatively
high?
3. [Question E-3]
Was there a relatively high degree of autonomy in the
defense industry?
a. [Question E-3.a]
Was the level of domestic research prior to 1989 relatively
high?
b. [Question E-3.b]
Were there a relatively large number of defense products of
original design?
c. [Question E-3.c]
Is there a relatively strong move toward cooperation with
Western firms?
4. [Question E-4]
Was the outlook on exports in 1989 relatively good?
a. [Question E-4.a]
Did they have export potential in expanding markets as early
as 1990? (i.e. the Far East of Middle East)
b. (Question E-4.b]
Did the prospects for exports rise over time?
268
44 V r4 %a qv VW MO '4 .-4r m 0






41 V 0 10O r4 (d14e41 6 0 .49 ~0)>1 v I(' .. 44 0j 4Jr J04I 1 Id
-4 -4 (~0 OM 54 i
~I0 ~ a a4 C: CE 4) Hl 0' M 4J
0M-40 > -WW '4.~ CO0
q 1a ý 4 1' +: U M ~ - 0 +.
'4000 0 O0i qw W; O Sn
r-4'-41c c
0J~











-,1 4 4 ai m v4 en. -w-
0; C4 UCJJCO 4 r4 rb
(1) W -IS W
0
m8 0 JIU
4) ( J4 a >4
0 JJ r- Id 01
0 w 9.D- H mw m "t o G
E-rr- k ( w44Oo1w4c,4 o
N UCýC ýC
U nc Dmmc 4c r
ChW0 0O . NC O
CI... ý ýCýC
v n% -c m - 4c
r-r -r -r-0 DO D0




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Mike Lacombe 1
Pol/Mil Officer, U.S. Embassy Prague
Embassy of the United States of America,
Prague, The Czech Republic,
Department of State Pouch Room,
Washington, D.C. 20520
4. Mary Mitchell Tracy 1
First Secretary, U.S. Embassy, Budapest
Embassy of the United States of America,
Budapest, Hungary,
Department of State Pouch Room,
Washington, D.C. 20520





Pol/Mil Officer, U.S. Embassy, Warsaw
Embassy of the United States of America,
Warsaw, Poland,
Department of State Pouch Room,
Washington, D.C. 20520
7. Dr. Jacob Kipp
Center for Foreign Military Studies
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 66028
8. Bruce Messelt
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Regional Security Affairs/European Affairs
OSD/RSA (EUR) Room ID 479, The Pentagon
Washington D.C. 20301
272





DASD Counter Proliferation Policy
Rm. IE 443
Washington D.C. 20301
11. RADM Philip A. Dur
N51, The Pentagon, Room 4E566
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
12. RADM William Center, USN
Assistant Deputy Director for
International Negotiations
The Joint Staff (J-5)
Washington, D.C. 20318-5105
13. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau
Chairman, National Security Affairs(NS/Bn)
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, California 93943
14. Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin
(Code NS/TK)
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, California 93943
15. Dr. Edward J. Laurance
International Policy Studies Division
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Monterey, California 93940









L8. Eric J. von Tersch
Marshall Center/FLTI
Unit 24502
APO AE 09053
274
